Vol. XLII JANUARY, 1910 No. 1

Ecclesiastical Review

Cum Approbatione Superiorum

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PHILADELPHIA, 1305 ARCH STREET

American Ecclesiastical Review

Subscription Price, Three Dollars and Fifty Cents a Year

Subscription Price, Foreign, Fifteen Shillings a Year

R. and T. WASHBOURNE, Ltd., 4 Paternoster Row, London, England
W. P. LINEHAN, 309 Little Collins Street, Melbourne, Australia

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

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THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW

FIFTH SERIES.—VOL. II.—(XLII).—JANUARY, 1910.—NO. 1.

THE NEWEST PHILOSOPHY.[1]

I.

THE heyday of Positivism as the ultimate philosophy of the universe is past. The mere heaping-up of scientific facts no longer satisfies us. Our age begins to feel anew that the true riddles of the Universe are after all not those which the naturalist declared to be such, and that we do not understand the world we live in by simply decomposing it into its physical and psychical elements. We have come to feel that life is not the more worth living by the mere accumulation of scientific facts.

Accordingly, Prof. Munsterberg discovers a new demand for a more comprehensive interpretation of the Universe through the understanding of its ultimate ends and causes. And in presence of the prevailing Pragmatism, many thinking minds are all the more insistent in this demand. According to pragmatic tenets "truth is nothing but that which helps us to fulfil our purposes; beauty is nothing but that which appeals agreeably to our senses; morality is nothing but useful prescriptions which secure comfort for our particular social group; religion is nothing but suggestions which give us hope. In short, our so-called values seem to be merely means of personal gratification, changing from age to age, from people to people, from group to group, from man to man."[2]

[1] *The Eternal Values.* By Hugo Munsterberg. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909.
[2] Introduction, p. 1.

Outspoken or not, that is the philosophical creed of the overwhelming majority of thinking persons to-day. The faithful believer, to be sure, feels that his religion really brings him in contact with something which is absolutely valuable. The moral man who sacrifices his life to follow the call of duty, believes in his deepest heart that the moral deed is of absolute value. The artist who creates a thing of beauty, imagines that his inspiration, too, opens to him a world of absolute value. The social reformer and the statesman, the pioneer and the captain of industry, when they work and fight for the progress of mankind, feel that the human advance is something absolutely valuable. The judge, when he serves on the bench, is filled with the belief that it is absolutely valuable to have justice prevail among men. And in the midst of his scholarly research the seeker for truth is indeed uplifted by the conviction that the full truth is something eternally valuable. But all these convictions and beliefs, these faiths and inspirations must fade away, it seems, as soon as the philosopher begins to examine them. He shows that they are nothing but illusions which pleasantly deceive the striving man, and that in reality no absolute values can exist. Everything is relative; everything is good only for a certain purpose, for a certain time, for a certain social group, for a certain individual. Goodness and beauty and progress and peace and religion and truth have merely pragmatic value. They help us to our personal ends. Our ideals and our lives have no value in themselves. What we dream of eternal values should simply be explained psychologically, like the fancies of a fairy-tale. "Philosophical scepticism and relativism are thus the last word, and their answer harmonizes with a thousand disorganizing tendencies of our time" (p. 2).

Our time, no doubt, welcomes every achievement of the sciences, physical and mental, and does not want to lose any of their conquests; but it begins to reject the superficiality with which such physical and psychological knowledge is raised to the dignity of a philosophy. The sciences themselves begin to urge a critical examination of their foundations, and that means that they ask about the real value of truth. And in practical life, also, everywhere an uncanny feeling prevails that our hasty, busy life has lost its aim; that our efficiency has grown, but that the meaning of our life is in danger; that

everything is scattered, and that we need a new unity. Clearer and clearer shine the values through the world of facts. More and more do we come to realize that the individual man is not the measure of all things.

We need therefore a philosophy which will do justice to all the knowledge and all the inspirations of the twentieth century, and yet avoid the shallowness of modern scepticism. And it is certain, if our time is to have a new philosophy which may give meaning to life and reality, and liberate us from the pseudo-philosophic doubt of our ideals, that the problem of values must stand in the center of the inquiry. The meaning of what is valuable must decide our view of the world. Of course, others may have their full share in the study of what mankind accredits as valuable. Sociologists and psychologists, historians and biologists, economists and theologians may and must approach the problem of values from new and ever new sides. They have to describe and classify and especially to explain the whole manifoldness of that which men value in the world. They have to make us understand how this endless variety of valuations has grown and how it originated. But the fundamental problem remains untouched by all of them; the philosopher alone is called to answer it: how far have we a right to give to our values an objective character? What does it mean to have values? In what sense can they really be valuable? In what sense are they dependent upon our personal standpoint? Is there anything in the world valuable except our personal likings and pleasures, anything worthless but the sources of our personal discomfort? Is there any moral or logical or esthetic or religious sin which we ought to reject without reference to our personal dislikes? (p. 6).

II

Are there any absolute values? The study of physical nature does not reveal to us anything of real absolute value. For, according to Prof. Munsterberg, the physical sciences, as such, have no relation to men, to his everlasting will; they busy themselves merely with descriptions of phenomena, their causes and effects, and the laws that rule them.

To be sure, that does not exclude the fact that their relations to man play an important rôle also in natural science; but

in that case man is himself considered as such a part of nature. For instance, the chemist may consider certain chemical substances in their effects on the human organism, and classify them as food or as drugs or as poison. From that point of view he is justified in calling the food valuable and the poison harmful. But if we take it rigorously, we must say that in the chemical system as such the substances which feed man and the substances which kill man are equally neutral, inasmuch as man is in that system only a chemical substance.

The conception of nature, however, cannot be narrowed down to include only the objects of physical nature. A description of all the objects of experience which we find in the world, must also include the mental contents, the ideas and thoughts, the feelings and emotions. The naturalist may interpret them as products of the organism, and the psychophysicist may consider their occurrence as determined by processes in the brain; but in every case they remain after all something different from the space-filling material object. A sensation is never a nerve-cell and is never mechanical energy; and yet no one denies that such sensations have just as much real existence in the world as the nerves, and that psychology therefore has the right to exist as well as physics. But from a distinctly psychological point of view thoughts and emotions and feelings are as indifferent as the molecules of the universe are indifferent in the system of physics. No atom is more valuable than another atom for the physicist; no feeling is more valuable than another feeling for the psychologist.

But this double series of experiences, this artificial division of nature into physical and mental objects, has been artificially created for scientific purposes; and in my immediate life-experience, unbroken by the division into subject and object, I am always a self for which the things are means and ends, objects of fear and hope, of desire and dislike; they become aims and means of a purposive will; they become values.

We apply the term value to certain human interests, for instance to the things that are desired. But since individuals as such desire and prefer for themselves certain things, because they give them personal satisfaction, we can call these only relative values. And it is impossible to ever deduce an

absolute value from the world of individual desires. There exists no bridge from the individual pleasure and displeasure to the absolute value (p. 28).

If we try to determine absolute values by taking as criterion their desirability or pleasantness, we may arrive at some climax-value, one which I prefer to all others, such as, for instance, the mild peace of a soul without desires, or the completeness of a harmonious active life. Or we may consider as absolutely valuable that which gives the greatest pleasure to the greatest number. But in both cases the standard of evaluation remains personal, because there is no essential difference between those pleasures and the pleasures of those who enjoy a feast; there is only the striving after a larger amount of individual happiness.

At all times the effort has been made to suit the demand for a general philosophy with such individualistic conceptions of value. Modern relativism in all its forms, the American Pragmatism, like the German Empirico-Criticism, glories in its nakedness. Its followers are satisfied in its poverty of thought as soon as it is demonstrated that the tastes and norms are different at various times, and among various peoples, and that even the most important evaluations are frequently changing. They triumphantly show that even in the highest sphere of human valuation everything changes and fluctuates: grotesque contradictions appear in the values of wisdom; that which is true to one generation may be error to the next; alarming contrasts appear in the religious valuations which are so often praised as over-personal, while science shows that in every part they have the stamp of passing civilizations. Chaos is found in the moral valuations of the peoples: the one places as the highest of values what another tribe may condemn as heinous (p. 34). Yet, the truth which I seek in my search for knowledge is an unconditional one, and such truth has lost its meaning as goal for my inquiry as soon as I suppose that the contrary may possibly have the same truth-value. I demand of any truth that its value be independent of the feelings of any majorities and temporal currents, and I subordinate myself to the truth in a way which excludes every relation to individuals, however much they agree in their needs (p. 37). Our moral consciousness affirms immediately that, when we are carried by moral will, we do

not aim at goals whose value is determined by our personal like or dislike. Whoever says "duty", means a value which is not founded on individual pleasures.

The human mind and will, then, are bound by absolute and necessary values: we cannot affirm a judgment in accordance with our caprice; we are bound by the truth, by something of which the opposite is impossible. We cannot act in accordance with every desire: we are bound by duties, the fulfilment of which is independent of any practical effects.

Yet, it would be misunderstanding Prof. Munsterberg, to think that truth and duty are objective realities, that the ultimate ground on which we admit their reality is to be found in the existence of a world independent of the thinking mind. Following in the wake of Kant, he admits that the existence of reality is given to us in judgments, and that their affirmation ultimately has no other reason than the fact that our thought faces a rule, an "ought". Such an "ought", he goes on to explain, does not belong to the existing object, but belongs to the will of the subject as its deepest significance.

Again, this ought or obligation should not be understood as if it meant submission to certain crystallized norms, the following of which, as experience has taught us, leads to certain effects which are most frequent, most typical or most beneficial to us. "Not to be obedient to the obligation means to play a risky game." But such a conception of obligation cannot bring us nearer to our goal, the attainment of absolute values; for that which we ought to do is here again ultimately that which we wish to do in the interest of our pleasure. It would bring us back to an individualistic conception of values. This appears more clearly in the consideration of the ethical values. For the idea of an ought lies before us most clearly and comes first to the mind of everyone in the field of moral obligation.

"Moral obligation" means a manifoldness of possibilities of action. Some are tempting and promise pleasure; but only one action may be demanded by our duty. The obligation faces us here in the choice of our action. We feel that we can do that which our duty forbids; this is evidently the commonplace meaning of obligation, and we should not speak of an obligation at all if there were no opportunity for a choice, no possibility to will that which we ought not to will. But does

this every-day idea of duty hold for the value of truth or beauty or justice? When I want to judge, do I really stand before a decision whether I want the true judgment or its opposite? Is it not rather the case that if I will to judge at all, I never desire to choose anything but the true valuable judgment? Often an error may tempt me, but it can tempt me only as long as I take it for truth. I never want the error as such.

This is equally true in the moral sphere. The moral value is in reality a value which we always will, and which is never fought by any not-willing. The moral value never stands in contradiction to our own true will. Thus in the case of the thief, if there were only the choice between the two actions as such, stealing and not-stealing, he would never hesitate; he would always prefer the valuable honest action. His difficulty is only that, while he wills of the two achievements only the one, the honest one, he wills at the same time the booty, and to get it, he has to steal. Stealing does not become desirable by it, but he must do it if he is to reach a desired pleasurable result.

The starting-point for a moral decision is therefore always that there are in view two possible actions, of which the one is desired only as a means to an effect, while the other is desired "as action itself, and for itself," and therefore without reference to any pleasurable effect. Such action is willed then as an expression of the will, as a realization of the personality. He alone thinks morally who performs the action which he wants to perform, not for any result, but only as an expression of his whole real will. Moral merit belongs only to the one who brings to realization that particular action which he himself really wants as action. Hence moral value comes in question only where a man chooses what he really wants himself, and what expresses his own deepest will; in short, when he is loyal to himself. This self-consistency is the only thing in the world which is morally valuable. And it needs no outside obligation, but is thoroughly based on one's own will. No one cannot will it. Even the criminal, if he is a criminal and not an insane person, values this loyalty, and feels sharply that he has lost in worth when, under the temptation of a pleasure, he realized that action which as action he did not will at all. He has never wavered between the will to moral self-consistency and the will to inconsistency; in

other words, he never did not will the moral. But here too it must be acknowledged that this will is a will which is ultimately overpersonal, necessary, and general. I want to be consistent with myself in my actions and thus want to be myself, not for the purpose of getting a personal pleasure from this consistency, but to satisfy a will in me which has no reference to my individual advantage. It is a will which, however much it concerns my personality, is ultimately not referring to myself, but serving an eternal cause. The ought, the obligation in the accepted sense of the word, loses all meaning when a decision between different desires is excluded, and "the will which finds its satisfaction in truth and beauty and morality and religion" is "a pure will," a will not touched by personal pleasure and displeasure.

The first question therefore is answered: we seek a truth which is meant as something absolutely valuable, something of which the opposite is impossible; we believe in the absolute value of our duty, which in our submission to it we conceive as independent of any practical effects. Every doubt of absolute values ultimately destroys itself; as thought it contradicts itself; as doubt it denies itself; as belief it despairs of itself. Absolute values must therefore be presumed by us as real, must have validity for us as superior to the relativistic values which historical individuals create. They are objects of pure will, and are to be fulfilled not in the interest of individuals, but on account of their absolute value; and their realization gives meaning to individual life.

It is in this sense that "we make the world". That does not mean that we construct it arbitrarily like the game of chess. It does not mean that we shape a world in order that we may have new problems about which to think while the true world goes on not caring about our constructions. It means that out of the experience of every-day life we build up, through philosophical investigation, the only world which has any absolute value at all.

Now another question presents itself: what are these absolute values? According to Prof. Munsterberg, they are already vaguely given in our every-day life; and out of these naive evaluations of life arise the purposive efforts which serve the systematic upbuilding of an absolutely valuable world. Such purposive efforts in the service of absolute values

we call the "labor of civilization". Consequently we have the "life values" and the "culture values"; and the history of knowledge is the great effort to elaborate the spontaneous values and to discover them where naive life would not recognize them.

The field of values is divided into four large compartments, each of which is subdivided again, according to whether they are spontaneously created or scientifically developed: we have thus the "logical values" of "existence" and of "connexion", *i. e.*, scientific connexion by the law of causality. Then we have the "esthetic values" of "unity" and of "beauty". Then the "ethical values" of "development" and of "achievement". Finally the "metaphysical values" of "holiness" or religion and of "absoluteness" or philosophy.

It does not come within the scope of this paper to follow Prof. Munsterberg in his analysis of the "logical" and "esthetic" values. We confine ourselves to the examination of the ethical and metaphysical values.

III.—THE ETHICAL VALUES.

The values of existence complete themselves in the scientific values of connexions; the values of unity demand their elaboration in the values of artistic beauty; so the values of development lead on to the values of achievement.

Morality is "that achievement by which the self-development of the personality, its self-realization, becomes a conscious deliberate task." We have seen already that, according to Prof. Munsterberg, moral obligation, in the common acceptance of the term, does not exist, for the pure will always and everywhere necessarily wills that which is good or valuable, and wills it as action itself and for itself. Whenever the action which we will as such comes in conflict with another action which we do not will as such, but which promises a result desirable for us as individuals, the first action, the one which constitutes the value, must be enforced. This can be done by a perfectly new, perfectly unique valuation: we learn to consider ourselves as an absolute valid value, which realizes itself through our own actions. As long as we merely want things and effects, while the action itself is indifferent to us, we, the acting subject, cannot be in question for our-

selves as valuable or worthless. But as soon as we will ourselves in a particular activity, the fulfilment of such a will, that is, the realization of the valued activity, makes ourselves valuable. And when the self is willed in such a way, a pure, over-personal demand is fulfilled. A man is immoral if he does not perform the action which he wills as action, and therefore does not realize himself; but prefers instead an action which is performed only to secure some desired result.

THE RELIGIOUS VALUES.

We feel that this world is not an inner chaos, and the soul yearns for identity, for unity. Religion is the "life-value" which secures this unity of the various worlds of values, viz., of the logical, esthetic and ethical values. The conscious purposive work toward this end is philosophy.

Religion and philosophy have the same task. Both aim to apprehend the worlds of values as ultimately identical with each other, and to show that the world totality is absolutely valuable. Both religion and philosophy must transcend the life-experience for that end. "But while philosophy reaches this end by conscious purposive efforts of thought, religion reaches it by following the feelings and emotions, without a conscious knowledge of the ultimate purpose."

In the system of values the holy represents the last value, coördinated with the true, the beautiful and the good. The world which is penetrated by the belief in God, no longer knows the opposition between the true connexions, the beauty of happiness and the moral realization. "And this world of God is real, because our conviction, which in the sphere of religion we call belief, realizes it; it is real because it offers us a hold for action, and thus dominates our life."

And how does religion bring about this unity in our world-view? "The lowest tribe in Ceylon indulges in wild nocturnal dances in the depths of the forest. They dance around the large arrow with rhythmical shoutings. No spirit and no god is in the arrow for them, but the arrow is the centre of their existence, the chief means of their preservation. Their whole thinking turns around the arrow. In all important events, in disease and need, the arrow is worshipped. In these midnight dances the arrow irradiates a power which transforms their whole world. The things of nature which oppose man,

his longing for happiness, and all his willing for action are now held together. The arrow helps and will help. The arrow triumphs over the hostile nature. The world now exists to serve their will and desire; all opposites are overcome. From the ecstasies of such savages who have not even reached a real belief in the spirits, up to the solemn worship of a church community, leads a continuous way. The immediate opposites are overcome in purer and purer form, and the highest religion must arise, where the purest union of the purest values is given" (p. 357).

The religious values manifest themselves through belief in creation, revelation and salvation.

With regard to Creation, Prof. Munsterberg thinks that "it remains a question of secondary importance whether God stands above the things or lives in the things themselves, whether there is one God or many" (p. 362). Only one question is always fundamental: whether the same God who orders the things in their natural connexion, at the same time transforms our experiences to beautiful inner agreement and realizes our ideals in the development of the world. The religious feeling must be certain that the world in which the things were in accordance with God's will is a world in which the connexions are controlled by natural law, in which everything unites itself in inner harmony, and in which the good deed brings with it the victory. To believe in God the Creator means therefore to be convinced in our innermost mind that through the agency of an over-experienceable power the opposition between natural order, happiness and morality is removed from the world. And such a creator stands at the central point of every great historical system. Thus for instance, "the original Chinese consciousness found its deepest emotional expression in Laotse, who proclaimed: 'Man comes from the earth and the earth from the sky, and the sky from the Tao, and the Tao comes from itself. The whole created nature with its product is only a manifestation of the Tao. While Tao is a spiritual and immaterial being, it embraces every visible thing, and in it are all beings. A supreme spirit lives in it in an incomprehensible way. This spirit is the highest and most perfect being, because in it there is truth and belief and confidence. From eternity to eternity his glory will not cease, because he combines in itself the true and the

good and the beautiful in the highest degree of perfection.' That is the fundamental tone which sounds through the religions of all nations and all ages. The order of nature, the pure happiness, and the moral striving must somehow be combined in something which is beyond experience, which we cannot understand, but in which we must believe" (p. 364).

As for revelation, "through it the holy spirit pervades the whole fabric of human society as religious doctrine, as cult, as church and clergy, and gives to the life of the community its overpersonal value. If our valuations are to be without contradiction in themselves, it is not sufficient to believe that the world of things is more than mere nature. We must also feel that the claims of men which approach us as historical reality are more than merely demands of historical men. Our social life is not only filled with social strifes, but it is the battle-ground of opposing valuations. The consciousness of our duties and of our rights, the dignity and power of the historical traditions, the over-personal hopes and appreciations, may oppose one another. All these contrasts can and must disappear only when we are certain that the historical connexion ultimately points back to God. We must feel that the demand of men is ultimately sanctioned by God Himself, in whom all order and all bliss and all morality become a unity" (pp. 370-371).

Finally, Prof. Munsterberg's new doctrine of salvation is thus explained: "the soul of every man is filled with contradictions. Through our own power this inner strife of our volitions cannot be subdued, and the soul seeks a beyond in which this inner play comes to silence. And the longing for this absolute value of unity in our soul is the demand for salvation. It arises wherever in the world mankind exists, because the necessary, the moral and the happy never have completely unified themselves in the life-experience of any one."

The thought of life after death is not at all necessarily in the foreground; and on the other hand, just this thought has been often developed without reference to the idea of salvation. In short, "salvation does not result as the effect of a divine action, but by our own aiming towards a higher, purer life. It is therefore an ideal, but this ideal can be believed as real because our conviction maintains it" (p. 383).

IV.

Thus far the exposé of Prof. Munsterberg's philosophy. We have tried to give a faithful, connected outline of it, mostly in his own words. A few critical remarks seem called for.

It cannot be denied that, in sharp contrast with the Naturalism and Pragmatism of the day, this new philosophy brings to the fore the existence of absolute values lying beyond this physical world; values which make for a spiritual and teleological view of the universe. These values, however, as pointed out already, have no objective reality. Prof. Munsterberg is a thoroughgoing follower of Kant and Fichte. We have no room here however to go into further details about that aspect of his system.

We would rather examine briefly some other logical consequences of his system, in as far as it is destined to exercise its influence on thinking minds and on the youth of the University that come under its sway, and for whom it will become a fundamental view of life and the world and a rule of personal conduct.

For that in the mind of the author it is intended to exercise such influence, he confesses himself. Although not writing for the intelligent amateur; although deprecating a tendency often apparent in our time to write philosophy in brilliant epigrams and clever discussions; and although on the other side not pleading for "a philosophical art for art's sake", yet he asserts with a very good reason: "everybody's life is controlled by some kind of philosophy, however haphazard and fragmentary it may be. And every true philosopher aims finally to reach the conviction of the masses. And if serious thought has distilled some truth, it will be distributed quickly enough through thousands of popular channels."

Such being the case, what does Prof. Munsterberg's theory on Ethics and Religion hold in store for us?

Morality, it will be remembered, is one of the values of achievement, one of the values developed by civilization.

If we ask for "a norm of morality," for a criterion by which to distinguish right from wrong, we are confronted by the assertion that conscience is our light and guide, and that we must follow its dictates. If we ask further why we should follow the dictates of our conscience, whether because there

is an objective difference between right and wrong, which difference we apprehend in our judgment; or whether it is merely a subjective feeling, something akin to the "moral sense" of a certain school, we receive no further enlightenment. This last alternative, however, seems to chime in best with the system of which Prof. Munsterberg is the protagonist. At any rate it is made perfectly clear that the ultimate foundation of right and wrong is to be sought in man, and not in God.

As for "moral obligation," after having reduced it to a mere norm, summarizing the good or evil effects of a generally followed line of conduct, that is binding only on the individual, he concludes that there is strictly speaking but one moral obligation, consisting in this "categoric imperative": realize the action which you will on its own account, as action. "There exists no moral law: you ought not to lie, you ought not to steal, you ought not to kill. Whether your speaking the truth is that kind of action which you really will as action of your personality, depends on the height of your development. But if you will this action, you ought to perform it, and you ought not to be tempted by pleasure or displeasure to actions which you do not at all will as actions. Self-faithfulness, self-loyalty is accordingly the only moral obligation" (p. 342).

And the "sanction of this moral obligation" is the complete harmonious self-development of nature, in accordance with the over-personal demands of reason. It is hard, nay impossible to admit, that a moral obligation, the last foundation and the ultimate sanction of which are found in man himself, can be really binding on him, as all agree the moral law is binding. Yet Prof. Munsterberg insists: "the only thing which is valuable in actions, namely the self-consistency, needs no outside obligation, but is thoroughly based on the own will" (p. 64).

But it is plain that when he further explains that a criminal never wavers between the will to moral self-consistency and the will to inconsistency; that he never does not will the consistency, he makes an inadmissible confusion between moral judgment and moral action. The criminal, if he is a criminal and not an idiot, always knows, perceives, apprehends the distinction between right and wrong. But by an act of his free will he deliberately chooses the wrong. The "pure will" is a psychological fiction.

And here lies the fundamental weakness of Prof. Munsterberg's elaborate moral synthesis: unless there be an outside obligation which the perverted human will cannot break; unless especially there be an outside sanction, a reward for those who keep and a punishment for those who break the moral law, no morality can hold out against the assaults of human passion. History is there to prove this contention, and every-day life around us forces it upon the most unwilling of men.

The moral law, such as we have it at present, is the outcome of centuries of "Christian" civilization, whose influence all of us undergo unwittingly, and whose ideals even the most inveterate enemies of Christianity cannot altogether put aside. But if with Prof. Munsterberg we admit that morality is only the product of civilization, of the natural evolution of the human mind, what guarantee is there that such a morality is of more than relative value; that a higher degree of culture is not destined to change its laws and ideals? Does his assumption not allow of the wildest speculations in the field of morality, speculations against which Prof. Munsterberg would protest in vain?

In the last analysis his ethics are reduced to the code of the *morale laïque;* they bring the world back to pagan morality. Unless ethics be ultimately founded on God and religious dogma; unless they admit an objective distinction between right and wrong, a moral obligation independent of man and a moral sanction that it is beyond man's power to escape or destroy, they can never contribute to the advancement of the human race. Such a morality may indeed be sufficient to keep a small intellectual elite within the bounds of reason and common decency; but it can never become a light to guide the masses.

A somewhat identical criticism must be made of Prof. Munsterberg's system of religious values.

He is careful indeed to assert that religion and philosophy, "each in its own sphere, are to coördinate the disjointed values into a harmonious whole." But this assertion notwithstanding, religion becomes subordinated to philosophy; philosophy ends by rationalizing religion, and bringing it down to its own limited understanding of things. As a consequence, the definition of the religion Prof. Munsterberg advocates is

and must be so broad that "inside its boundaries there is room for Buddhism and the cult of the Greeks, and Christianity and Islam" (p. 388).

In other words, all religions as such stand on the same level, since their value does not consist in the truth of their tenets, but in their power to unify the contradictory values that surround us on all sides. We can therefore also have peace with all the opposing views that have been advanced in the name of Christianity. "Since the days of the first Christian communities all the particular views have passed through incessant changes. The order of nature is very unequally conceived if sometimes every change in the world is understood as always a new action of the Creator and at other times there is a sure belief that God has given to nature the laws for all time. Still more, morality is very unequally conceived. Sometimes it is a presupposition that every human soul has the free power to decide between good and bad; at other times it has been a fixed belief that God had decided beforehand who is to have the power for good and bad; at other times it has been a fixed belief that God has decided beforehand who is to have the power for good and who may victoriously carry through the struggle. And not less different is the way in which happiness has been conceived, if it is sometimes promised for the resurrection at the last day, and sometimes sought in the trustful belief itself in the heart of the fighter in the hour of the fight. But in the fundamental demand, these contradictions do not change anything" (p. 368).

Christianity itself, although Prof. Munsterberg grants it to be a superior form of civilization, when looked upon in the light of the ultimate purpose it is destined to fulfil, stands no higher than the religion of the South Sea Islander or the savage Congolese: all religions are equally supernatural inasmuch as they are considered thus by their adherents; all are equally true for those who believe in them.

What such doctrines, following logically from Prof. Munsterberg's system, and scrupulously consistent with it, must lead to, we need not point out. Suffice it to note in conclusion that his philosophical doctrine of the absolute values leads to a dreary pantheism: "Religion is philosophy for the I who maintains its self-hood, also in the face of the all; philosophy

is religion for the I which in its own deed finally grasps the all, and through the all gives up the self-hood" (p. 413).

We do not pretend that Prof. Munsterberg is a deliberate and inveterate foe of Christian morality and religion, and is seeking for cheap notoriety in propounding his doctrine. He is no doubt perfectly sincere in his convictions, and never does he indulge in vulgar attacks on what we hold in sacred reverence. But the danger is all the greater on that score.

In the beginning of this article we quoted Prof. Munsterberg as saying that we need a philosophy that will do justice to all the aspirations of the twentieth century, and yet avoid the shallowness of modern scepticism; that in such a philosophy the problem of values must stand in the center of the inquiry; that the meaning of what is valuable must decide our view of the world. True enough; but when the values have been inverted, when the higher values of revelation are made subservient to the fluctuating values of human reason, our view of the world becomes decidedly faulty. "Next to religion, rigid philosophical systems which the man in the street hardly understood in their original form, have been the most powerful factors in the history of the last two thousand years; they have made revolutions and they have brought reforms," Prof. Munsterberg tells us very rightly. Yet the adoption of his principles would speedily bring the world back to the "splendid paganism" of Greece and Rome, to which, indeed outside of the Catholic Church, it is speedily drifting. In confirmation of this view, we have Prof. Munsterberg's own testimony. Writing in *The Atlantic Monthly* for October, he again outlines his new philosophy, and proceeds: "to give it at once a historical background, we have only to look . . . to the underlying world-views of the German nation . . . during the eighteenth century, the period of Schiller and Goethe, of Kant and Fichte and Hegel. . . . In such a philosophy the moral deed is not valuable because it adds to the pleasure of the neighbor, but because it is eternally good; the work of art is valuable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it realizes the ideal of beauty; the world of the market is valuable, not because it satisfies individual needs, but because it means a realization of the ideal of progress; the life of the state is valuable, not because it secures the greatest happiness of its members, but because it is a realiza-

tion of the ideals of right and as such of eternal value; and knowledge too is valuable, not because it is a serviceable tool for the pleasures of individuals, but because it is a fulfillment of the ideal of truth" (pp. 458-459). It is rather remarkable that religion, as a life-shaping force and factor, should be left out of this enumeration; although from a historical standpoint our surprise is lessened when we remember that atheism was predominant in the life of the eighteenth century, and that its greatest thinkers were religion's sworn antagonists.

It is not hard to tell what the influence of such a system of philosophy must be on immature minds that imbibe it from the master's lips. And the study of this newest philosophy certainly gives point to the contentions of those who never cease repeating that many of our Universities are "blasting at the Rock of Ages." [3]

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EXTREME UNCTION.

"It is also declared that this unction is to be applied to the sick, especially those who are so dangerously ill as to seem to be about to depart this life; whence also it is called the sacrament of the departing. And if the sick should recover after having received this unction, they may again get the succor of this sacrament, when they fall into another like danger of death."—Council of Trent, Sess. 14, On the Sacrament of Extreme Unction. Chap. 3.

THIS is the doctrine of the Church as defined at Trent. The words embody a definition, as is plain on the face of them, and from the intention expressed in the preamble: "It hath also seemed good to the Holy Synod to subjoin to the preceding doctrine on Penance the following on the sacrament of Extreme Unction." We have here, therefore, a law and norm for all time, to which the teaching of theologians

[3] Writing in *The Harvard Theological Review* for October, Prof. Josiah Royce expresses much the same views as Prof. Munsterberg: "The doctrine of the incarnation is the doctrine which teaches that the world-will desires our unity with the universal purpose, that God will be born in us and through our consent, that the whole meaning of our life is that it shall transmute transient and temporal values into eternal meanings. Humanity becomes conscious God incarnate only in so far as humanity looks godward; that is in the direction of the whole unity of the rational spiritual life."

and the practice of priests in the administration of this sacrament should conform.

The Council touches here on two points, the subject or recipient of the sacrament, and the iteration of it. As regards the former of the two, it is declared that this unction is to be applied to the sick, especially to those who are so dangerously ill as to seem to be on the point of death—"in exitu vitae constituti." The first part of the statement, taken by itself, might be construed to mean that the sacrament may be given to any sick person, even though not in danger of death. We have it on the authority of Simeon, Archbishop of Thessalonica in the 15th century, that this was the practice of the Orthodox Greek Church.[1] The tradition of the Latin Church is clean against this, and the context shows that such was not the meaning the Council intended to convey. For in the preamble "it declares and teaches that our most gracious Redeemer, who would have His servants at all times provided with salutary remedies against all the assaults of all their enemies, while in the other sacraments He prepared the greatest aids whereby Christians may preserve themselves whole during life from the more grievous spiritual evils, did, by the sacrament of extreme unction, guard the close of life as with a most firm defense"; also, as we see, in the more immediate context, Extreme Unction is spoken of by the Council as "the sacrament of the departing". When therefore it declares that this unction is to be applied to the sick, especially those who are so dangerously ill as to seem to be on the point of quitting this life, it does but signify that the sacrament may be administered even when there is no immediate danger of death, or when the sickness is such that a man, though likely to die, has still some chance of recovery.

Touching the iteration of the sacrament the teaching of the Council is precise. "If the sick recover after having received this unction, they may again be anointed when they fall into a like danger of death." The word translated "recover" is "convaluerint" from "convalescere," which properly means to begin to be strong again—to get better rather

[1] He inveighs against the Latins who "say it is not to be given to the sick but to the dying," and affirms that if one were to fall into "a sickness of the soul only" one should call in the priests of the Church, presumably to administer extreme unction. P. G. Tom. CLV, cols. 515-518.

than to get well or be completely restored to health. As often, therefore, as the sick person rallies and is judged to be on the road to recovery, then suffers a relapse and is again considered to be in danger, he may again be anointed, according to the teaching of the Council. Mark the word "may", for the Council does not say that he should, but that he may—"iterum hujus sacramenti subsidio juvari poterunt." Observe also that the Council does not lay down a time-limit; it is not at all a question of time, but a question of growing better and then again getting worse—of being pronounced out of danger and then falling back into a like danger again. A person may be anointed again even after a few days, if in the meantime he has so far recovered as to be pronounced out of danger and afterwards has a relapse. On the other hand, suppose a person has been anointed and lingers on for two or three months, or even longer, without getting better, sinking slowly all the time, he is not again to be anointed. Such I take to be a plain and necessary inference from the teaching of the Council. The same may be gathered also from the nature of the sacrament and from its effects.

Extreme Unction, as the Council of Trent declares and as the name itself implies, is the sacrament that prepares the Christian for his passage out of this world into the next. And because a man passes out of this world but once, this sacrament, of itself and in the nature of things, should be given but once. As a matter of fact, however, men cannot tell in many cases whether death is going to ensue from an illness or not. Hence the sacrament is often given when death does not follow, or at any rate does not follow without convalescence and subsequent relapse. But once a person dangerously ill has been anointed, he is not to be anointed a second time in the same sickness unless he becomes convalescent, that is, unless he at least gets so much better as to appear to be out of danger. The reason is that whenever the sacrament is both validly and fruitfully administered it at once begets its proper effects, which are, in general, to prepare a person for his passage out of this world. Now these effects endure until death, if death really is to follow from the sickness without convalescence. If they did not endure, then a person who lies dangerously ill should be anointed over again at least once

a day as long as the danger lasts. Since, therefore, they do endure, to repeat the sacrament in such a case is to expose it to the manifest risk of being null and void, which would be sacrilege.

Again, the primary end of this sacrament is the spiritual healing of the soul with a view to its entrance into glory. A secondary end is the healing of the body, when God sees this to be for the good of the soul. Now the healing of the body, as being but a secondary end, would not by itself warrant the repetition of the sacrament in the same sickness. In any case, since the sacrament does not operate naturally for the healing of the body, after the manner of corporal medicine, but supernaturally, in such a way that its efficacy depends simply and wholly on the will of God, one administration of it is as effectual in this point of view as half a dozen. But what of the primary end? Would not this warrant the repetition of the sacrament in the same sickness even when there is no convalescence? It does not appear that it would, for the reason that the sacrament, being a divine ordinance, does its work effectually, given the proper dispositions in the recipient—and we are assuming the proper dispositions. It takes away sin, if sin there be; it takes away the remains of sin; it soothes the soul and strengthens it for the last struggle. And all this, as I have said, it does effectually, so that nothing more remains to be done if the sickness is really unto death and the sick person is going to face the last struggle at the end of it without convalescence. This will become clearer if we consider these effects in detail.

The taking away of sin is not itself the proper effect of this sacrament. St. James says: "If he be in sins they shall be forgiven him." The Apostle would not have made his statement conditional if the remission of sin were the proper effect of the sacrament, for no man is to be deemed so perfect as to be wholly free from sin. To remit sin is the proper effect of the sacrament of penance, and what is the proper effect of one sacrament cannot be the proper effect of another. Moreover, all are agreed that Extreme Unction is primarily a sacrament of the living. Hence we understand St. James to mean that if a person is not able, for some reason or other, to confess any grievous sins that may be on his conscience, the

sacrament of Extreme Unction will take them away, provided of course, he has at least attrition for them. If, then, one should fall into sin after having been anointed, the proper remedy is the sacrament of Penance, not Extreme Unction.

The other effects are the taking away of the remains of sin, and the healing and strengthening of the soul. By the remains of sin some have understood the temporal punishment due to sin—an unlikely opinion, for the Council of Trent declares that extreme unction "wipes out the remains of sin—peccati reliquias abstergit," and if the temporal punishment were thus wiped out there would be no purgatory for any one who devoutly receives this sacrament. This does not mean that the sacrament may not lessen the temporal punishment, but only that the latter is not to be identified with what is known as "the remains of sin". By this then, we rightly understand the weakness or infirmity of the soul which is consequent on sin. And so these two effects coalesce into one, for the same unction of grace which heals the infirmity of the soul also comforts and strengthens it for the final struggle.

But may not this proper effect of the sacrament, which is the spiritual healing of the soul, be increased by repetition, as in the case of Penance and Holy Communion and so the anointing of the sick over and over again in the same sickness be warranted, even when there is no sign of convalescence? There is no parity between this sacrament and the other two. Holy Communion is the food of the soul, and may be given daily. It might even be given oftener, validly though not lawfully. Penance may be given both validly and lawfully as often as there is matter for absolution. And because sins already confessed are matter for absolution, inasmuch as the acts of the penitent are the matter of this sacrament and one may confess over again sins already confessed, be sorry for them, and be willing to do penance for them if need be, therefore the sacrament of Penance may, both validly and lawfully, be repeated over and over again as often as the penitent presents himself for confession.

On the other hand, it is quite certain that Extreme Unction cannot lawfully be given more than once in the same sickness, except in case of convalescence and relapse. So much is clearly implied by the Council of Trent and expressly affirmed

in the Roman Ritual. But would not the repetition of it be at least valid? There does not seem to be any good reason for affirming that it would. In the first place, the very fact that the repetition of it is not lawful goes to show that it would not be valid. Why forbid its being administered again and again if the sacramental effect were increased and added grace were given every time? Moreover, this sacrament is the spiritual medicine of the sick man, and has for its proper effect the spiritual healing of the soul. Now, as a sacrament, as God's own medicine, it does its work effectually, it does heal the soul, and therefore to repeat it would be as void of effect and as senseless as the giving of medicine to a well man, unless there be a recrudescence of the evil and a new crisis to be met. Which is to say, that if a sick person is prepared by the anointing with oil to meet death, he is prepared, and it is absurd to speak of his being further prepared, unless he gets better, then gets worse, and is face to face with death once more. In this case it is a new danger, and he may properly be prepared anew to meet it.

Against this may be urged the practice existing in certain parts of the West, from the ninth to the twelfth century, of repeating the unction seven days, or even while the sickness lasted.[2] But this practice was never widespread, and was never recognized or sanctioned by the Church. Such a rubric is found, indeed, in the rituals of local Churches, but no writer of the time, so far at least as I have been able to find, ever as much as mentions the practice. On the contrary, several writers of that period, who treat of Extreme Unction, either affirm the existence of the very opposite practice, or discuss the repetition of the sacrament in such a way as to imply that the practice in question was unknown to them. Thus Bandinus, in the 12th century, tells us that, "this unction, according to the various use of the Churches, is repeated, or given only once."[3] So also Abelard testifies to the diversity of use in this matter in divers Churches—"De iteratione secundum diversas consuetudines fiat Ecclesiarum."[4]

In the early part of the 12th century, Godfried, Abbot of Vendôme and St. Yves, Bishop of Chartres, both declare

[2] Cf. Kern, De Sacram. Extr. Unct. Tract. Dogm., pp. 338 ff., also Benedict XIV, De Synod. Dioec. lib. 7, cap. 8, n. 4.

[3] P. L. Tom. CXCII, col. 1102.

[4] Ib., Tom. CLXXVIII, col. 1745.

against the iteration of the sacrament under any circumstances.[5] Hugo of St. Victor says that "It is the practice in some Churches to repeat this sacrament," and he argues that this may be done.[6] In like manner the Master of the Sentences says: "Some inquire whether this sacrament can be repeated, since baptism and certain other sacraments, once received, are not repeated," and he, too, maintains that it may.[7] In the 9th century, we have, in the "Excerpta e Pontificali S. Prudentii," a detailed account of the way Extreme Unction was administered, in which there is no trace of the practice of repeating the unction.[8] Once more, some writers maintained that it could be repeated only after three years, others after one year.[9] All this serves to show that the practice was not widespread and had not the sanction of the Church. Had it been widespread, had it had the sanction of the Church, it would never have been a moot point whether the sacrament could be repeated. For, to the question whether Extreme Unction could be given a second time, the obvious answer of such writers as Peter Lombard and Hugo of St. Victor would have been that it was a practice sanctioned by the Church to repeat the unction over and over again in the same sickness.

Simeon, of Thessalonica, already cited, testifies that, in the Greek Orthodox Church it was in the 15th century "an ancient custom" to call in several priests, seven or at least three, each of whom in turn anointed the sick person.[10] This custom he considers to have been founded on the words of St. James, and intimates that one priest alone is not competent to administer the sacrament: "Let him call in [says St. James] the priests of the Church (and not one priest), and let them pray over him, anointing with oil." Whether this custom was ancient in the sense that it could be traced, in the East, to the early centuries, I am unable to say. In any case, the idea that one priest alone cannot administer Extreme Unction seems

[5] Ib., Tom. CLVII, col. 83.

[6] Ib., Tom. CLXXVI, col. 154.

[7] Tom. CXCII, cols. 899, 900.

[8] Tom. CXV, cols. 1442, 1444.

[9] De Synod. Dioec. lib. 8, cap. 8, n. 3.

[10] Loc. cit. A similar custom of old existed in the West, and there can be no doubt as to the validity of such administration.

to have had its origin in a mistaken, because too rigidly literal, interpretation of the words of St. James. Besides, the seven-fold anointing, or three-fold, as the case may have been, was not regarded as a seven-fold, or three-fold, repetition of the sacrament, for the objection against one priest administering Extreme Unction is grounded on the text of St. James, who seems to say that several priests are required—not to repeat the unction, for this one priest could do—but to administer the sacrament.

It is plain that in the middle age, between the eighth century and the twelfth, there was great diversity of teaching and practice regarding the repetition of Extreme Unction, some maintaining that it should not at all be repeated, others that it might, while others still appeared to think that it was to be repeated, or at any rate might be repeated, daily in the same sickness. The doctrine regarding this point was then in course of development. Those who would have us go back of the Council of Trent, by the path of literary and historical research, for fuller light upon it, permit themselves to forget this.

Among the writers who helped in the following century to free the question from doubt, and bring it to a stage ripe for definition, St. Thomas of Aquin holds a foremost place. His treatment of it is so lucid and so thorough that no writer who has come after him can be said to have bettered it. "In the case of this sacrament," he writes, "regard must be had not only to the sickness but to its state, for it is not to be given except to sick persons who are, as far as men can judge, drawing near to death. Now there are certain kinds of sickness that are not chronic, and if in these this sacrament is given, when the person reaches the stage in which he is in danger of death he does not get over it unless he is cured, and so he is not to be anointed again. But if he suffers a relapse, it will be another [attack of the] sickness, and he may again be anointed. There are, on the other hand, certain chronic diseases, such as consumption and dropsy, and in these the sacrament is not to be administered until the sickness verges to the point where there is real danger of death. If the person escapes the danger, and falls again into a like danger from the same disease, he may again be anointed, because, though not abso-

lutely another illness, it is another crisis of the same." [11] For such light on this and kindred points we shall look in vain to the Schismatical Churches of the East during the same or any later period. With their going into schism, the light seems to have gone out from them. Development of doctrine was stayed; tradition handed on truth and error alike. In all this time there is not heard among them a magisterial voice defining what the truth is and what is error. They are cut off, though now by no fault of their own, from those to whom is the divine promise, " Lo! I am with you always even to the end of the world." They must bear the curse of stationariness and sterility in consequence. To advance is to run the risk of straying from the way and losing what they have so long held fast.

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THOMAS AQUINAS AS PREACHER.

THE thirteenth was a century of stupendous intellectual activity. It may even be doubted whether the world has seen another in which the desire for learning rose to so high a pitch. History must ever look on it as an age of schools, students, and universities. Sacred eloquence or effective preaching was one of the sciences that attained to a high degree of perfection. It was, furthermore, an era of combat, intellectual as well as political, against the violence and errors of rising heresies. The very force of circumstances, the very nature of the stirring times, caused and demanded earnest men to speak with vigor and force against prevailing and threatening evils. No other century can boast of greater gifts of thought, of speech, of stronger or deeper faith or love of God and religion. An age it was that called for the best efforts of strenuous and effective preaching. The great religious revival called into existence by the newly-founded religious orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis contributed much to bring the noble science and art of preaching

[11] Additiones ad Tertiam Partem, q. 33, a. 2. For the rest, the Council took almost word for word from St. Thomas its statement about the repetition of the sacrament. Cf. Contra Gentes, lib. 4, c. 73.

to a high degree of perfection. The days of Basil and Gregory, of Chrysostom and Augustine, seemed to have returned; the celebrated preachers of the Crusades, with the famous monk of Clairvaux at their head, appeared to live again in their worthy successors, the sons of the gentle and gentlemanly Guzman and the humble man of Assisi. The new orders, as they were then called, were born in the early glow and glory of Bernard's memory; and they rekindled it anew into full-blown blaze.

We take it for granted that the reader will kindly overlook the bit of honest pride and pardonable warmth with which we here cite unquestioned history in saying that the Dominicans were the great preachers of the thirteenth century. Faithfully adhering to the plan of their saintly and illustrious Founder, they energetically followed the special spirit and calling of their Order, as interpreted by its first head. Preaching the Word of God with the thoroughness of learning, and the fire of zeal and eloquence, was the prime object and purpose of their institute. We may judge of the manner in which they acquitted themselves in their task by the results which history tells us in unmistakable terms they achieved. The black *cappa* over the white habit to this day suggests the sermon. Thomas Aquinas was in the forefront of the battle. He was a leader in this band of leaders.

The university world should attract attention by its great preachers. It did in the age with which we are dealing. Much moral corruption prevailed then, as it has prevailed in all times. But withal it was an era of strong faith. There was need of good, strong preaching; and it exerted a wholesome influence over the students of the universities, as well as over the rest of the world. The success of Bernard proves this; so does the success of Blessed Jordan, the General of the Dominicans, who peopled his numerous monasteries with university men. Albert the Great and his illustrious disciple, Thomas Aquinas, exerted a similar influence. The Dominicans of the thirteenth century introduced a strongly intellectual element into their sermons. The scriptures and the Fathers were given the most important place, somewhat at the expense of rhetoric. They spoke to the people, instructing them in true Catholic doctrine, and waging war against

the evils of the day. Their style was earnest, simple and natural. Thomas followed this same method, which was classic among the brethren in his day.

We may form some conception of the great schoolman as a preacher, of his sermons and the manner of their delivery, from the history of their influence over his audiences, from his short sermon-schemata, and from the rules for the guidance of preachers which he lays down in more than one place in his voluminous writings—notably in his commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, in his work *Contra Impugnantes Religionem,* and in the *Responsio ad Lectorem Bisuntinum de sex Articulis.*

The Saint's earliest biographers are unanimous in telling us that he was a preacher of great power and acceptance; that, whenever and wherever he preached, the people gathered in crowds eager to hear the truth of salvation spoken by the holy man of God. They received his words, as Tocco, a contemporary biographer, informs us, "as coming from the Holy Ghost." From the same source we learn that on Good Friday, during a Lenten course of sermons he preached, at the request of Urban IV, in the Basilica of St. Peter, Rome, speaking on the Passion of our Lord, he brought the sufferings of our Blessed Saviour so vividly before his hearers, and dwelt so touchingly on His compassion, mercy, love, goodness toward man, that every one in the vast church burst into lamentation. It was almost impossible, for some time, for him to continue his discourse. Then on the Easter Sunday following, his sermon on the Resurrection infused such hope, joy, and happiness into the hearts of his audience that it was with difficulty they were prevented from breaking out into applause.

The Angelic Doctor's reputation was of itself sufficient to draw immense crowds to hear him. And if we are to credit the description his early biographers give of him—a description that has every characteristic of true history—his physical appearance was a sermon in itself. We speak of this, because in forming an estimate of a preacher we must not commit the error of separating the man from his work. The spoken discourse, in no small measure, has its life in that of the man who speaks it. The Saint's tall and commanding figure, his

countenance, pale from fasting and mortification, his calm self-possession, his strong and persuasive voice, his extraordinary learning and gifts, his nobility of birth and character, his personal magnetism, and withal his great humility, his gentle, unassuming amiability, and known sanctity,—all these must have made a deep and lasting impression on those who heard him. The eloquent speaker, the learned man, the zealous priest of God, the saint and apostle were all combined in the preacher before them. He was a man, too, whose deeds and life spoke no less tellingly than his tongue. Like St. Paul, whose writings he knew and loved so well, the Angel of the Schools belonged wholly to Christ; like Paul again, he "became all things to all men in order to gain all to Christ," "bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ." His charity knew no bounds, embracing all in his unbounded love of the Master. His look, his manner, his word and action, clearly bespoke his one intent and purpose to draw to God.

Paris, Cologne, Rome, Viterbo, Orvieto, Fondi, Perugia, Bologna, Naples, every city, in short, where he taught, had the good fortune to witness the Angelic Doctor's triumphs as a preacher; for it seems to have been his custom to preach to both people and students wherever he was located. Naples, however, appears to have been the city especially favored with his presence; and justly so, as she may rightfully claim him as her most illustrious son. For ten years, we are told, he occupied the pulpit there, drawing the eyes of the world upon him as one of its foremost preachers. There he discoursed one whole Lent on the words of the Angelic Salutation: *Ave Maria, gratia plena, Dominus tecum;* and Tocco tells us that throughout this course of sermons he spoke as one inspired. As the beautiful thoughts flowed forth in crystal streams from his lips, "he stood with eyes and head uplifted as if lost in vision". All the city came to the great Dominican church to hear him. It is then no matter for surprise that "his word was received as coming from the Holy Ghost", or that "the fruits of his preaching were scarcely less than those of his writings".

It is needless to say that Aquinas never descended to empty declamation; never needed to conceal poverty of thought

under the cover of pompous and showy language; never sought to make ostentatious display of the figures and devices of rhetoric; never affected the wit, instead of speaking as an apostle and man of God; never aimed at gaining a name rather than souls, or confounding rather than instructing and converting his hearers. There was nothing of the sensational in him. The preëminent schoolman gave out to the people, not studied and high-flown phraseology, but the simple, fascinating, life-giving Word of God; and he did it with a guileless simplicity, charm, and directness that won hearts. His aim was to please, to draw, to gain with the charm of the divine truth which he sought to put before the people in its full spiritual beauty. No preacher of the Gospel ever realized more keenly than did our Saint that his task was not one of marshaling words, of making phrases, or of rounding periods, but that of the grave, serious, instructive, and persuasive discourse.

Yet, so we are told, "he spoke with much animation, and great variety of manner;" his sermons were really eloquent. He himself insists on the necessity of eloquence and learning on the part of those who preach, that they may be able to present the Word of God in a way that will win souls. But the eloquence of which he speaks is that which befits so sacred a place as the Christian pulpit, not the vain display which is sometimes made. Beauty of diction he loved, but that of lucid exposition of Catholic doctrine more. Following the golden rule of sacred oratory, Thomas spoke from the fulness of his heart, and touched the hearts of those who heard him. He felt what he said, and made his audience feel it too.

It is indeed profoundly to be regretted that probably not one of St. Thomas's sermons is extant to-day as it was spoken. Especially is it a pity that we have not the complete discourse on the Blessed Sacrament, which history tells us he preached at the command of Urban IV, in the presence of that pontiff and his cardinals. Thomas's devotion to the august Sacrament of the Altar was boundless. It was under the influence of this consuming love for the Holy Eucharist that he composed, at the request of the same pontiff, the most exquisite of our divine offices—that of Corpus Christi. One cannot help thinking that the Angelic Doctor made the supreme

effort of his life in the composition and delivery of this sermon on the subject of his heart's fondest devotion. The conviction that this was his masterpiece forces itself upon us.

The sense of this loss grows with the consideration of the exquisite and sublime poetry in the hymns of the Mass and office of Corpus Christi. Here the Saint gives us the happiest expression of the deepest theology in poetry of the highest order. Never has the poet reasoned so like the philosopher and theologian, or the philosopher and theologian written so like the poet, as has the Angel of the Schools in these compositions. Nowhere else has the profoundest theological thought so aptly clothed itself at once in the garb of clear, clean-cut philosophic language, and in the form and color, the charm and warmth of rhythmic measure.

That we have none of the Saint's sermons as they were delivered by him, is most likely because he did not write them out fully before preaching. To the writer it seems almost certain that the famous schoolman, after the manner of many great preachers of all ages, confined his written preparation to a mere plan or skeleton of what he intended to say. Unfortunately, these sermon-outlines are generally preserved in a rather imperfect shape. In many instances, as we have them, they form nothing more than a naked sketch, giving simply the substance or groundwork of the discourse, as it was reported by some pupil or listener. In truth, we have now no means of ascertaining whether those discourses of which we have only the reports or notes of hearers, were ever written in any manner by Thomas himself. Tocco tells us that he preached not only in Latin, but also in his native tongue, Italian; but it seems more than probable that he likewise preached in French. Instead, however, of the original French or Italian in which they were spoken to the people, even this class of his sermons have survived only in a Latin garb.

And here the reader's attention may be called to a distinction we should make in the sermons of St. Thomas. Some of them were for the faithful generally; some again for university students; and yet others for the brethren of his Order, as was a custom in the early days. The first were always, or almost always, given, it would seem, in the language of his

audience; the second sometimes in their native language, sometimes in the Latin. Those to his brethren, it appears certain, were all spoken in Latin; and we take it for granted that these at least we have in the original language, though not in the original form, in which they were delivered.

Despite the grave defect of the imperfect dress in which they have come down to us, the greater number of these outline discourses of the Angelic Doctor's—at least those that are certainly his—are rich in their possibility of moral and doctrinal development. Although at first sight they are of no great importance, on further study they are seen to fairly bristle with deep, vigorous, condensed thought; to abound in a wealth of truth, Scriptural, doctrinal, moral, spiritual, aptly brought together. Bareille [1] remarks that these notes or outlines of St. Thomas may, in a sense, be likened to the recapitulations that Bossuet was accustomed to make of his discourse just before descending from the pulpit. Vaughan,[2] speaking in a similar strain, says that our Saint in his drafts of sermons "divides the meaning of his text into three of four grand divisions; and each of these he subdivides into three of four portions. These divisions are expressed with exceeding brevity, and yet with so good a choice of words that the whole becomes evident at a glance. To each division is attached a text to the point from Holy Scripture, with the proper reference. The skeleton is so well organized that, when once fixed in the mind, there is no difficulty in diversifying each portion into one very clear and consecutive discourse."

The sermon-plans of the noted schoolman that have been preserved to posterity are thus an invaluable index to his method, giving us, as they do, a rather clear insight into the manner in which he treated his subject. They, furthermore, plainly show that even in the pulpit St. Thomas never ceased to be the theologian; for they literaly abound in theological thought. Still his sermons did not, for this reason, suffer either in merit or efficacy. Because of his peculiar genius it was rather a quality that lent them an additional charm; certainly it gave them a thoroughness that otherwise had nec-

[1] *Histoire de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Chap. XV, p. 163.
[2] *Life and Labors of St. Thomas of Aquin*, Vol. I, p. 446.

essarily been wanting. He preached, too, according to the requirements of the times—Thomas himself was a product of the times. It was an age when men thought, and thought deeply, despite all that has been said to the contrary. It was an age both of great universities and of strong faith; and the world generally was given to no superficial study of philosophy and theology. At the pulpit and at the professor's chair alike it sought instruction and enlightenment rather than an outpouring of merely sonorous and pleasing words. The first Dominicans had introduced into their sermons a strongly intellectual element. Thomas, seeing that this system was best suited to the day, followed in their footsteps, and developed their method along sane lines.

In the learned Friar Preacher's short or minor treatises on theological subjects, known as his *Opuscula Theologica,* we find some two hundred and twenty-five of these skeleton discourses. The greater number of them are on the Epistles and Gospels of the Sundays of the Christian year; many are for the different feasts as they existed in his day, and others are panegyrics of saints. While several of these are of doubtful authorship, most of them are certainly his work; and the evidence in favor of the others has been deemed sufficiently strong to justify their incorporation in the Parma and other splendid later editions of his writings. Nor does this collection, significant as it is, represent all the Saint's apostolical activity. There are various other sermons not found in this list that are admittedly his. Some certainly from his pen have been discovered at a comparatively recent date in the different libraries of Europe; a circumstance which gives strong hope that others still will some day be brought to light. Uccelli and the learned Father Da Fanna have made important finds of this kind.

Again, the *Opuscula* on the Lord's Prayer, the Angelic Salutation, the Creed, and the Sacraments are in reality the groundwork of discourses and conferences pronounced before the brethren of his Order. The one on the Angelic Salutation is one of the most beautiful and striking of St. Thomas's short sermons that has come down to us. It is likewise probably one of the most complete, and most nearly approaching the original form in which it was delivered. Adding this list to that

mentioned above, we have a great number of sermons of which the Saint is known to be the author. Assuredly they make a collection showing the Angelic Doctor's great activity in the apostolical labors of his day.

For priests versed in scholastic theology these sermon-schemata of our celebrated Friar Preacher are a treasury of sketches and plans, of superb ideas, for orderly and instructive discourses on the Epistles and Gospels of the Sundays, on feasts of our Lord and the saints; a real mine of instruction, of crisp, vigorous thoughts. All that is needed to fill them out and round them into masterpieces is a masterhand like that which framed them. Clearly do they bear the impress of keen thought and penetration, profound erudition, a broad and comprehensive view of his subject, a marvelous knowledge and command of the Scriptures and the Fathers, along with a marked felicity of adapting these to the moral or doctrine to be inculcated. Whether St. Thomas gives us a homily on the Epistle or Gospel of the Sunday, or a discourse on some mystery of our Blessed Lord, or a panegyric of some saint, we always find the strictly methodical treatment of his subject; a splendid exposition of Catholic doctrine, an earnest effort to stem the evils that prevailed in his day; an ardent longing to enkindle the love of God in the hearts of men. His purpose is ever and always the same—to aid all who hear him: to convert the sinner, to make the good better, and the holy holier, to lead the saintly farther along the way of sanctity; to combat error; to serve God and His Church.

In the course of his numerous works, the Angelic Doctor lays down three general rules which in his mind are of the first importance for all preachers of the Word of God. First, he should seek to instill true, solid Christian doctrine into the minds of his audience, preaching Jesus Christ, and Him alone; for He is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. In all he says the preacher must seek to draw his hearers to God; he should seek souls, not himself; it should be his aim to convert them, or to make them better. The speaker of the Word whose purpose is vain glory, rather than the good fruit of the Word, is an abomination in the eyes of the Lord. His work cannot be productive of any great and lasting good. One must strive to preach with eloquence, it is true, but his very

eloquence should be called into requisition for the glory of God and the welfare of souls; not for one's own glory and reputation. This is the gist of what is to be found here and there in the works of St. Thomas—notably in the *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*—on the office and duties of a preacher of the Word. This rule is truly golden.

Next the preacher of the Gospel should eschew vain, frivolous, unseemly worldly topics, adhering faithfully and strictly to Christian doctrine (*Responsio ad Lectorem Bisuntinum*). In the opinion of the Angelic Doctor the field of Catholic doctrine is, or should be, wide enough for any preacher of the Word. Certainly this principle needs no comment.

And thirdly, the preacher should practice what he teaches from the pulpit. In short, he should preach not less eloquently by his actions than by his words. Little avails the sermon of him whose life and deeds tell a story far different from that which his lips proclaim from the pulpit.[3] Nor is there need of comment here.

These principles are surely cardinal. They are for all preachers of the Word, and for all time. He who wishes his ministry of "shepherdizing" souls to be of fruitful harvest, cannot lay them aside. To do so brings failure; it means that one's ministry must prove unprofitable. It is not without significance that Pope Pius X has found it advisable to remind our modern preachers of the real duties of their high calling. The Encyclical, *Acerbo nimis,* runs along lines identical with St. Thomas's cardinal principles.

Modern preachers of the Word may learn not a little from the precepts and example of Thomas Aquinas. He has given us a splendid lesson, and this lesson is further emphasized by the words of another Pope. It can hardly have gone out of the remembrance of scholars how the late Pope Leo XIII exhorted the Italian clergy to adopt the very same *modus praedicandi* upon which his saintly successor so strongly insists. Leo's words, it is true, were addressed to the pastors of Italy; but would it not be well and profitable, if they struck a responsive chord in other parts of the world? A law of wisdom is a law for all; it is equally applicable the world over. May we not surmise that the illustrious Pontiff in-

[3] Summa, IIIa, q. XLI, a. 3 ad 1m.

tended that his words should go home to the rest of Christendom? No one better understood the needs of the Catholic world than did Leo.

Although it seems almost, if not quite, certain that the Angelic Doctor, in preparing his sermons, confined his writing to notes or sketches, and extemporized the words as he developed and filled in the plan from the pulpit, it were wholly untrue to say that he spoke offhand. No wise man would so tempt God. He was always prepared, because always preparing. Thomas's earliest biographers all tell us that prayer, study, meditation were habitual with him. Thought on the mysteries and life of our Blessed Saviour formed no small part of his life. Schooled by continual reading of Holy Scripture, the Fathers, theology, history, philosophy, and the sciences of the day; practised in speaking, writing, and teaching; possessing a genius of the highest order, he was certainly not obliged to go out of himself in search of ideas, and found no difficulty in readily clothing his thoughts in appropriate words. Thoughts deep, original, and luminous, welled up unbidden from his full mind; and the habit of speaking brought spontaneously to his lips clear and accurate language wherewith to give them suitable expression. He spoke with a heart that was aflame with charity. Hence his words went straight to the hearts of his audience.

The world knows Thomas Aquinas as a great saint and a great scholar, as one of our first theologians and most profound philosophers; as a man, in fact, of many-sided erudidition. It is remarkable how he did so many things, and did them so well. But in his transcendent reputation as a scholar his fame as one of the Church's really great preachers has been forgotten even by scholars.

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TRIBUNALS OF THE ROMAN CURIA.

I. The Sacred Penitentiary.

IN the first article of this series upon the Roman Curia[1] it was stated that there were three departments, viz., the Congregations, the Tribunals, and the Offices. We have considered the Congregations in as far as they have been reorganized under the Constitution, *Sapienti Consilio,* and we have seen what are the chief functions assigned to each Congregation. In the present article I propose to deal with the second department of the Curia, which comprises three Tribunals, the *Sacred Penitentiary,* the *Sacred Rota,* and the *Apostolic Segnatura.* I follow the order observed in the New Constitution.

ORIGIN OF THE S. PENITENTIARY.

At a very early date a priest was appointed in the Eastern Church, and somewhat later, one in the Western Church, who received special authority in the sacrament of Penance (*Penitentiarius*), and who was placed over those obliged to perform public penances. In the beginning of the thirteenth century there were special *penitentiarii* appointed for the City of Rome, one of them being St. Raymund of Pennafort. In the same century a cardinal was selected to direct those *penitentiarii* and to take charge of the Apostolic Penitentiary. Somewhat later, viz., in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the cardinal who was appointed Prefect received the title of *Penitentiarius major,* a title which has continued down to the present day in the possession of the Chief Officer of the Tribunal. Originally the Sacred Penitentiary took cognizance of questions of the *forum internum* alone; but during a considerable portion of the fifteenth century a controversy was carried on regarding the proper province of its functions, some contending that it was to be confined to the *forum internum,* others defending its competence to deal with the *forum externum* also. Accordingly a Constitution, *Quoniam nonnulli,* was issued by Sixtus IV, 9 May, 1484, declaring that the Apostolic Penitentiary possessed authority to settle questions of the *forum externum* and could delegate this authority to others. Upon this point according to different circumstances a diversity of discipline has existed. Thus we find that

[1] Eccl. Review, Dec., 1908.

nearly a century later St. Pius V, in order to obviate certain inconveniences, ordained in two constitutions issued together, 18 May, 1567, *In Omnibus* and *Ut bonis,* that the Apostolic Penitentiary should be altogether limited to the *forum internum.* However, during the reign of this Sovereign Pontiff a modification was introduced and was afterwards confirmed by other Roman Pontiffs, such as Urban VIII and Innocent XII.

LEGISLATION OF BENEDICT XIV ON THE S. PENITENTIARY.

Finally, Benedict XIV issued two Constitutions of the same date, 13 April, 1744, *Pastor bonus* and *In Apostolicae.* When one examines these two documents as they are found in the Bullarium of Benedict XIV, he perceives that in the former (*Pastor bonus*) the Pontiff ordained with much minuteness of detail the faculties committed to the S. Penitentiary; while in the other (*In Apostolicae*) he laid down the various classes of offices for the Tribunal as well as the requirements for the incumbents of these several offices. When it is remembered that the enactments contained in these two constitutions have remained substantially in force until the legislation of the *Sapienti consilio* became effective in Nov., 1908, and that even now to a large extent the same faculties are continued, as well as the same classes of offices, it may be easily inferred that these documents are deserving of careful perusal. Yet, as they are of notable length, we can refer here to only a few general headings, and this with a view to a better understanding of the new legislation of our present Sovereign Pontiff.

By the Constitution, *Pastor bonus,* Benedict XIV conferred authority upon the Sacred Penitentiary to absolve from all sins and censures in whatsoever manner reserved, whether to the Roman Pontiff, or to the Ordinaries, or to the Superiors of Regulars. This power should be exercised by the Major Penitentiary or by some one delegated by him in favor of regulars or seculars, ecclesiastics or laics. There was, however, a distinction made, viz., that in the case of regulars the absolution given through this Tribunal was effectual not only for the forum of conscience, but likewise in *foro externo.* The same authority was also available for seculars, whether ecclesiastics or laics, in *foro externo,* when the censures were inflicted *a jure;* not, however, when inflicted *ab homine,* until

the jurisdiction of the delegate or judge inflicting the censure had ceased.[2] The S. Penitentiary besides received authority to dispense in occult irregularities for the forum of conscience not only laics, but also clerics, both secular and regular (N. 15). It possessed the authority to validate the titles of benefices obtained with an occult inhability; the power of condoning a portion of the simoniacal price given for a benefice; it received certain faculties of remitting the obligation of restitution under particular conditions; relaxing the obligation of oaths in the forum of conscience, when no injury would arise therefrom; dispensing by commutation from vows, even those reserved to the Pope; dispensing from the obligation of reciting the Divine Office by commuting it into some other prayers.[3] Power was given to the S. Penitentiary of dispensing regulars from any irregularity, whether *ex delicto* or *ex defectu,* in the forum of conscience; even in *foro externo* for public cases, after consultation with the superiors; authority of absolving apostate or fugitive regulars under certain conditions was also conferred.[4] In Matrimony the S. Penitentiary could dispense with occult impedient impediments for the forum of conscience; but not from diriment impediments of consanguinity, affinity, or spiritual relationship, even when the impediment was occult, if there were question of a marriage to be contracted (*contrahendum*). In marriages already contracted (invalidly), the S. Penitentiary should abstain from dispensing in the first and second degree of consanguinity (mixed), or in the second only of consanguinity, or affinity from *copula licita,* even in occult cases; but in the third and fourth degrees (occult) for marriages invalidly contracted it might dispense. It could dispense from the impediment of *crimen* arising out of adultery. It also possessed authority to solve all doubts in the matter of sins or regarding the penitential forum. It was declared, too, by Benedict XIV that whenever the S. Penitentiary would exercise any authority in granting dispensations, absolutions, etc., for the *forum externum,* such exercise should be considered valid, since the Major Penitentiary ought to be held as having received from the Roman Pontiff the requisite jurisdiction in particular cases.[5]

[2] Cf. *Pastor Bonus,* N. 7.
[3] NN. 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30.
[4] NN. 31, 32, 33.
[5] NN. 39, 40, 44, 48.

Since the time of Benedict XIV, until the Constitution, *Sapienti consilio,* became effective, the Apostolic Penitentiary lost none of its faculties; rather they were increased, especially in regard to the power of granting matrimonial dispensations. At one period, namely, at the end of the eighteenth century when the French Revolution broke out, the S. Penitentiary was the chief organ through which dispensations in matrimony were procured, even in *foro externo,* the other Tribunal (Dataria) being impeded in the exercise of its functions.

FACULTIES ACCORDING TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

In order to understand the change effected in the authority of the Sacred Penitentiary by the Constitution, *Sapienti consilio,* it is well to quote the words in which its present authority is conveyed. "The jurisdiction of this sacred court or tribunal is limited entirely to those things which regard the *forum internum,* non-sacramental as well as sacramental. Hence, matrimonial dispensations of the *forum externum* being assigned to the Congregation for the Discipline of the Sacraments, this tribunal for the *forum internum* concedes favors, absolutions, dispensations, commutations, sanations, condonations; moreover, it examines questions of conscience and decides them."

The foregoing are the only words found in the New Constitution regarding the Sacred Penitentiary; they are, however, sufficient to enable one to perceive the difference between the new legislation and the legislation already existing. The competence of the Sacred Penitentiary is now brought back to the condition in which it was placed by St. Pius V; it may be even said that at present its scope is the same as when this tribunal was originally constituted. The S. Penitentiary is now confined to the *forum internum,* and therefore no longer possesses any jurisdiction in the *forum externum.* To many readers of the REVIEW this distinction between the *forum internum* and the *forum externum* is very well known; still it may not be amiss for a more correct understanding of the competence of the S. Penitentiary to say a few words concerning the meaning of this old distinction.

There is a twofold power existing in the Church; there is the power of the Sacrament of Orders, and there is the power

of jurisdiction. This latter power relates to two different kinds of questions. There are some causes which refer chiefly to the private benefit of the individual, and the jurisdiction or authority required to deal with them is termed jurisdiction of the *forum internum,* or of the forum of conscience. This jurisdiction may be immediately connected with the Sacrament of Penance and is called sacramental. Thus the jurisdiction necessary for the absolution from sin is sacramental; and even when the Sacrament of Penance is not actually received, provided that there be confession, the term sacramental jurisdiction in *foro interno* is employed. But jurisdiction in *foro interno* may also be exercised outside the administration of the Sacrament of Penance, and even without any confession; it is then called non-sacramental. For instance, the act of dispensing from a private vow, or of dispensing from a secret irregularity, or of absolving from a secret censure may be performed without reference to Confession or the Sacrament of Penance, and yet be an act of jurisdiction in *foro interno.*

Then there are other causes which proximately relate to the social good of the Church; they regard the relation of the individual to ecclesiastical society. The authority necessary to deal with these causes is called jurisdiction in *foro externo.* Thus if two persons wishing to be married are related by consanguinity within the prohibited degrees, there is required the exercise of jurisdiction in *foro externo* for the granting of the dispensation. Now the radical difference touching the S. Penitentiary between the new legislation and that immediately preceding is that all jurisdiction in *foro externo* is now taken from it. The chief practical application of this change will be found in matrimonial dispensations. Heretofore the Dataria was the customary channel through which dispensations from matrimonial impediments were granted for those countries not subject to the authority of the Propaganda. But it was not the only channel; the S. Penitentiary was empowered to grant dispensations from diriment impediments, even when these impediments were not occult. I do not mean to say that there was no limitation placed upon the S. Penitentiary in its authority to dispense from matrimonial impediments, or that it possessed regularly equal authority with the Dataria in granting matrimonial dispensations. It has been the general rule for a hundred years that when the applicants

for the matrimonial dispensations were such as could be designated *pauperes* or *fere pauperes,* the dispensations could be obtained from the S. Penitentiary, even though the impediments in the given cases were of their own nature public; while the Dataria was competent to grant matrimonial dispensations in *foro externo,* whether the application came from those who were *pauperes* or not. The main distinction between these two tribunals has been that the Dataria granted dispensations in *utroque foro,* and the S. Penitentiary in *foro interno.* Accordingly, when the impediment was public, either from its own nature, as consanguinity, although it was not commonly known to exist, or when it was foreseen to become public, or when it was actually public, though of its own nature secret, in each of these suppositions the Dataria was the proper tribunal for granting the dispensation. On the other hand, the S. Penitentiary having authority for the *forum internum* could grant a dispensation when the impediment was of its own nature occult and at the same time *de facto* occult, but as was said above, it acquired additional authority to dispense in *utroque foro* those petitioners who could be considered at least *fere pauperes.*

It was noticed before when treating of the Congregation of the Sacraments,[6] that according to the new legislation this Congregation possesses authority to grant matrimonial dispensations instead of the Dataria which is no longer competent to grant them. Thus the Congregation of the Sacraments is empowered to take the place of the Dataria for dispensations in matrimony. It is however to be noted that when there is question of the impediment of *disparitas cultus,* or of *mixta religio,* or the application of the Pauline Privilege, it is the Congregation of the Holy Office which is competent, since matters of this kind pertain to doctrine and therefore belong exclusively to this Congregation. The S. Penientiary according to the new legislation possesses no authority to dispense in *foro externo,* so that when an impediment of matrimony is of its nature public, or, though secret at present, is likely to become public, it is useless to have recourse to the S. Penitentiary, which is no longer competent in such cases; reference must be made to the Congregation of the Sacra-

[6] Cf. March number of REVIEW, p. 272.

ments or, when a dogmatic question is involved, to the Holy Office. It is not however to be inferred that the S. Penitentiary is now deprived of all authority in the matter of matrimonial dispensations. Whatever authority of jurisdiction it hitherto possessed in *foro interno* to grant these dispensations, it retains the same authority under the new legislation. When the impediment is of its nature occult and at the same time actually secret without danger of becoming public, this tribunal has authority to dispense. Thus if A. have illicet copula with B., there rises a diriment impediment to the marriage of A. and the sister of B. which impediment is considered *ex natura sua* occult, and if there be no danger of this impediment becoming public *de facto,* the S. Penitentiary is still the competent tribunal for granting the dispensation. It is scarcely necessary to observe that in sending a petition for such a dispensation to the S. Penitentiary fictitious names should be employed, so that no infamy may arise to any of the parties concerned from the granting of the dispensation. If from any cause it should become publicly known that such illicit copula occurred, the S. Penitentiary would not be competent to grant the dispensation; the case should be referred to the Congregation of the Sacraments. What has been said of the impediment of affinity from illicit copula should be extended to the impediment of *crimen,* in which under similar conditions the S. Penitentiary can dispense. Regarding other ecclesiastical impediments which from their character are public such as consanguinity, spiritual relationship, or affinity from licit copula, a dispensation can no longer be procured from the S. Penitentiary, no matter what be the circumstances of the applicants.

Whether or not the S. Penitentiary still retains authority to dispense when there is question of a marriage invalidly contracted on account of an impediment of its nature public, while *de facto* occult, e. g. spiritual relationship which is secret, the present writer prefers to refrain from offering an opinion, until the question be decided by a declaration of the Holy See. It is certain that the S. Penitentiary was competent in such cases, but whether these are to be held as belonging to the *forum externum* and therefore outside the province of the S. Penitentiary as now constituted is not evident. It apper-

tains to the Consistorial Congregation alone to give an authoritative decision upon this question.

In matrimonial cases it may happen that two impediments occur, one occult, the other public. In this contingency a rule similar to what was formerly followed should still be observed, viz. application should be made to the S. Penitentiary for a dispensation from the occult impediment with mention that a petition has been or is to be sent to the Congregation of the Sacraments for a dispensation from the public impediment; while in the petition to the Congregation of the Sacraments for a dispensation from the public impediment no allusion is to be made to the presence of an occult impediment. If however the two impediments (one occult, the other public) be of such a character that on account of the presence of one the dispensation for the other would not be rendered more difficult, it is held to be unnecessary to make reference to the existence of the second impediment in the petition to the S. Penitentiary.[7] Others, e. g. De Becker,[8] and Noldin (N. 133) omit the distinction between impediments *disparata* and *non-disparata,* laying down the rule just given, viz. that mention should be made of the public impediment in the petition addressed to the S. Penitentiary.

"NORMAE PECULIARES" CONCERNING THE S. PENITENTIARY.

After the publication of the Constitution, *Sapienti consilio,* the Holy See issued certain regulations referring to the departments of the Curia. A few of these relate to the S. Penitentiary and should be here noticed. One touching the personnel of this tribunal sets down that, besides the Cardinal Penitentiary who is the Prefect of the tribunal, the Regent, five Prelates of the Segnatura, a Procurator, a Substitute and some inferior officials shall continue in the respective duties assigned them under the previous arrangement. These different offices were created for the proper management of this tribunal by Benedict XIV in his Constitution *In Apostolicae,* above referred to. A second regulation of the *Normae* lays down that all the rules given in that Constitution of Benedict XIV are to be observed by the S. Penitentiary except in those particulars which were subsequently introduced by

[7] Cf. S. Alph. N. 1139. [8] 2nd. ed. p. 341.

legitimate use; and changes so introduced are to be in writing and to be submitted by the Cardinal Penitentiary for the approval of the Roman Pontiff. The only remaining regulation of the *Normae peculiares* concerning the S. Penitentiary is that all business transacted by this tribunal should be conducted secretly and gratuitously.[9] When however dispensations in matrimony are required from the S. Penitentiary the taxes which were hitherto imposed will for the present be continued, since one of the *Dispositiones temporariae* (N. 12) is the following: "Pro dispensationibus Matrimonii vigere quoque pergent in praesens taxationes pendi solitae penes Datariam Apostolicam et S. Penitentiariam. In causis vero matrimonialibus dispensationis super rato, et in aliis quae a S. Congregatione de Sacramentis judicantur, standum normis a S. Congregatione Concilii hucusque servatis." [10]

It is unnecessary to explain in detail more than is set forth in the Constitution already quoted, the various powers conferred upon the S. Penitentiary. It should be noticed however that many of these may be subdelegated to Bishops and in some degree to priests also. In this respect no change has been effected in the authority of this tribunal to subdelegate its faculties, keeping within the province assigned to it. *Pagellae* have sometimes been issued by the S. Penitentiary to Bishops, and to some priests on the recommendation of their respective Ordinaries. In the interpretation of such faculties attention should be paid to particular clauses which may be found in the formulas issued by this tribunal in order that the extent of the faculties may be accurately ascertained without either undue amplification or undue limitation.

In conclusion it may be observed that it belongs to the S. Penitentiary to examine cases of conscience and to decide them. Thus a practical question may arise as to what is lawful or unlawful in given circumstances. The person concerned may send a *quaesitum* to this tribunal and from the answer determine the course of conduct he should pursue. In presenting such quaesita it is not necessary to express the real name of the petitioner, but of course the address to which the answer is to be directed is to be given. In order to expedite

[9] Cf. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, pp. 101-102.
[10] *A. Ap. Sed.*, p. 57.

matters through this Tribunal it is advisable to have the *quaesita* authenticated by the Ordinary of the petitioner, whenever the latter has no sufficient reason to conceal from him the fact of his *quaesitum*.

M. MARTIN, S.J.

St. Louis University.

THE BLINDNESS OF THE REVEREND DR. GRAY;*

OR

THE FINAL LAW.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE TRIAL.

DICK DUGGAN had been formally committed for trial and it came off at the summer assizes at Cork in that year. It was not a sensational case. No element of romance entered into it. It was simply a trial for a very vulgar murder, wrought through hate and revenge. But, as the case had an agrarian aspect, the Crown attached some importance to it; and the Solicitor-General was sent down from Dublin to prosecute. The court was crowded, although the one element that could excite public curiosity was absent. There appeared to be no doubt about the prisoner's guilt; and therefore, there was no room for forensic displays. There was a foregone conclusion as to the prisoner's conviction. Nevertheless, as no loophole of escape can be left on such occasions, but every web must be tightened around the doomed man, the Solicitor-General made a most elaborate opening statement, showing that from the beginning that deadly hate, which was the final cause of the dread tragedy, was not only entertained, but publicly avowed by the prisoner. The first element, therefore, of conviction, the establishment of a motive, was evident. Disappointment about the land, rage and hatred at seeing the girl, whom he hoped to make his wife, espoused to his enemy, the public shame of defeat—all these combined to offer the jury every assurance of cogent motive for the dreadful crime. And, as if this were not enough, the learned counsel guaranteed to put before the jury evidence that the prisoner, again and again, publicly avowed his determination to be revenged

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on his supposed enemy in the one way that such natures seek revenge—that is, by the commission of wilful and deliberate murder.

The wretched prisoner stood in the dock with bowed head. Streaks of gray showed themselves in his black hair, signs of the terrible conflict he had waged with himself down there in the narrow cell where he had been confined. He never looked up at judge or jury, but with head bent down he seemed the very embodiment of despair, or sullen hate. With the greatest difficulty, his solicitor coerced him to plead: *Not guilty!* His own wish was to say *Guilty,* and to be hanged without delay. The court was crowded with witnesses and police. The aged mother sat back amongst the audience—the only person in that assembly, who felt no fear, nor pity, because she had perfect faith in God and in His priest.

The first witness called was the Sergeant of Police. He testified that he received information of the murder about seven o'clock on the evening of 7 February. His informant was a servant of Dr. Wycherly's. He proceeded at once to the place which was about two miles from the town of M——. There in a recess in the road, the cob or pony was still quietly grazing. The form of a man lay down over the dashboard, his head almost touching the animal. He raised him up, and saw at once that he was dead. There was a blot of blood on his coat. The pike, one prong stained with blood, lay at the bottom of the cart. He at once with the aid of the constable arranged the dead body in the cart, and drove back to town, where the body was deposited at the barracks. From information received, he proceeded at once to take out a warrant for the arrest of Dick Duggan.

Cross-examined, he testified that the time in which he got notice of the murder could not have been earlier than seven o'clock; and that he was at the scene of the murder at half-past seven o'clock.

Further cross-examined, he declined to give the name of his informant; but it was a well-known fact that there was deep hostility—

But here he was peremptorily called to order by counsel for defense, who was supported by the presiding judge.

Again, examined by the Solicitor-General, he testified that he had proceeded with the warrant to Duggan's house; but having ascertained that he was absent all the evening, he and his men hid themselves in the cow-house, and waited till Duggan arrived.

"At what hour did he arrive?"

"At half-past ten."

"Did he go straight to his house?"

"No, he came into the barn."

"What did he do there?"

"He commenced washing away streaks of blood from his face and hands, in a huge boiler or cauldron of water that was there."

"And then?"

"Then I arrested him for wilful murder, and had him handcuffed."

"Did he resist?"

"No, he submitted quietly."

"Did you warn him?"

"Yes, I warned him that every word he uttered might be used in evidence against him."

"Did he make any remark then?"

"Yes! His first remark was: 'My God! did I kill him?' He then said: 'I suppose I'll swing for it; but I deserve it.' He wanted to go in and see his mother; but this wasn't allowed."

Dr. Dalton was called and testified that he saw the deceased in the police office. He had the body stripped. There was a slight accumulation of blood on the inner and outer garments of the dead man. On washing the surface of the body he discovered a wound over the heart, such as would be made by a sharp, keen instrument. He then, aided by another surgeon, Dr. Willis, opened the body and traced the wound through the left ventricle of the heart, severing many vessels, and terminating in the apex, or first lobe of the lung behind. Death must have been instantaneous.

The pike was produced, still blood-stained. Yes, that pike was an instrument that would cause such a wound.

Dr. Willis called, corroborated the testimony of Dr. Dalton. There could be no doubt as to the cause of death.

Cross-examined, he admitted that it was perfectly possible the sad tragedy might have been the result of an accident. Such accidents are extremely common; and if the deceased had had a pike with him in the trap, and if that pike had been placed carelessly, with the points upwards, it is quite possible that the deceased, if thrown forward by a sudden lurch, might have fallen on the prongs of the pike, and met his death. The wound was lateral and upward. Examined by the Solicitor-General, as to whether the deceased, if he had sustained such an accident, could deliberately withdraw the weapon from his side, and place it in the bottom of the trap, witness declared such a thing impossible, as death must have been instantaneous.

Pete, the gipsy, on being sworn testified that he had heard the

prisoner say in his own and Mr. Edward Wycherly's presence, "By the Lord God, I'll make such an example of Kerins and all belonging to him, and all that has anything to say or do with him, that it will be remembered in the parish, as long as the old castle stands." Mr. Wycherly said: "Take care, Duggan, he carries his six-shooter always about him; and a bullet goes faster than a shillalagh." Duggan replied: "And there's something that goes faster than a bullet, *and it makes no noise.*" On another occasion, somewhere about the New Year, he heard Duggan say, in allusion to Kerins' marriage: "If I thought that Martha Sullivan would have him, I'd think no more of blowing out his brains than shooting a dog." And, on another occasion he, the prisoner, asked witness: "Couldn't the ould woman give the girl something to drab, that is, to poison her?" And he replied: "We have a bad name enough, but we've always kept our hands from blood."

Cross-examined, Pete admitted that the gipsies had a bad name in the parish; but it was not justified. He was a hard-working tradesman, a tinker if you like; but his mother told fortunes, and the people were afraid of her.

Cora, the gipsy-girl, came on the table with the same self-assurance that always characterized her. She tossed back her black gipsy locks, and sitting down, she placed her elbow on her knee, and supported her head on her hand in the old attitude. She testified that on the 29th day of January, she was present at the festivities in Kerins' house; that in the course of the evening she was called out of the kitchen by Mrs. Kerins, and bade to go over to Duggan's and tell Dick that she wished to see him in the screen of firs behind the house; that she went to Duggan's, beckoned Dick from the kitchen, and in the yard told him the message Mrs. Kerins had sent; that she hid herself in the screen, and heard the conversation between Dick Duggan and Mrs. Kerins; that the latter begged and implored him to let bygones be bygones; that he replied, "Take this from me, that neither here nor hereafter will I forgive the man that wronged me and mine." Mrs. Kerins said: "The black hatred is in your heart, and all for nothing." He replied: "How can I forgive the man that first took away from me the place I wanted to bring you; and then took you from me in the bargain? I'll not lie to you nor God. I've an account to settle with Kerins; and when it is settled, there will be no arrears."

Cross-examined, Cora said that she beckoned Dick from the kitchen by pulling his sleeve. When the counsel for the prisoner asked her whether she was not unutterably mean to play the spy

in the screen, she coolly answered: "It was her business to know everything;" and then she added: "You have just reminded me that Duggan before he left the kitchen, said in answer to some question about the jollification going on at Crossfields: 'I guess their *ceol* [music] will be changed into keening soon enough.'" The counsel asked no further questions.

Then came one of the sensations of the trial. The gipsy-girl, on being ordered to go down from the witness-table, said solemnly, "I have sworn the truth. But *it wasn't Dicky Duggan that murdered Kerins.*"

She was instantly ordered back, examined and cross-examined; but she gave no information, beyond repeating her assertion: "Dicky Duggan is a bad fellow enough; but he never murdered Kerins."

Dan Goggin, a sturdy farmer, testified that he was in the public-house at the Cross the day of the murder. He was returning from the fair at M——. A lot of farmers were drinking and chaffing Dick Duggan, who had drink taken; but wasn't drunk. He heard Duggan saying: "There may be another dance at Crossfields soon; and the feet won't touch the ground either." He also spoke of a Banshee and a *Caoine.*

The bar-girl at the public-house testified that Duggan had come to the house the day before the murder, had remained there talking and drinking all day. He had several times uttered terrible threats against Kerins and his family. He was too drunk to go home that night; and he slept at the public-house. Next day, he drank again, but not much. The farmers coming home from the fair at M—— were chaffing him about the dance at Kerins'. He again grew furious and threatening, and demanded more drink. This she refused, and bade him go home. At length, he demanded whiskey peremptorily, saying: "Give it to me. I have work to do to-night!" He then left the house.

Cross-examined, the girl said, it could not have been earlier then half-past six when Duggan left the house, because she had heard the Angelus-bell ring some time before. Questioned as to where he went, she declared she had no idea. A second question as to what was her interpretation of Duggan's words: "I have work to do to-night!" was peremptorily challenged by counsel for defense, and the challenge was allowed.

The sergeant of police, recalled, gave evidence that Duggan said something about the parish priest on his way to prison; but seemed to think it a matter of no consequence that Kerins was killed.

Finally, as if to clinch the case against the unfortunate prisoner, the sergeant swore that in the early dawn of the morning following

the murder, he had taken the pike to Duggan's house, when it was too dusk to notice the blood-stains on the prong; and that old Duggan had admitted that the pike was their property; and that he had seen it last in Dick's hands the morning of the day previous to the murder, when Dick had been cutting soil from a rick of hay near the road.

And thus a terrible chain of circumstantial evidence had been drawn around the unhappy criminal, for whom there seemed no loophole of escape. The statement of Cora, the gipsy girl, affected the sympathies of the audience; but had no effect on the legal progress of the case.

The counsel for defence called no witnesses. He had none to call. The case against the prisoner was overwhelming; and the prisoner positively refused to give the least assistance towards establishing his innocence. His solicitor begged, prayed, implored him to say where he had spent the evening, or to give some evidence that would establish an *alibi;* or even to declare his innocence. No! He maintained a stubborn and sullen silence; and neither the appeals of his lawyer, nor the tearful expostulations of his friends had any effect upon him. It was quite clear to lawyer and counsel, to warder and jailer, that Dicky Duggan would die a felon's death.

Half-ashamed of the wretched defence he had to make, knowing its inutility, and conscious of its hollowness, the senior barrister arose, and after a few words, he rested the entire case for the defence on the evidence of the barmaid, and the untrustworthiness of the witnesses. He seemed to score a point by showing how utterly impossible it was for the prisoner to reach the scene of the murder, which it was averred had taken place before seven o'clock that night, for the barmaid had sworn that he could not have left the public-house before half-past six; and there were four miles at least between the public-house and the scene of the murder. He then raked up in that strong, vituperative manner which characterizes the Bar, the history and antecedents of the gipsies; proved that they were utterly disreputable; and volunteered to show that they had been expelled from Duggan's house again and again for rude language or conduct, and that they had a bias against the family. Finally, he developed the sergeant's evidence, and proved that the words used by Duggan when arrested, manifestly showed his innocence of the crime. He wound up his address by warning the jury of the dangers of entertaining merely circumstantial evidence; and hinted broadly that it was a matter of public notoriety that judicial murders had been committed on exactly such evidence as was now submitted to the jury.

The bar-maid, recalled again, swore that Duggan could not have left the house before half-past six o'clock that evening, because the Angelus-bell had rung out a considerable time before he had departed.

The learned judge asked rather demurely what was the Angelus-bell to which reference had been made so often during the trial.

The counsel for defence, who was a Roman Catholic, explained that it was a continuation amongst a conservative people, and one tenacious of tradition, of the old Curfew-bell, of which his Lordship had read.

"And at what hour does the curfew-bell ring?" asked the judge. "Does it not change with the seasons?"

But someone had mercifully passed on a slip of paper to counsel, who now declared with evident consciousness of superior intelligence:

"No! my Lord!" he said. "In *this* country, it is always rung at six o'clock in the evening!"

The sergeant, recalled, stated that the gipsies were utterly disreputable characters; and that charges of stealing fowl, fortune-telling, and other such nefarious practices were often alleged against them.

"Alleged?" said the Solicitor-General. "Were they ever proved, sergeant?"

And the sergeant shook his head mournfully. He had never secured a conviction against them.

He was again interrogated about the prisoner's language when he was arrested; and he admitted that the prisoner seemed surprised that it was Kerins, and not the parish priest, who had been killed.

Again interrogated, he said he had taken measurements of the distance between the public-house and the scene of the murder; and found the distance to be three miles, seven furlongs, three yards, and two feet.

"Could the prisoner have possibly reached on foot the scene of the murder, if he had not left the public-house before half-past six?"

"No!" said the sergeant. "That is, if the murder was actually committed in the spot where we found the dead man."

At which remark, the Solicitor-General smiled.

The prisoner's father testified that the gipsies were regarded as dishonest and disreputable characters in the parish; and Pete and his daughter had been driven by the old woman from the house for improper language from time to time.

"Do you believe," asked the junior counsel for prosecution, "that they cherished any particular animosity against your family so that they would swear falsely against the prisoner?"

And the old man had to answer, "No."

"One more question," said counsel. "I did not intend to ask you to give evidence against your son; but as the opposing counsel, my learned friend opposite, has put you in the chair, perhaps you would answer. Is that pike," pointing to the weapon lying on the table, the one prong still rusty from its ghastly work, "your property?"

"It is," said the old man.

"In whose hands did you last see it?"

"In my son's!" was the reply.

The old man turned around and paused for a few seconds, looking wistfully at his son. Then, brushing aside a tear, he descended the steps.

This closed the evidence; and the junior counsel for defence rose up, and pulled his gown over his shoulders. He was a young man, and therefore eloquent; and as he drew on the vast resources of his oratory, a smile rippled over the faces of the older and more prosaic men. He addressed himself to one point only—the danger of convicting on circumstantial evidence, and the awful responsibility entailed on the consciences of the jurors by reason of the fact that only circumstantial evidence had been adduced in support of the case. He insisted strongly that there was some grave mystery hidden behind the apparent certainties that had been brought under their notice; and he quoted the saying of Cora, and her evident conviction that, notwithstanding her own evidence, the prisoner was innocent of the crime. He tried to torture the minds of the jurors by the suggestion that, if they sent the prisoner to the gallows, the time would come, when, under the light of fresh revelations, they would look back with remorse and horror on the terrible miscarriage of justice that would be perpetrated that day, if they brought in a verdict of "Guilty!"

Then the Solicitor-General arose, and in a few words tore into tatters the little web of oratory which his "very young but learned friend" had spun before their eyes. And with a brevity that was more alarming, because more assured than the lengthiest speech, he marshalled facts and motives, so as to leave no room for doubt of Dick Duggan's guilt in the mind of the vast audience that filled the courthouse.

The jurors, who shuffled uneasily under the infliction of the speech for the defence, looked relieved at the brevity of the prosecuting counsel's address. Their minds were evidently made up. They seemed to wait impatiently for the judge's final charge.

CHAPTER XLVII.

An Apparition.

During the terrible tragedy, the old woman sat back amongst the benches behind the dock. Her face was nearly covered by the hood of the black cloak that she had worn since her marriage. Her white cap, frilled and ironed, shone beneath it; but her face was shrouded as if with the shame and pain of the ordeal through which she was passing. She was rolling her beads through her fingers during the trial; and seemed, in her communion with God, to be oblivious of all around her. But when the final crisis was approaching, she raised her head, and looked ever and again anxiously toward the door of the court. But her heart fell, when the crowd seemed to thicken, as the trial progressed, and no messenger from God appeared to rekindle her hopes, or reassure her faith. Yet these hopes smouldered on, until the final appeal, absolute and convincing, was made; and the judge, with all the solemnity of his high office increased by the gravity of the case, proceeded to recapitulate and sift the evidence before him.

He commenced at once by laying down the law about circumstantial evidence, endorsing the remarks of the prosecuting counsel, that in very few cases was a murderer caught red-handed in his guilt, and that thus justice would be completely frustrated, if convictions could not be obtained on circumstantial evidence. That evidence, however, should be of a nature that would make guilt a moral certainty—a clear, logical deduction from facts and motives converging toward a final issue. If this chain of facts and motives lacked even one link, the presumption should be in the prisoner's favor. If the chain were complete, it was equivalent to direct evidence; and the presumption of guilt became a certainty. It was for the jury to consider and weigh the evidence in the present case, with a view of determining whether, in their judgment, the alleged conversations and facts tended to produce not only a *prima facie* case against the prisoner at the bar; but also an absolute conviction that this brutal murder, by which an innocent man lost his life in a violent and savage manner, was perpetrated by the unhappy man at the dock, and by no one else.

He then went into the evidence, word by word, and fact by fact, referring to his notes, which he had carefully taken down. On the question of motive and the repeated declarations of the prisoner that he would seek to be revenged on the murdered man, there appeared to be no room for doubt; for if the evidence of the

gipsies were discredited, there was still supplementary evidence that the prisoner did threaten violence, or rather a violent death, against the murdered man repeatedly. The evidence again as to the ownership of the pike, the instrument of the murder, was unassailable. But there were two points that needed clearing up. These were the strange expressions used by prisoner to the sergeant of police, who arrested him, and in which he seemed to have expected the death of his parish priest, and not Kerins; and the evidence of the barmaid that he could not have left the public-house before half-past six on the night of the murder; and the evidence of the police that it was about seven o'clock the intimation of the tragedy reached them. It was for the jury to determine whether it was possible for the prisoner to cover four miles of ground and perpetrate an atrocious crime within that interval; or whether they would accept the theory of the crown that the murder was committed much nearer the public-house, and the body driven towards the town with a view of screening the murderer. It was most unfortunate the judge added, that no evidence was adduced by the defence to show the whereabouts of the prisoner that night; but the jury would now have to determine whether these varied circumstances brought home guilt to the prisoner in the dock, or whether there was still a grave doubt as to his connexion with the murder. The responsibility of determining his guilt or innocence was probably the greatest that could be laid on the consciences of men; and he conjured them to bring to their consideration of the case an unbiased and unprejudiced judgment, not leaning to the side of justice by any presumptions of guilt, nor to the side of mercy by any false notions of pity; but examining patiently and minutely the evidence and arguments on both sides, and bringing in their verdict, fearless of any consequences, but the violation of their solemn oaths.

Here the jury retired, and the judge also arose. It was noticed that as he did so, he leaned down, and seemed to be searching for something, or placing something near his hand; and the whisper ran around the court:

"He's lookin' for the black cap!"

But all public interest was now more keenly aroused, when the prisoner's mother, suddenly standing up in her place in the court, and flinging back the quilted hood of her black cloak, shouted passionately as she stretched her right-hand toward the door:

"Make way, there: make way there, I say, for the minister of God, who is come to save my child!"

She stood rigid as a statue, her right-hand extended toward the

door, where now was distinctly seen above the heads of the multitude the pale face darkened by the deep-blue spectacles of Dr. William Gray. He was pushing his way slowly through the dense mass of people, who surged around him and helped to block his way in their new excitement. The judge paused, and sat down. The crier yelled: "Silence!" which the police repeated from man to man, till it died away in an echo at the door; and at length by dint of pushing and elbowing, the tall figure of the great priest came around the dock, and approached the place where the counsel and solicitors for the defence were sitting. Here there was a hurried conference, pens and pencils flying furiously over sheets of paper, while the deepest silence reigned in court, and the judge looked down interested and curious, and the counsel for the Crown looked anxious and amazed.

At length, the leading barrister for the defence arose, and said:

"An unexpected circumstance has arisen in the case, my Lord; and I request permission to have the jury recalled for a few moments."

The Solicitor-General at once protested vigorously.

"The case is closed, my Lord," he said. "The fullest time was given to the gentlemen in charge of the defence to summon witnesses in the prisoner's favor. I presume the reverend gentleman, who has just appeared in court, is about to give evidence as to character. That can be done when the jury have brought in their verdict. I totally object to have the case opened again."

"It is certainly unusual and irregular, Mr. ——," said the judge, addressing the counsel for the defence, "to have the case reopened when the jury are consulting about their verdict. But, perhaps, you would acquaint the court with the nature of the circumstance to which you have alluded, and its bearing on the case?"

"Certainly, my Lord," said the lawyer. "This gentleman, Dr. William Gray, late parish priest of the place where the murder was committed, has come hither at great inconvenience to testify that on the night of the murder, the prisoner was at his house at seven o'clock, and this proves so complete an *alibi*, that I demand the prisoner's immediate discharge."

"Why was not the reverend gentleman here at the earlier stages of the trial?" demanded the judge.

"He was fully prepared to come," was the answer, "but he lost his train, and hastened hither by car. The evidence is so important that it cannot be overlooked."

It was quite true the old priest had missed his train; and in an agony of remorse had hurried hither, driving his horse furiously

the thirty miles that lay between his house and the City. Ever since the murder, or rather since the committal of Duggan, his mind had been the prey of unusual emotions. The sense of shame and personal dishonor for having used physical violence toward an illiterate peasant, gradually developed into a feeling of compassion for his victim; and when the latter lay under the frightful charge of murder, this sentiment of pity was deepened and intensified, until it almost took on the aspect of the pity of great love. Duggan's demeanor, too, since the blow fell upon him—his total change of manner, his silence, and, above all, his intense remorse and despair for having struck a priest, touched the old man deeply. His was one of those dispositions that are as hard as granite toward the proud and the obstinate, but are instantly melted into compassion at the first indication of sorrow or remorse. Hence, as reports daily reached his ears of Duggan's manifest contrition and horror at his conduct, he grew more deeply interested in his case, and what he had originally determined to do through a mere sense of justice, he now determined to accomplish thoroughly through a new-born and affectionate interest in the unhappy man. Perhaps, too, the revelation was opening up wider and wider to his view, that he had badly blundered during life by mistaking the lower laws, which serve to bind society together, for the higher law that sweetens and strengthens all human life; and looking back on his ministry of a quarter of a century, he began to see that its fruits would have been greater, if he had taken more deeply to heart the Divine Words: "A *new* commandment I give you."

It is easy, therefore, to conjecture his agitation and terror, when, on the morning of the trial, having dressed with unusual care, he drove to the railway station to find that the only train that would reach Cork for hours, had already departed. He had an idea of going to the City the night before; but the dread of meeting people, and sleeping in a strange room, deterred him. Now, half-mad with the terror of thinking that the life of his unhappy parishioner might be lost through his neglect, for he felt, with a pang of reproach, how inexorable was the law, he determined to drive straight to the City, taking his chances of being in time.

"She'll never do it, yer reverence," said the jarvey, whose horse he had hired, and who did not relish the idea of driving thirty miles at a furious rate of speed.

"If she is killed, I'll pay you," was the answer. And so he reached the courthouse as the jury retired; and the big beads of perspiration on his forehead, and the tremulous motions of his hands, showed the tremendous agony through which he had passed.

After a good deal of forensic sparring, the judge recalled the jury; and the aged priest was helped into the witness-box. He was sworn, and gave his name as Dr. William Gray, late parish priest of the united parishes of Doonvarragh, Lackagh, and Athboy; but now retired.

"Do you remember the evening of February the seventh in the present year?" he was asked.

"Yes!" he replied.

"Would you detail the circumstances that brought you into connexion with the prisoner that night?"

"I was in my room that night, the room which serves me as library and sitting-room, when a single knock was heard at the door. My housekeeper announced that Duggan wished to see me, adding that he seemed under the influence of drink. I went into the hall; and he at once made a most insulting observation—"

"Would you be good enough to tell the jury what it was?"

"Is it necessary?" the priest asked, in a pleading manner.

"Yes! It is necessary!"

The priest waited for a moment, as if summoning up courage to bear this latest trial; and then said:

"He said: 'I want to ask you a question. Why didn't you denounce from the altar your niece for eloping with young Wycherly, when you never spared any poor girl before?' These might not have been his exact words, but they were the equivalent."

"Very good. And then?"

"Then I am sorry to say that I lost temper and caught hold of him violently by the neckcloth, and pushed him against the wall, or the door of the opposite room. In an agony of rage, or perhaps to defend himself, he struck me with his left-hand full on the forehead, breaking my glasses. These are the marks."

And he raised his blue spectacles to show the faint scars where the steel of the broken one had penetrated.

There was some sensation in court here; and the old woman muttered aloud:

"The blagard! Hanging is too good for him now!"

"I then swung him round and round the hall," continued the priest, "and finally flung him out through the open door, where he lay face down on the gravel. I locked and bolted the door; and gave the matter no further heed. It was only when I was retiring to rest at ten o'clock, that I heard him raise himself from the gravel before the hall-door, and go away."

"Can you state exactly the hour when all this occurred?" asked counsel.

"Yes! The clock on my mantlepiece was just chiming seven when I returned to my room."

"Is your clock correct?" asked the judge.

"Absolutely," said the priest.

"Did you read the dial; for perhaps it might occur that the hours are not struck according to the figures."

"No! I'm blind!" was the mournful admission; and a murmur of sympathy seemed to run through the court. "But there can be no doubt of the hour. The clock is absolutely correct."

"And presuming that this is so, what is the exact distance between the presbytery and the public-house?"

"A little over two miles!" he said.

"And would it be humanly possible for a man to traverse the road to M——, a distance of four miles, commit a murder with all its ghastly details, return to the Cross, and walk two miles towards your house in the space of less than half an hour?"

"That question answers itself," said the priest.

He was then cross-examined.

"You are no longer parish priest of Doonvarragh, and the other unnamable places?"

"No! I'm retired!"

"And you came here to do a good turn for your old friends?"

"I came to testify the truth. Duggan was my worst enemy."

"And a thoroughly and essentially bad character, I presume?"

"No! He is hot-headed and turbulent, especially in drink; and he is a loud boaster. But he is incapable of committing a great crime."

"Now, sir, you have said that the clock was chiming 'seven' when you returned to your room?"

"Yes!"

"Now, don't you think it very unlikely that in the state of high excitement in which you were after your alleged rencontre with the prisoner, you would count the strokes of a clock?"

"I didn't count them," said the priest.

"Then why did you swear the clock was chiming 'seven'?"

"Because the clock had struck six, quarter after six, half-past six, the three-quarters; and I knew I was in the hall only a few minutes."

"I see. And you also allege that the prisoner remained on your gravel walk prostrate for three hours. Do you think that credible; or were you not deceived?"

"Not in the least. He was more than half-drunk; I swung him and threw him with much violence. No one else could be in the vicinity at such an hour."

"I have no more to ask," said counsel. "It is for your lordship to say to the jury, how far they can accept such evidence against the overwhelming case against the prisoner."

"One question more," said the judge. "You aver that the prisoner fell face downwards on the gravel, and remained there?"

"Yes!"

"And that he was flung with much violence?"

"I'm sorry to say, Yes!"

"There can be no doubt, gentlemen," said the judge, turning toward the jury, "that the evidence of the reverend gentleman puts this case in a different aspect. It supplies the information, sullenly withheld by the prisoner, as to his movements after leaving the public-house. It also goes far toward explaining the nature of the blood-stains which the prisoner was striving to wash away when arrested in the cowhouse; and it also seems to explain the strange language used by the prisoner when arrested, when he expressed his horror on supposing that his parish-priest had been murdered, and his subsequent unconcern when he found it was Kerins. When he said: 'Is he dead? I suppose I'll swing for it,' it was clearly under the conviction that the blow which he had struck in the hall of the presbytery had had fatal consequences. And when he said subsequently: 'Kerins? Is that all?' it may have expressed his sense of relief that the death of his priest was not upon his soul. Of course, it is for you to determine the value you place on the reverend gentleman's testimony, which, as you have perceived, involved revelations personal to himself, which must have been very humiliating. You will also notice the trouble and inconvenience to which an old, infirm, and blind clergyman has put himself voluntarily in order to save the life of one who was persistently and cruelly hostile to him. Yet, sympathy with such heroism must not blind you to the other facts put into evidence by the Crown. The admission that the weapon that caused death was the property of the prisoner, and seen last in his possession by his own father, tells terribly against him—"

"Maybe the pike was stolen for the purpose?" said a shrill voice from the place where the witnesses of the Crown were marshalled behind the Crown counsel.

All eyes turned in that direction and saw Cora, the gipsy girl, in her favorite attitude, elbow on knee, and her chin resting on her hand, and her great black eyes calmly surveying the vast multitude that filled the court.

"Remove that girl instantly!" shouted the judge; and Cora was

hustled ignominiously out of court. But the judge was disconcerted, and wound up his address to the jury by briefly saying:

"All these things are now subjects for your deliberation, gentlemen. You will please retire again; and may the God of Truth and Justice guide your decision."

The judge descended from the bench; the jury retired; but in less than ten minutes returned with their verdict. The judge was recalled, and resumed his seat; and the stillness and silence of death fell upon the court.

"Have you agreed to your verdict, gentlemen?" said the clerk of the court.

"Yes!" replied the foreman, handing down his paper.

"You find that the prisoner, Richard, alias Dick, Duggan, is NOT GUILTY of the murder of Edward Kerins?"

"Yes!" was the reply.

A sigh of relief was whispered through the court. The judge said:

"I thoroughly agree with your verdict, although the case lies enshrouded in mystery. The prisoner is discharged!"

A roar of triumph shook the building, and, caught up by the multitude waiting outside, was carried down along the street.

Dazed and stupid, Dick Duggan was led from the dock; and his arms were half torn from their sockets by handshakings and congratulations. Then it was remembered that his mother had the first right to see him and embrace him, and he was led through the crowd to where she was sitting. She had been crying with delight and happiness; but when her son was brought to her, she looked at him sternly, instead of embracing him on his rescue from a horrible and shameful death, and sternly said:

"Is it thrue what the priesht said, that you struck him, that you dar lay hands on the ministher of God?"

"Lave the poor fellow alone, Mrs. Duggan," said the more compassionate neighbors. "He has gone through enough already."

But this would not do. She pushed the poor fellow before her rudely, and forced him on his knees before the priest, who was still communing with the lawyers.

"Go down on your two knees," she said, "and ask pardon of God and the minister of God for what you done."

The old priest turned around, and groping in the air, he laid his hand at last on the thick black hair of the unhappy culprit.

"There, 'tis all right, now, Mrs. Duggan," he said, "Dick will be a good boy forevermore."

But the old woman, lifting up her face and hands toward heaven, cried:

"Oh, vo, vo, vo, vo! And to think the people never knew you till they lost you!"

And the priest heard the echo in his own heart:

"Oh woe, woe! And I never knew the people till I lost them!"

He would gladly have escaped now from the crowd that still filled the street, but he had to make his way slowly through them; and he had an ovation a king might envy, as he forged his way with difficulty to the car that was to bear him to the railway station. And as he went, he saw through his blindness the dark ramparts and sullen fortifications with which society seeks to save itself from itself, slowly crumble and fall, and above in the empyrean, the Eternal Star of Love shine liquid and resplendent.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

It is the Law.

THE murder of Ned Kerins, as the judge said, remained shrouded in mystery. Not the slighest suspicion attached to the gipsy, although it was commonly surmised from the remarks of the gipsy girl, that the tribe knew more than they cared to reveal. And one morning, Dunkerrin Castle, the old keep down by the sea, was untenanted again. In the midnight a strange hulk loomed up over the waters far out at sea; and a couple of boats containing the gipsy family and all their belongings shot alongside. The boats were rowed homewards empty by one man, who soon after disappeared; and a few rags of wretched bedding, and some broken tins alone marked the place where the uncanny people had dwelt. They carried their secret with them.

One alone seemed to divine what had happened. That was Dick Duggan, and he held his peace. He was now a changed man. All the fierce violence of his nature had culminated and broken out on that night when he had committed the unpardonable crime of laying hands on a priest; and he was smitten, as we have seen, with a sudden remorse, that seemed to have opened up the dark gulf of his life, and shown him all its horrors. It was no passing contrition, therefore, that made him wish for death, when death stared him in the face; but a desire to make atonement for a great crime, and to escape the odium and shame that attached to it. And now that he was saved from an ignominious death by the very man he had pursued with such hatred during

many years of his life, his character underwent one of those sudden transformations that may be witnessed in strong and turbulent natures under the visitation of great trial. Dick Duggan became a model man. All the riotous fun and fierceness of his disposition gave way under a subdued and solemn melancholy, which would have been a subject for Celtic jests and laughter, but that the tragedy of his life was so well known. He worked late and early at the farm; was assiduous in the performance of his religious duties; was respectful and helpful to the priests. And gradually, the old-time intimacy with Martha Kerins began to be resumed. For she was young and a widow, and inexperienced; and she needed advice about the buying and selling of cattle, the rotation of crops, etc.; and her people were far away, and Dick Duggan was so often only on the other side of the ditch, and it became so easy to consult him. And Dick was very obliging and courteous, and had forsworn drink, and therefore had a clear head; and so things went on, until one day it suddenly dawned on him that he might become master of the coveted Crossfields for the asking. And he did ask, and was accepted. There was some reclamation on the part of her friends, not because of Dick's antecedents, but because he had no means or money; but Martha, like every good woman, had a will of her own, and she duly asserted it. Her first husband, by the marriage settlement, had left everything to her; and she used her own discretion in disposing of it.

So peace settled down on the united parishes of Doonvarragh, Lackagh, and Athboy—peace after a turbulent and trying time. But their priests were gone—and there was shame in the hearts of the people for many a long day.

Henry Liston, who was in thorough touch and sympathy with his pastor during all the troublous time, could not remain in the parish after him. He argued, If one so great and good, one, too, who loved so his people that he would have died for them, found yet but disappointment in life and ingratitude in human hearts, what could a weakling, like himself, expect? No. He felt he was not made for the rough play and tumble of life, and he sought peace. Besides, certain letters emanating from the far-off convent, where the sisters, when they were hungry, pulled the convent bell for food, and sat on the bare floor while eating it, began to reveal to him many things. And amongst the rest! this, That, amidst all the "storm and stress" of modern life, the cries and creaking of the chariots of Progress on their way toward some final goal, which no man sees or foresees, and the frantic appeals to the Church

and her priests to come out of the sanctuary, and put their shoulders to the chariot-wheels that are forever sinking into the ruts of revolution, perhaps there might be a few souls, who, unpossessed of the physical or intellectual strength that is the first factor in modern progress, might go aside, and help a little by lifting their hands in prayer to the Unseen Powers, that have more to say in the direction of human events than the progressivists and utilitarians of the age will allow. And so, he sought peace for himself and power for many in a quiet little monastery, where there was no activity, no machinery, no economic problems to solve; only the old-fashioned and completely out of date routine, day by day, and night by night, of fasting, contemplation, prayer. And there, under the name of Father Alexis, he lived as unknown and unnoticed as the Saint whose name he was elected to bear.

But the shame on the hearts of the people was greatest for their pastor, whom they felt they had expelled and driven forth from amongst them. He had taken a long, low-roofed cottage in another parish, about a mile to the west of the place where he had ministered for a quarter of a century. A little suite of three rooms ran in front of the house; beyond was a potato-patch badly cultivated and showing but dockweeds and thistles. Beyond the fence of the potato-patch were great sand-dunes, where the sea-thistles grew in profusion; and these sloped down in a firm, glistening, sandy beach, where the waves thundered at high-tide, and the sea-swallows perched at the ebb of the waters to watch and capture their living food. All the rooms faced the sea; and there he fell asleep on wintry nights, lulled by the soft splash of the waves, or rejoicing in their thunder-voices; and on the long summer days he sat outside on a rude bench, fanned by the sea-breezes, or warmed by the sun. And here one day, there stole across the sands, and across the potato-patch, and into the kitchen that very Annie who, he almost swore in his wrath, should never come under his roof-tree again.

It was the autumn time, and she and Dion had been at home for a few days only, when the terrible aching at her heart to see her suffering and abandoned uncle compelled her to set aside every feeling of dread, and brave the chances of rejection. For she did not know, how could she? of the mighty change that had been wrought in his heart; and she pictured in her girlish imagination her uncle as she had first seen him, tall and powerful and imposing, his gray eyes scanning her face, and his aquiline features softening under the tenderness of a first greeting. And her ears

were echoing (they never ceased to echo) the sharp and bitter words with which he pronounced the sentence of her expulsion, and bade her never dream of seeing him again. How could she know that his heart, too, was aching after her? How could she hear him call "Annie!" in the midnight, when no voice came in response save the soft or hoarse whispers of the deep?

She stood at the kitchen door, and the old housekeeper almost fainted when she saw her. Then there were greetings and questions in hushed tones; and there were tears over a past that was sombre enough to the eyes of both women.

A hundred times Annie asked the old housekeeper, "How is he? Had he everything he required? Was there any lack of the little comforts he would require in his old age? Did the people remember him? Who came to see him?"

And the old woman could answer that he was well; but changed, sadly changed to her eyes.

"He's almost like a child now, Miss, or, perhaps I should say, Ma'am. He sits all day, thinking and praying, but never talking. But, whin any of the prieshts comes, he sees 'em, and talks to 'em in the ould way. The people? Ah, the people! They sees now their mistake, and the crachures are doing their besht. See here, Miss, or maybe, I should say, Ma'am!"

And she took Annie out and showed her a whole aviary of young turkeys, geese, and hens, cackling melodiously in the yard, or straying for food across the potato-patch.

"And sure ould Mrs. Duggan comes down every week,—ah! she's the dacent ould shtock, althou' her son was a blagard; but he's all right now; and she doesn't know what she can do for the priesht. But still he's lonesome, Miss, or maybe I should say, Ma'am; lonesome for somethin'; and I do be sometimes afeard that maybe the death is comin' on him."

"I wonder if I could see him, Anne, without his knowing it?"

"Yerra, sure I'll tell him, Miss, that you're here."

"Oh, no! not for the world, Anne," she said, in a great fright. "I mean not now, some other time; and don't tell him for your life that I've been here."

"Faix, I won't, Miss, for he'd kill me if he knew it, and knew I didn't tell him."

"But I'll come again. Tell me now, when you go in or out of his room, does he know you, or speak to you?"

"Yerra, no, Miss. Sure he never opens his lips to me. I takes him in his breakfast and dinner; and I removes the things; and he never says, 'Iss, aye, or no,' no more than if I wor never there at all."

"And do you think now, if I—that is, supposing that I took your place some day, and went in with dinner, do you think he would know that it wasn't you that was there?"

"Yerra, how could he, Miss—Ma'am, I should say? That is, onless you spoke to him."

"Well, now, I'll come some other day, perhaps to-morrow, and try. You know, Anne, that he is old, and that it would never do to give him a great surprise."

"I suppose so, Miss," said Anne, somewhat incredulously.

"You know old people have sometimes died suddenly from sudden surprises like that. We must go gently, Anne. I wonder could I see his bedroom now? Is there any danger he would know?"

"Not the laste, Miss," said Anne. "He won't know but you're one of the neighbours come in wid a few chickens."

They entered the old man's bedroom. It was not too bad. But the heart of the girl sank as her quick eyes noticed the stains on the pillow covers and the counterpane; and some other aspects of things that showed that the skill of the washerwoman was not often called into requisition.

But she said nothing, fearing to hurt the feelings of the old domestic. But, as she was going away, she said gaily:

"There are a lot of linens and things up at the house of which there is no use. I think I'll bring them down to you. And tell me, what does uncle eat?"

"Oh, wisha, Miss, he doesn't ate as much as a sparrow. He haves a cup of tea in the morning, and a bit of toast about the size of a sixpenny bit. And thin I gets him a chop or a chicken for his dinner; but the finest lady in the land couldn't ate less of it. I don't know, I'm sure, how he lives, at all, at all."

"Very well, Anne. Now we'll put our heads together, you and I, as we did long ago—do you remember my cooking, Anne?"

"Ah, wisha, Miss, don't I? Sure 'twas you had the light hand—"

"Very good! Now, we'll commence again; and I'll engage I'll make uncle eat something. Goodbye now! Did I tell you I was married, Anne?"

"You didn't, Miss; but sure I guessed it. And there was me, like an old fool, callin' you 'Miss" all the time. But sure you looks as young, Miss, as the night you stepped off the car in the rain, and gev us all the fright."

"Ah me! I was young then. I am older now, Anne, because I have seen a great deal."

"Wisha thin, Miss, I wish you luck, and may your ondhertakin' thrive wid you. Sure won't the priesht be glad whin he hears it?"

"Of course," said Annie, dubiously. "But not a word, Anne, not a word that I was here. Remember, I'll come to-morrow again."

She came, and brought a complete change of linen, etc., for his bedroom; and glided away again without a word with him. The old housekeeper again urged her to go in and speak to her uncle; but her heart failed her. But his quick senses noticed a change in his bedroom.

"Anne," said he, half jocularly, "you're becoming quite fashionable. Where did you get the lavender that is in my pillow-covers and bed-linen?"

Anne coughed behind her hand; and, this seemed to irritate all her bronchial tubes, because she was seized with a sudden paroxysm of coughing and wheezing. When she recovered her breath, she said faintly:

"I suppose somethin' quare got into the wather; or maybe, 'twas the new soap."

"Maybe so," he said, and he relapsed into silence again.

Then one day, Annie summoned up courage, and with a white face and a beating heart, she took the dinner into the old man's room. She nearly fell at the threshold; but calling on all her strength, she entered the room, and softly laid the plates and dishes on the table. If he should speak now, she thought, as her hands trembled! But not a word. And she was able to observe him, as he sat bolt upright in an arm-chair near the window. But her self-possession was near giving way, when she saw the change, which was greater than even she dreaded. For the tall form, though erect, seemed dwarfed and shrunken; the pale face was paler, and she noticed with a gasp of pity that he, who had been so fastidious and particular about his personal appearance, was unshaven, and that his clothes were discolored and soiled. A little rent in the sleeve spoke volumes to her, and the seam of his coat was opened where it fell over his fingers. He held a book in his hand—one of his old calf-bound volumes, and his fingers were feeling one of the pages, as if he were striving by the sense of touch to read what was written therein. He made no movement, when she entered the room, and seemed not to notice her presence; but, as she was leaving, he gave a little start forward, and seemed to be listening intently. She glided softly from the room, and fell into a chair quite faint and weak with emotion.

Yet she came every day, always bringing some little article of food or furniture or clothing to make a little happier the lonely life that was now spread before her in all its pathos and solemnity. She didn't seem to know how acute are the senses of the blind; and how

the swift intelligence and observation of her uncle were gathering clue after clue from her movements.

She had now become so accustomed to enter his room unnoticed, that she had become almost reckless, and probably betrayed herself in many little ways. And one day, as she busied herself around the dinner-table, arranging cloths and napkins, she heard her name called softly, and as if by question:

"Annie?"

She stood silent, watching him intently. He was leaning forward, as if eager to catch fresh indications of her presence, and yet not quite sure that he was right. But he said again in a louder tone:

"Annie, I know 'tis you. Come here!"

And she went over, and knelt humbly at his feet, placing her clasped hands on his knees. He stretched forth his withered hand, and passed it gently and affectionately over her hair, and then more tenderly and reverently over the soft lines of her face. She looked up, and saw the tears streaming down the furrowed cheeks, and she knew all.

"Oh, uncle, uncle! and have you quite forgiven me?"

He said nothing, but drew her more closely to him. Then he found words to say:

"I knew you'd come. I knew *you* wouldn't desert me!"

And that was all. For now in the sunset of his life the clouds had lifted, and were now wreathing themselves in all lovely forms around the little remnant of his life. Annie came every day, and remained with him from luncheon time to dinner. Every day Dion drove her down the four or five miles from Rohira to the home of the lonely priest. At first, he drove back when his young wife had alighted; and came for her again in the evening. But when the great revelation was made he too had to come and stay. When Annie broke to her uncle the fact of her marriage with Dion, he started, and just one flash of the old spirit broke out again.

"Wycherly? Why, he's a Protestant!"

But she was able to assure him that she had been faithful to her principles, and then she opened up before him, as only a devoted wife could, all the splendors of Dion's character, his fearlessness, his honor, his manliness, his freedom above all from the passion of gain. And many an afternoon was whiled away by Dion's recital of his many adventures by sea and land. And then his voice became softer, as he remembered with just a little touch of conscience, the devotion of his black dependents; and softer still, when he spoke of that grave beneath the African skies, where the stricken brother had found rest.

"It was poor Jack, sir," he said, "that proposed for me to Annie. I was too much afraid of her to say all that was in my mind. But Jack, poor fellow, knew it all. And one day, he clasped our hands together above his hammock, and 'twas all done. Of course, Annie told me at once that it could never be, never, never, never! Then I began to find that never meant until—. And then she began to explain to me all about the mysteries of faith; but I had no head for these things. I could box the compass, or shoot a flying fish, or horsewhip a coward; but I couldn't get hold of such slippery things as mysteries and doctrines. So Annie explained to me all about explicit faith. And then the good Padre came; and he said to me, 'Do you believe all the Catholic Church teaches?' And I said, 'If Annie believes all the Church teaches, and I believe all that Annie believes, isn't that the same thing?' And, by Jove, he was puzzled; but, of course, he had to say 'Yes!' And I was baptized; and we were spliced. And, by Jove, sir, I hope the Angels will put off my call to glory for some time. I don't want any other heaven just yet."

At another time in earlier life, the stern old theologian would hardly accept this kind of explicit faith as a preliminary to entering the Church; but now he saw by the illumination of sorrow great hidden depths beneath the apparent frivolity of this strong character, and he said nothing. But he asked, with some hesitation, how Dion's father had taken the news of his son's conversion and marriage.

"Dad? Ah, if you were to see dad. He's twenty years younger since we came home; and when he puts on his velvet jacket, and brushes down his hair on his shoulders, he's quite a beau. One day, we had a funny little scene which explains matters. We were talking about old times, and Jack's terrible illness, and Annie's great tenderness and kindness, and dad said: 'I remember I once expressed a wish that I had a daughter like you, Annie.' And Annie blushed, and said, 'I heard you, sir!' And that's the reason, I suppose," Dion continued, as Annie entered the room, "that Annie set the trap for me; and, I, an innocent fellow, fell into it."

And one day, Annie proposed to her uncle, very modestly and gently, that she would read to him some hours each day, at intervals, from his old favorite books, the classics, or the theologians, whom he had never parted with. His face lighted up with pleasure. She took down a Horace, and began to read one of the Odes. The Latin was beyond her own comprehension, for old Horace had a dainty way of saying things. But she had not proceeded far, when he stopped her:

"Do you think you understand the meaning of that Ode, Annie?"

"No!" she said. "I recognize a word here and there; and that is all."

"And 'tis enough," he said. "I think I've had enough of Horace."

"Well, then, we'll try the magician, Virgil," she said, replacing the Horace, and taking down a Delphin Virgil.

She read on for some time, opening the pages here and there; but he seemed to be weary of it also.

"Well, then, here's St. Thomas," she said. "Of course, 'tis all Greek to me; but I shall be able to read so that you, uncle, can follow."

And she commenced to read slowly and with difficulty from the *Summa*. He listened more patiently now, and apparently with some pleasure. But, the brain was now less elastic than in former times; and he again showed signs of weariness.

"I'll tell you what, uncle," she said gaily, although her heart misgave her, "I'll bring on to-morrow what Dion calls a good rousing novel—lots of fighting and love-making, and thunder and lightning; and I'll put you through a course of them."

He smiled. He had never read a novel in the whole course of life.

She kept her word. She brought down not what she had suggested; but a tender and gentle tale; but alas! it was full of the tragedy and sorrow of the world. He grew almost angry.

"Is there not sorrow and trouble enough in real life," he said, "without wringing our hearts with pictured misery and desolation?"

And Annie desisted; and looked around her in a hopeless manner.

There was an old Greek Testament, hidden among his books; and she took it out, and dusted it.

"Well," she said, "I must keep up my Greek, uncle. I wonder can I translate this?"

And she opened the Fourteenth Chapter of the Gospel of St. John, and began to read.

This time he did not interrupt her. The soft, sweet music of the Greek, in which are enshrined the solemn messages of the "new commandment", sank into his soul; and he allowed his niece to read on to the very end of that sublime discourse and prayer for his disciples which the Divine Master uttered under the most solemn circumstances of His life.

"Take the Douay Testament, and read it for me again, if you are not tired," he said.

And commencing at the words; "Let not your heart be troubled. You believe in God, believe also in me," she read uninterruptedly to the end of the seventeenth chapter.

"That will do!" he said. "That is now my poetry, philosophy, and theology, unto the end. We need no more!"

And every day, even unto the end, that was his mental food and medicine. He saw at last that the "new commandment" was the "final law" of the universe, although everything in Nature and in Man seems to disprove it; or as that sad poet interpreted it, who, had he lived, would have been the fervent disciple of Him whom he railed against during life:

"Love is celebrated everywhere as the sole law which should govern the moral world."

It is a doctrine difficult to believe, as the "law" is a difficult one to practise; but the law is final. It is the last word that has been uttered by Divine and human philosophy.

[FINIS.]

P. A. SHEEHAN.

Doneraile, Ireland.

Analecta.

EX ACTIS SUMMI PONTIFICIS.

INDULGENTIAE SS. NOMINIS JESU CONFRATERNITATI CONCEDUNTUR.

Beatissime Pater,

In America Septentrionali, curis et zelo Fratrum Praedicatorum, celebris est SSmi Nominis Jesu Confraternitas, cui plus quam 500,000 virorum nomen dederunt; eorum major pars semel in mense Sacris Sacramentis participat; pluries insuper in anno solemnes per vias publicas instituunt processiones (quae *Holy Name Rallies* dicuntur), in professionem Fidei erga Divinitatem D. N. Jesu Christi, et in reparationem blasphemiarum. Hujusmodi processiones in magnis civitatibus, 50,000 virorum aliquando constant; et quotidie augentur.

Ut autem haec adeo salutaris erga SS. Dei et Jesu nomen devotio magis ac magis foveatur, crescat et dilatetur, Fratres Praedicatores qui Confraternitati SS. Nominis Jesu praesunt ad pedes S. V. provoluti, humiliter implorant:

1. Indulgentiam plenariam, pro Confratribus SS. Nominis Jesu, quoties, confessi et Sacra Communione refecti, processionibus de quibus supra, portando praefatae Confraternitatis insigne, cujus exemplar aureum, per manus Rmi P. Magistri Generalis Ordinis sui, Sanctitati Vestrae humiliter offerunt.

2. Indulgentiam 300 dierum semel in die lucrandam ab iisdem Confratribus, qui modo visibili habitualiter idem insigne deferunt, dum in publicum prodeunt, si devote dixerint: *Sit Nomen Domini benedictum!*

3. Benedictionem Apostolicam pro Redactoribus et Lectoribus Ephemeridis ejusdem Confraternitatis cui titulus: *The Holy Name Journal,* et pro omnibus illis qui Confraternitatis SS. Nominis Jesu propagationi dant operam.

Et Deus . . .

Juxta preces perlibenter Indulgentias in Domino concedimus, et cunctis dilectis Patribus Praedicatoribus, Confraternitatis a SS. Nomine nuncupatae Sociis, et Scriptoribus, Redactoribus Lectoribusque Ephemeridis ejusdem Confraternitatis Apostolicam Benedictionem peramanter impertimus.

PIUS PP. X.

Die 4 Novembris 1909.

S. CONGREGATIO RITUUM.

I.

ADDENDA IN BREVIARIO ROMANO.

DIE 27 IANUARII

In Festo S. Ioannis Chrysostomi, Episcopi Confessoris et Ecclesiae Doctoris.

Ad calcem lectionis VI, post verba dictasse videatur, *addatur:*

Hunc vero praeclarissimum universae Ecclesiae Doctorem Pius decimus Pontifex maximus coelestem oratorum sacrorum patronum declaravit atque constituit.

DOMINICA I IULII

In Festo Pretiosissimi Sanguinis D.N.I.C.

In corpore lectionem VII et VIII deleantur divisionis signa, et ante textum lectionis VIII addatur citatio: Enarrat. in psalm. 95, n. 5.

Si hoc festum extra Dominicam transferatur, deficiente alia lectione IX, Officii utcumque simplicis, erit sequens

Lectio IX.

Serm. 31, alias 344.

Habuit ille sanguinem, unde nos redimeret; et ad hoc accepit sanguinem, ut esset quem pro nobis redimendis effunderet. Sanguis Domini enim tui, si vis, datus est pro te; si nolueris esse, non est datus pro te. Forte enim dicis: Habuit sanguinem Deus meus, quo me redimeret; sed iam, cum passus est, totum dedit. Quid illi remansit, quod det et pro me? Hoc est magnum, quia semel dedit, et pro omnibus dedit. Sanguis Christi volenti est salus, nolenti supplicium. Quid ergo dubitas qui mori non vis, a secunda potius morte liberari? Qua liberaris, si vis tollere crucem tuam, et sequi Dominum; quia ille tulit suam, et quaesivit servum.

Te Deum laudamus.

DOMINICA INFRA OCTAVAM NATIVITATIS B. MARIAE V.

In Festo Sanctissimi Nominis Mariae

Si hoc festum extra Dominicam recolatur, deficiente alia lectione IX, Officii utcumque simplicis, erit sequens

Lectio IX.

Beata, quae inter homines audire sola meruit prae omnibus: Invenisti gratiam. Quantam? Quantam superius dixerat: plenam. Et vero plenam, quae largo imbre totam funderet et infunderet creaturam: Invenisti enim gratiam apud Deum. Haec cum dicit, et ipse angelus miratur, aut feminam tantum, aut omnes homines vitam meruisse per feminam: stupet angelus totum Deum venire intra virginalis uteri angustias, cui tota simul angusta est creatura. Hinc est quod remoratur angelus, hinc est quod virginem vocat de merito, de gratia compellat, vix causam prodit audienti, sane ut sensum promoveat, vix longa trepidatione componit.

Te Deum laudamus.

DOMINICA III SEPTEMBRIS

In Festo Septem Dolorum B. M. V.

Si hoc festum extra Dominicam reponatur, deficiente alia lectione IX, Officii utcumque simplicis, erit sequens

Lectio IX.

Ecce, inquit, filius tuus: ecce mater tua. Testabatur de

cruce Christus, et inter matrem atque discipulum dividebat pietatis officia. Condebat Dominus non solum publicum, sed etiam domesticum testamentum; et hoc eius testamentum signabat Ioannes, dignus tanto testatore testis. Bonum testamentum non pecuniae, sed vitae aeternae; quod non atramento scriptum est, sed Spiritu Dei vivi, qui ait: Lingua mea calamus scribae, velociter scribentis.

Te Deum laudamus.

DIE 3 DECEMBRIS

In Festo S. Francisci Xaverii Confessoris

Ad calcem lectionis VI, post verba Sanctis adscripsit, *addatur:*

Pius autem decimus ipsum sodalitati et operi Propagandae Fidei coelestem patronum elegit atque constituit.

DECRETUM

Sanctissimus Dominus noster Pius Papa X, referente infrascripto Cardinali sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefecto, suprascriptas additiones, respectivis suis locis Breviarii Romani inserendas, suprema auctoritate Sua approbavit. Die 10 Novembris 1909.

Fr. S. Card. MARTINELLI, *Praefectus.*

L. ✠ S.

PHILIPPUS CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus.*

MONITUM.—*In festo sancti Paulini Episcopi et confessoris, sub finem lectionis VII, dictatur:* QUIDQUID de suis donis, *atque sub initium lectionis VIII dicatur* in die MALO ab ira, *et infra* in die MALO liberabit.

II.

ADDENDA IN MARTYROLOGIO ROMANO

DIE 27 IANUARII

Ad calcem elogii sancti Ioannis Chrysostomi, post verba conditum fuit, *addatur:*

Hunc vero praeclarissimum divini verbi praeconem Pius Papa decimus oratorum sacrorum coelestem patronum declaravit atque constituit.

DIE 6 MARTII

Primo loco legitur:

Sanctarum Perpetuae et Felicitatis martyrum, quae nonis Martii gloriosam martyrii coronam a Domino receperunt.

DIE 7 MARTII

Ad calcem elogii sanctorum Perpetuae et Felicitatis, post verba sub Severo principe, *addatur:*

Sanctarum vero Perpetuae et Felicitatis festum pridie huius diei recolitur.

DIE 15 MARTII

Ultimo loco legitur:

Vindobonae in Austria, sancti Clementis Mariae Hofbauer, sacerdotis professi congregationis sanctissimi Redemptoris, plurimis in Dei gloria et animarum salute promovenda ac dilatanda ipsa congregatione exantlatis laboribus insignis; quem virtutibus et miraculis clarum Pius decimus Pontifex maximus in Sanctorum canonem retulit.

DIE 23 MARTII

Ultimo loco legitur:

Barcinone in Hispania, sancti Iosephi Oriol presbyteri, ecclesiae S. Mariae Regum beneficiarii, omnigena virtute, ac praesertim corporis afflictatione, paupertatis vultu, atque in egenos et infirmos caritate celebris; quem in vita et post mortem miraculis gloriosum Pius Papa decimus Sanctorum numero accensuit.

DIE 3 DECEMBRIS

Ad calcem elogii sancti Francisci Xaverii, post verba hac die celebratur, *addatur:*

Pius vero Papa decimus ipsum beatum virum sodalitati et operi Propagandae Fidei coelestem patronum elegit atque constituit.

DECRETUM

Sanctissimus Dominus noster Pius Papa X, referente infrascripto Cardinali sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefecto, suprascripta elogia, ita approbata, Martyrologio Ro-

mano suis locis respective inseri iussit. Die 10 Novembris 1909.

Fr. S. Card. MARTINELLI, *Praefectus.*

L. ✠ S.

PHILIPPUS CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus.*

III.

CIRCA CONSECRATIONEM ECCLESIAE "COEMENTO ARMATO" CONSTRUCTAE.

A Rmo Dno Iuliano Conan, Archiepiscopo Portus Principis sacrorum Rituum Congregatione nuper propositum fuit, pro opportuna solutione, sequens dubium: An ecclesia, constructa vel construenda ex materia quae *coementum armatum* nuncupatur, consecrari valeat, adhibita forma ac ritu Pontificalis Romani?

Et sacra Rituum Congregatio, exquisito Commissionis liturgicae suffragio, ita respondendum sensuit: *Affirmative,* dummodo duodecim crucium loca, et postes ianuae principalis, sint ex lapide.

Atque ita rescripsit, die 12 Novembris 1909.

Fr. S. Card. MARTINELLI, *Praefectus.*

L. ✠ S.

PHILIPPUS CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus.*

S. CONGREGAZIONE DEL CONCILIO.

CONCORSO

Per ordine superiore, e in conformità al Regolamento annesso alla Costituzione Apostolica *Sapienti consilio,* parte I, capo 2, si dichiara aperto un concorso per due posti di scrittore nella Segreteria della S. C. del Concilio. I sacerdoti che volessero concorrere sono invitati a presentare alla Segreteria della stessa S. C. regolare domanda, munita dei requisiti necessari e titoli per l'ammissione, nel termine di un mese dalla data del presente avviso.

Roma, 6 Novembre 1909.

L. ✠ S.

B. POMPILI, *Segretario.*

SACRA PENITENZIERIA.

CONCORSO

Indicitur omnibus et singulis in ordine sacro constitutis, concurrere volentibus ad munus officialis sacrae Poenitentiariae, ut, intra spatium triginta dierum a data praesentium computandum, documenta de nomine, cognomine, patria, consensu Emi Cardinalis Urbis Vicarii, bono proprii Ordinarii testimonio, aetate, requisitis, studiis, conditione, exercitio ceterisque qualitatibus et gradibus R. P. D. Oresti Giorgi Regenti, vel R. P. D. Iosepho Latini Correctori exhibeant; quibus probatis, admittentur ad concursum, qui habebitur in Secretaria S. Poenitentiariae die 24 Novembris hora octava ante meridiem, pro examine in scriptis; die vero 30 Novembris hora nona ante meridiem in aedibus nostris, pro examine orali.

Datum Romae, ex nostris aedibus, die 22 Octobris 1909.

S. Card. VANNUTELLI, *Poenitentiarius maior.*

L. ✠ S.

VINCENTIUS CAN. ROSETTI, *S. P. Capellanus.*

ROMAN CURIA.

Official announcement is made of the following honors:

4 November: The Rev James Anesagasti, Canon of the Metropolitan Church of Guadalaxara, nominated to the Cathedral See of Campeche in Mexico.

The Rev. Right Rev. John Stariha, formerly Bishop of Lead, appointed to the titular See of Antipatris in Palestine.

12 November: The Rev. Joseph of Jesus Guzman, Canon of the Metropolitan Church of Durango, nominated to the Cathedral See of Taumalipas in Mexico.

21 September: The Rev. Victor Deby, of the Diocese of Nicaragua, for Honorary Chamberlain *in abito paonazzo.*

8 October: The Rev. Augustine Piaggio, of the Archdiocese of Buenos Ayres, for the same honor.

Studies and Conferences.

OUR ANALECTA.

The Roman documents for the month are:

SOVEREIGN PONTIFF grants to the members of the Holy Name Society (a) Plenary Indulgence for wearing the Society badge in procession (i. e. at their "Rallies"), on condition that they go to confession and receive Communion; (b) Indulgence of 300 days, once a day, for saying "Blessed be the Name of God," to those members who regularly wear the badge in public; and (c) the Apostolic Benediction to the editors and readers of the *Holy Name Journal,* and to all who work for the spread of the Society.

S. CONGREGATION OF RITES: 1. Publishes some corrections and additions to the Roman Breviary—viz. for the feast of St. John Chrysostom (27 January); the feast of the Most Precious Blood (first Sunday of July); the feast of the Holy Name of Mary (Sunday within the octave of the Nativity of the B. V. M.); the feast of the Seven Dolors B. V. M. (third Sunday in September); the feast of St. Francis Xavier (3 December); and for the feast of St. Paulinus (24 June).

2. Additions and changes are indicated for the Roman Martyrology—27 January, 6 March, 7 March, 15 March, 23 March, 3 December.

3. Sanctions the consecration of church edifices built of cement or concrete (*coementum armatum*).

SS. CONGREGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL AND OF THE PENITENTIARY issue announcements for the concursus of officials for their respective departments, as prescribed by the Decree *Sapienti consilio.*

ROMAN CURIA announces recent appointments.

FREQUENT COMMUNION AND THE EUCHARISTIC FAST.

In replying to a suggestion of a correspondent in the December issue of the REVIEW, advocating the modification of the present law of fasting for those who wish to communicate frequently, we stated that, in order to open the way practically

toward obtaining such modification it would be necessary before all to point out definitely the reasons, social, ecclesiastical, and hygienic, the existence of which our correspondent had estimated in a general way. The following letter is the answer, which we submit to our clerical readers with a view to further discussion:

To the Editor, The Ecclesiastical Review.

Ever since the appearance of the Decree on Frequent Communion a constant stream of books, pamphlets and articles has issued from the Catholic press, in which the several writers have exhorted the faithful to avail themselves of the privileges which the Decree extends to them. Priests in their pulpits have everywhere zealously urged the Holy Father's fervent appeal. The results have been most gratifying, as every pastor of souls can happily testify. Communions have been multiplied and the spiritual life of our people has been wonderfully benefited. While, however, writers and preachers have thus earnestly exhorted the faithful to the practice of frequent Communion, not a word has been said or written (so far as I am aware) in behalf of large classes of our people who are practically prevented from receiving Holy Communion frequently by the severe requirements of the law of fasting. As examples of these classes I may instance the following:

1. In our country churches Masses are usually fixed at a late hour to accommodate the scattered population of the parishes. This is especially true of mission churches, in which the priests may be saying a second Mass. The people come to these churches from long distances and, if they propose to receive Holy Communion, they are obliged, besides, to fast until 10 o'clock, or 11, or even later. Experience shows that the few who do receive Holy Communion at these Masses receive but rarely. Were it not for the necessity of fasting till nearly mid-day, there is every reason to believe that very many more of such people would approach the altar. Catholics living in country districts are necessarily deprived of many of the spiritual advantages which are within reach of their more fortunate brethren who live in cities and towns. This is an additional reason why their reception of Holy Communion should be facilitated rather than hindered. Exhortations to frequent Communion can mean nothing to the large number of Catholics who fall under this class, as long as the law obliging them to a rigorous fast remains in force.

2. A large number of our girls are employed as night operators in telephone offices. A midnight luncheon is usually provided for

such operators. Many of them would, doubtless, gladly receive Holy Communion on their way home from duty at 6 or 7 o'clock were it not for the law of fasting. To take their luncheon before midnight would mean an impossible fast of six or seven hours while working. The law operates similarly against other night workers, such as nurses, who would be unable to fast from midnight until the time of the first available Mass.

3. There is every reason to believe that a great many working people (who should receive every encouragement in this matter) would receive Holy Communion on week days as well as on Sundays if some mitigation were allowed in the law of fasting. As it is, it is simply impossible for them to go to church, return home for breakfast, and then hurry to their several places of work. The comparatively few who do attempt it are usually obliged to cut short their prayers and thanksgiving, much to the detriment of their spirit of piety. And there are many housekeepers who would be glad to go to Mass and receive Holy Communion after their early morning work is finished, if they could do so without being obliged to an absolute fast.

4. In most parish churches there is an "after breakfast" Mass at 9 or half past 9 o'clock during Lent. The attendance at this Mass is always very large; Communions, however, are few. It seems certain that a very considerable proportion of those who attend this Mass could be brought to receive daily Communion during this season of devotion, if they were allowed to take their cup of coffee before Mass instead of after it.

These are some of the deserving classes of Catholics against whom the present law of fasting operates to prevent a more frequent reception of Holy Communion; there are, doubtless, others. I have enumerated these in the hope that some of your readers may take up this matter and discuss the needs of these Catholics and the possible mitigation of the present strict fasting discipline. We all recognize that the conditions of life at present are very different from those which prevailed when this discipline first went into effect. Sacraments are for the good of our souls; and it seems a pity that the good to be derived from the greatest of the Sacraments should be so absolutely conditioned by a requirement which is purely physical. The law of fasting in reference to Holy Communion is, speaking generally, absolute. No latitude whatever, in this respect, is allowed to the bodily condition while, on the other hand, short of mortal sin, considerable latitude is tolerated in the condition of the souls of those who may receive.

S. C. B.

THE BISHOP'S RIGHT TO FIX AN AGE LIMIT FOR ADMISSION TO FIRST COMMUNION.

We have been asked whether a diocesan statute determining a fixed age before which children are not to be admitted to First Communion has any binding force, since it appears to contradict the general law of the Church which gives to the individual, if properly instructed, the right of receiving Communion as soon as he or she has arrived at the age of discretion. Since the development of the natural intelligence of children is not confined to a fixed age, it would seem that to prevent a child from receiving Communion when its intelligent appreciation of the graces of the Blessed Eucharist fits it for the same, is depriving the individual of a right beyond the reach of episcopal or parish legislation.

The answer to this difficulty is that a bishop may fix by diocesan statute a certain age before which children are not to be admitted to the solemn and public celebration of First Communion in the parish church. For many reasons a uniform method of admission to a sort of parochial incorporation through the solemn act of First Communion may be desirable and useful. Thus the retention of children in the parish school, their introduction to the sodality, or to certain other organizations connected with the church, may be more readily secured for the benefit of the parochial body; above all, the instruction in the rudiments and practices of faith will have a better chance of becoming a vital matter of conscientious observance the longer children are kept under the surveillance and direction of teachers and priests.

On the other hand, no ecclesiastical authority can hinder a child who has undoubtedly the proper dispositions for receiving the Sacrament from doing so as soon and as often as he or she desires. This is the right of every properly instructed and disposed Christian according to the decrees of the Fourth Lateran and the Tridentine Council, not to mention more recent Pontifical enactments. It may be objected that an ecclesiastical superior may for the sake of the general good oblige the individual to hold in abeyance the exercise of his ordinary rights. Yes, unless the suspension of such rights hinder the spiritual welfare of the individual without absolute necessity, or unless there is fear of the probable im-

minence of a greater evil to the community. As a matter of fact this contingency is not included in such legislation, which is based on purely prudential and pastoral reasons.

But there is on record a comparatively recent decision, in the above sense, by the Sacred Congregation of the Council. The Bishop of Annecy, in 1887, wishing to secure uniformity in pastoral ministration throughout his diocese, made, among other laws, one according to which no child that had not attained its twelfth year was to be admitted to First Communion. A parish priest objected to this statute, and the matter was referred to Rome:

An Decreta Episcopi Anneciensis sint confirmanda vel infirmanda in casu?

Resp. *Affirmative* ad primam partem, juxta modum. Modus est ne Episcopus parochos prohibeat ab admittendis ad primam Communionem iis pueris, de quibus certo constat eos ad discretionis aetatem juxta Conciliorum Lateranensis IV et Tridentini Decreta pervenisse.

Sanctissimus vero, in audientia diei 23 Julii jussit declarari verba *ad primam Communionem* esse intelligenda ad exclusionem primae Communionis *in forma solemni.*

The decision was variously interpreted, until a further instruction of the Cardinal Prefect made it plain in the following exposition: "Parochus potest S. Communionem administrare juveni quem ipse reputat *instructum* et quem dicit habere discretionem intelligendi id quod agit, sed *privatim* absque ulla solemnitate et publicitate; at cum agitur de administranda S. Communione *in forma publica et solemni* juxta morem ecclesiarum Franciae, observari debet decretum episcopale" (Cf. Mocchegiani, *Jurisprudentia,* tom. I, cap. IV, ad 1068).

THE RIGHT TO ADMIT CHILDREN TO FIRST COMMUNION.

Qu. I have just read the August number of your esteemed REVIEW.

On page 234 you claim for Sisters the right to admit their day-scholars to Holy Communion irrespective of the pastor's rights, because of the affirmative answer given to the General of the Regulars of the Scholae Piae, asking: "An et quomodo Clerici Regulares etc. . . . jus habeant admittendi" etc.

Will you kindly inform me whether in the present canonical legislation Sisters are considered as *Clerici?* There seems to be a great difference between priests and ordinary lay-sisters.

We have a couple of boarding schools here, governed by Sisters, and although we never have difficulties, it is good to know one's rights. Thanking you beforehand, I am very respectfully

FR. REGINALD YZENDOORN,
Vicariate Apostolic of Hawaii.

Resp. The question whether the right of religious (*Regulares*) to admit children to First Communion, irrespective of the pastor's claims, is confined to communities of priests, such as the Regulars of the Scholae Piae, is to be answered in the negative. That right belongs to the children's parents or to whomsoever these choose to commit it; and in the next place to the confessor. Canon Law does not admit of pastoral rights in this matter. "Puerorum ad primam Communionem admissio, inter jura parochialia minime accensetur," writes Mocchegiani, quoting Bouix (*De Jure Reg.*, tom. II, p. 210); and he adds "contraria opinio vix confutatione digna videtur" (*Jurisprudentia ecclesiastica,* tom. I, cap. IV, n. 1068).

It is on this principle that the S. Congregation decides such doubts as the one of which we gave an instance in the case referred to by our correspondent. The question whether Sisters come under the term *clerici* is hardly pertinent therefore.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR OUR CATECHISMS.

TO THE EDITOR, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

It may or may not help to jot down what occurred to one old teacher when reading Monsgr. Dunne's suggestive article on this subject.

There is no need of apology for making suggestions. The feeling that our catechisms need improvement is quite general.

It would be an improvement to impart a knowledge of what religion is; but can that be done by a definition? How much does a child really learn by definitions? Think how difficult it is for a child to give a definition of something already perfectly well known to the child. Suppose we say to the child: "Shut your eyes and tell me what a chair is." The child knows as much about a chair as I know; but it is beyond the child's power to define it in words. Definition is not the natural way of imparting knowledge to a child.

The additional catechetical instruction suggested by Monsgr. Dunne is needed; the problem is how to impart it. Instead of 25 questions he would have to ask at least a hundred, and make them much more concrete, before the instruction could be assimilated by children.

The Trinitarian division of the Apostles' Creed is a long step in the way of improvement.

The "old-time and common-sense division" of the catechism might still serve if consistently carried out. I do not know; for what appears a nice order of sequence to us adults may not be the order best suited for instruction of children. But anyhow it was too inconsistent as it stood. The sacramental system involves a large number of the most vital articles of faith, and yet it was placed outside of "what we are to believe." The Sacraments are not co-ordinate with the Church. They are part of the Church, and yet they were treated as if apart from the Church, under different general headings. The Baltimore Catechism has the following:

Q. Which are the means instituted by our Lord to enable men at all times to share in the fruits of the Redemption?

A. The means . . . are the Church and the Sacraments.

A pedagogical objection to this arrangement is that it places an obstacle in the way of the children getting any complete idea either of the Church or the Sacraments. It is the definition-method and too mechanical. Monsgr. Dunne's Trinitarian division of the Creed suggests a more vital method. Connect the Church and *her* Sacraments with the abiding Presence of the Holy Ghost as closely in the catechism as they are connected in the Creed, and the children will understand whence it is that the Sacraments have their divine efficacy. They will understand it, not by any definitions that may be given, but by a proper sequence of facts, images, and ideas.

TEACHER.

THE REFORM IN CHASUBLES.

TO THE EDITOR, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

Fra Arminio's article on the Chasuble is delightful. We know that our modern vestments are ugly, we would like to have chasubles more conformable to the beautiful chasubles of old; but where can we get them? Will Fra Arminio tell us the name and address of someone who makes them?

If there were a firm somewhere in the world that would make nothing but what was beautiful and rubrical, we could write or go there with confidence for what we wanted.

A gentleman who was sick and tired of reading "about" how Mass should be sung, asked me to tell him where he could hear the Proper and Common of the Mass as it ought to be sung. I suggested a certain Seminary near his home. He went there. I asked him how he liked it. He said: "It gave me a pain."

Don't tell us what we ought to have. Let us hear it and see it, and we will gladly follow. Let us have the names of half a dozen churches in the United States where everything is rubrical and beautiful, where all the ceremonies are correctly and reverently carried out, and we will go to see them and learn. One church that has everything correct, will do more to reform the Rubrics than thousands of pages of writing.

J. F. SHEAHAN.

Church of St. Peter, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE OLD ROMAN (GOTHIC) CHASUBLE.

A correspondent who favors the introduction of the older form of chasuble, as suggested in the December number, but who apprehends difficulties on the score of prejudice, habit, and mercantile convenience, directs our attention to a paper on this subject by Bishop William von Keppler in the *Archiv. Christ. Kunst.* The Bishop proposes that the graceful style of the old Roman—miscalled "Gothic"—chasuble be first adopted in the cathedrals, where the distinction would be not only natural as befitting the more solemn ceremonial but would likewise be more easily understood as a mark of episcopal bearing. He suggests the Borromean form (for city churches) on solemn festivals, which would familiarize the faithful with the fact that it is not a question of change, as though the old vestments were censurable, but rather of an increase of beauty in the form of paramentics befitting the solemnity of exceptional services. For weekdays Bishop Keppler would recommend the old form of chasuble, but in the ampler fashion actually in use in Rome.

We outlined in the last number the general shape of the older form as contrasted with the cut-away fashion of the present-day, factory-made chasuble. In the February issue we shall bring exact patterns as made according to definite principles of Christian art and liturgical law.

It may be added here that the learned Luxembourg writer

on paramentics, Father J. Braun, S.J., endorses the opinion of the Bishop of Rotenberg, and stands for a gradual or discriminating introduction which will allow a proper place for the three kinds of chasuble mentioned.

THE FACULTY "DISPENSANDI AB IMPEDIMENTIS MATRIMONIALIBUS, IMMINENTE MORTIS PERICULO".

In the November number of the REVIEW on page 617, in summarizing the decision *de facultate dispensandi ab impedimentis matrimonialibus* (page 586), it is stated that "the faculty . . . does not apply to those who live in concubinage, but to any other cause" etc. By a printer's error the word "merely" before "apply" has been omitted, as will be plain if the reader refers to the document which accompanies the summary. Accordingly the faculty is to be understood as applying not only in case of concubinage, but in other cases also when there is need of providing for the relief of conscience.

THE OBLIGATION OF THE "ORATIO IMPERATA".

Qu. What is the law governing the "Oratio imperata"? For what length of time can a bishop indict an "imperata"? Does it continue in force after his death until a new bishop is appointed? Can an administrator "sede vacante" order an "imperata"?

I have been unable to find anything definite on the question in the various hand-books of Canon Law. I think the answer would interest quite a number of clergymen. A. C. Z.

Resp. The *imperata* is in force as long as the bishop wishes, or until he revokes the obligation. If the bishop order an *imperata* for a definitely assigned cause, the obligation ceases when the assigned cause ceases.

It does not continue in force after the bishop's death or transfer, unless renewed by his successor.

The administrator has the right to order an *imperata* for special cause. (See ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW YEAR BOOK for 1909, p. 13.)

THE ALTAR-BREADS.

To the Editor, The Ecclesiastical Review.

In discussing the period beyond which altar-breads are not to be used, the point should, I think, be taken into consideration that old hosts, especially in a dry climate, are more likely to crumble. They leave numerous and minute fragments on the corporal. On account of their small size it is more difficult to gather these up with the paten. In consuming the Host one is apt to touch it with the lower lip or the teeth which causes such particles to separate more readily from a host dry from several weeks' age, and the fragments naturally adhere to the organs and are transferred to the rim of the chalice. When distributing Holy Communion, little pieces frequently become detached from the Hosts, falling on the Communion cloth or on the floor directly, or they adhere to the priest's fingers. In purifying the ciborium there will sometimes be considerable difficulty in getting all the minute particles out with the wine and water. All these difficulties savoring of possible irreverence can be avoided only by the use of fresh altar-breads. R.

Criticisms and Notes.

NEW SERIES OF HOMILIES FOR THE WHOLE YEAR. By the Right Rev. Jeremias Bonomelli, D. D. Translated by the Right Rev. Thomas Byrne, D. D. Four volumes. New York: Benziger Brothers. 1909.

CATECHISM IN EXAMPLES. By the Rev. D. Chisholm. Five volumes. New York: Benziger Brothers. 1909.

THE SERMON OF THE SEA and Other Studies. By the Rev. Robert Kane, S. J. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1909.

HUMANITY—ITS DESTINY AND THE MEANS TO ATTAIN IT. By the Rev. Henry Denifle, O. P. Translated by the Very Rev. Ferdinand Brossart, V. G. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1909.

Some helps for "the pulpit" and—may it not be so augured?—for "the pew", since *correlativa sunt simul et re et ratione*, as say the philosophers. When a bishop, with the wisdom, enlightened zeal, and the just sense of "actuality" which his preceding works show to be so eminently exercised by the present occupant of the See of Cremona, undertakes to write and have published four volumes of homilies, one may be assured in advance that the work will be worth while; will be solid and usable. And when one observes that a busy American prelate has given his time and labor to translating these volumes, the assurance becomes doubly assured. If with this *a priori* anticipation one takes up the volumes themselves, one quickly finds it justified.

These are homilies that explain. They illuminate and bring out the literal meaning of God's Word. They are not subjective aerial speculations, nor are they catenae of passages from the Fathers. Their author has utilized the wisdom of the great commentators, but he has passed it through his own mind, made it his own and set it down in plain language understanded surely of his own people. Fortunately, too, the translation does justice to the original. The English is English, not a mongrel of foreign idioms. The priest who will give an hour or even less to the reading of the pertinent Epistle or Gospel homily need never let his people go without a solidly instructive and practical understanding of the divine word which the Church has selected for their support and comfort. The discourses may not lend themselves to outbursts of passionate oratory, or to inflated self-preachments; but they will supply the pastor with abundant food with which to strengthen and edify his flock.

If, moreover, in preparing for his Sunday discourses the priest will draw for illustrative stories on the *Catechism in Examples*, compiled by Father Chisholm in the work placed second on the above list, he can add not a little to the interest of the Scriptural commentary. Reference has previously been made in the REVIEW to this collection of illustrations designed for catechetical instructions, but equally available for all pulpit purposes. Not every story set down in the five volumes will appeal to every one who uses the work, but there is such a rich abundance of matter that usually something will be found adapted to one's purpose. It is easily the best collection of illustrative material to be found in English.

Reverting again to the above-mentioned Homilies, it should be noted that, though the preface promises Homilies for every Sunday of the year, should the priest who uses the work depend upon it for the sixth Sunday after Epiphany, he would have to content himself on that day with the experience of Old Mother Hubbard, when she went to the cupboard. It was probably an oversight that the author passed by the beautiful parable of the mustard seed and the leaven hidden in the meal.

The third book on the list above does not strictly belong to pulpit literature. The *Sermon of the Sea*, which gives it its title, was not uttered by human lips. The sea itself here preaches its own sermon. Rather is it the deep voicing the divine praises, the *benedicite maria et flumina Domino*. Besides this song of the sea there are a score of other "studies"—none dry—on subjects supernatural as these reflect themselves in nature, studies which reveal the spiritual in the material, the ideal in the sensible, the divine in the human. It were useless to set down here the titles of these studies, as the headings could hardly even suggest to the reader the matter or the lines of the thought. A casual persual of the pages might indeed lead one to side with the author's "candid" friends who "have sometimes accused him of literary affectation"; for almost every sentence scintillates with some brilliant of the imagination; so that one's eye is almost bedazzled by the multiplied radiations. If one takes, however, the author's assurance that he wrote "under the absorbing inspiration of nature" and "sought to express what he felt of its impetuous power" and therefore "spoke rather than wrote"—if one, in a word, tries to enter into the author's spirit and reads the book with the ear rather than the eye, the luxuriant wealth of fancy will not so much arrest the intellect from the embodied thought. The book belongs to the literature of power rather than of technical knowledge. The priest will gather from it inspirations

and suggestions to quicken his spirit and to utilize the ministry of nature in uplifting himself and his people—to find the sermons in stones, tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, and the good in everything.

The lectures delivered by the learned Dominican historian, the late Father Denifle, and translated by Father Brossart, Vicar General of the Diocese of Covington, are not really sermons, though they were originally delivered from the Cathedral pulpit in Gratz, Austria. They are, strictly speaking, "discourses", reasoned elaborations of principles—principles in the first place rational, natural, that express the fundamental relations of man, individual and social, to God; in the second place principles supernatural, that grow out of the Incarnation and express the relation of the Catholic Church to the perfection, moral, intellectual, spiritual, of humanity—or rather the other way about, of humanity to the Church as the teacher and organ of grace and truth. These principles are carefully formulated and solidly established as real. They are then unfolded with rigid consecutiveness and a wealth of learning—philosophical, theological, and historical. The book is not such that one may read it while running. One must sit down leisurely and think along steadily if one would profit. The profit will be increased, by imparting depth and breadth of vision, and suggestive thoughts that the preacher can use, once they have passed into his own spiritual life. The translator "out of profound respect for the author has adhered closely to his mode of expression". One could wish that equal tenderness had been exercised toward the reader. The English is not as smooth as one would like it, and does not facilitate the process of mental assimilation. The meaning, however, will nowhere escape the *willing* reader, who, moreover, may be the better for the increased attention demanded of him.

PREDIGTEN UND ANSPRACHEN zunaechst fuer die Jugend gebildeter Staende. Von Mgr. Dr. Paul Baron de Mathies (Ansgar Albing). Erster Band. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder. 1909.

Those of the readers of THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW who may be acquainted with the numerous and varied writings of Ansgar Albing—for such is the author's pseudonym—will heartily welcome this latest literary venture of the gifted and versatile writer. The author, it is true, has in the *Predigten und Ansprachen* entered upon a new line of literary endeavor. But, whilst it need scarcely be said that sermons differ essentially in content, style, and method of

handling, from other forms of writing, sacred and profane, we have here the same distinctive qualities of style and manner which mark the purely literary productions of the author.

Monsignor Mathies is a literary artist of recognized ability. Everywhere in German-speaking countries his novels, poems, and short stories have won for him general recognition. The author's high connexions in his native city—he is the scion of an old patrician family of Hamburg—and his intimate relations with the Austrian and Italian nobility have enabled him to portray with color and precision the manners, the aspirations, and the foibles of modern society, as is evident from his society novels. The style is distinctive and fascinating.

Similarly the author's poetic productions present a round of lyrics full of inspiration and charm. They are the finely finished utterances of a poet commenting upon men and happenings as they presented themselves to a mind keenly sensitive to everything that is beautiful and elevating.

While the author's poems and works of fiction aim primarily, though not exclusively, at affording his readers healthful exhilaration and ennobling enjoyment, his apologetic and ascetical works —such as *Religion in Salon und Welt, Nim und Lies, Harmonien und Disharmonien der Seele, Epistulae Redivivae*—are chiefly addressed to Catholics whose social position and environment are, in no small measure, responsible for the manifold dangers to which their faith and morals are exposed. The same phases of the author's productive and versatile mind, reflected singly in his novels, poems, short stories, published letters, apologetic and ascetical works, are to be found combined in the *Predigten und Ansprachen* before us. There is throughout an originality of manner that lends charm and interest to the book, converting what might otherwise have possibly proved a collection of dry and dull talks into eloquent and impressive sermons. The practical lessons which they convey are enhanced by the literary grace with which they are set forth. For the rest, the style is clear and plain throughout, at times even severely plain in its classic stateliness. The author delivers his august message with all the accompaniment of learning, depth of thought, and the reverential attitude which best becomes it. He has manifestly spent much time in study and meditation upon the Holy Scriptures and the liturgical books of the Church before committing these "Sermons and Addresses" to paper.

And this fact is no doubt the chief cause of that charming aroma of simplicity and directness—such as we associate with the *Parochial and Plain Sermons* of Cardinal Newman—which pervades

the entire volume. The perfection of art is hidden in the careful proportioning of parts. In matter of fact, a refined and ideal temperament looks out through every one of them,—a temperament quick to perceive and happy to linger on the inner beauties and harmonies of the Catholic religion.

But whatever may be said of the literary and esthetic character of these "Sermons and Addresses", it is more especially their apologetic and ascetical worth that merits a particular recommendation. Thanks to his first-hand knowledge of Protestantism in various shapes and forms and to years of personal contact with Protestants of many shades, the author is in a position to estimate, at its full value, the happiness of membership in the Church of Christ. This is a favorite topic of the author. Moreover, his personal experience of the spiritual life, in many phases, entitles him to assume the responsibility of a guide and adviser to such Catholics, in particular, as by reason of indifference and worldly-mindedness stand most sorely in need of spiritual direction and enlightenment. In a candid and withal sympathetic tone the author directs, cautions, or reproves, as the spirit moves him. At one time it is the uncompromising postulates of Catholic dogma, at another the enrapturing beauty of Catholic ideals and the ineffable delights springing from a life of Christian perfection that he unfolds to his reader in his luminous and inimitable fashion; at another, with his finger firmly set on the pulse of the times, he discloses the multiform and complex evils that gnaw, canker-like, at the very vitals of religion, morality, and social well-being. Then, too, he does not hesitate, on occasion, to sound notes of warning to Catholics whose faith is dormant and whose devotion to the interests and demands of their holy religion is being displaced by, if it has not already succumbed to, cold indifference to matters of religious practice and belief.

The "Sermons and Addresses" comprise two parts. The first consists of twenty-four sermons for the Sundays and chief festivals from the first Sunday of Advent to Low Sunday. The second part contains eleven occasional sermons. I should recommend the *Predigten und Ansprachen* to all priests and educated laymen acquainted with the German language. Here the reader will find not only a collection of solid, practical, and inspiring sermons, but instructive and readable chapters on the great truths of the spiritual life.

O. L. L.

THE MEANING OF TRUTH. A Sequel to "Pragmatism." By William James. Longmans, Green & Co.: New York. Pp. xx–298.

The sub-title of this work but recently from the press recalls the whole war of words waged with rather unnecessary seriousness around the somewhat mystic "Pragmatism" championed during the last few years by Professor James. The present work, however, will be a decided disappointment to all who have taken any real interest in the matter; since, so far from being a "sequel" to "Pragmatism", it is its merely diluted reiteration; for nine out of the fifteen articles which it contains either preceded that work, or were practically contemporaneous with it; and all are reprints excepting two; one of which is an unimportant "dialogue" of ten pages at the conclusion of the work. With a similarly unimportant preface, these two articles form the only new portions of the work, and they are new only in a chronological sense.

Since, moreover, Pragmatism completely denies every ordinary anchorage of daily human thought, no time need be spent in tracing its misleading etymology. Historically, the name and the system (?) originated with C. S. Peirce in 1878, and led an extremely anaemic existence until, twenty years later, Professor James of Harvard, by a liberal infusion of his peculiarly striking adjectives and adverbs, galvanized the new ideas into agile and seemingly robust life; so much so that they became everywhere known, and found especially ardent advocates in Schiller in England, Le Roy in France, and Papini in Italy. Peirce was very soon forced to bewail this active and powerful patronage, for his principal ideas had become utterly unrecognizable under the Jamesonic and other metamorphoses; and, abandoning the misappropriated name, he retained, and still further evolved, his original thought under the new designation of "Pragmaticism", a word ugly enough, he says, to no longer tempt kidnappers. Since then, the fortunes of the system have been very varied. Trained philosophers readily pointed out the palpable contradictions and absurdities of the theory; but the ordinary, half-read philosophical dilettanti eagerly welcomed a system which seemed to open long-closed doors with surprising ease, and to place even the great problems hitherto deemed far too abstruse for popular treatment within their convenient reach and command. Needless to say, the new hope was more brilliant than real.

In our own very brief account of Pragmatism and of its peculiar theory of truth, we shall restrict ourselves mainly to Professor James; since he is sufficiently expository and typical, and is especially representative of American Pragmatism. His principal utter-

ances are to be found in three different works following in close succession upon one another: *Pragmatism, A Pluralistic Universe,* and the present work. Professor James is not without a great deal of originality, but it is rather of expression than of thought. He leans heavily upon others. In his *Pragmatism*, he is very evidently inspired to a great extent by Papini. In *A Pluralistic Universe,* Bergson is avowedly his prophet, and in the present work, Schiller and Dewey lend him much aid, wherever his anxious pen is not evidently seeking the path of least resistance through the tangled mass of adverse criticism which has accumulated around his own ill-considered utterances. At times he becomes penitent, and regrets his unguarded language, but he also as soon forgets his confession, and loads his critics with the most drastic abuse.

Our own task is not unlike that of the bewildered professor. We must attempt what no Pragmatist has ever accomplished; that is, we must seek to induce some order into a maze of philosophico-theological thought which touches every branch of higher human knowledge, yet in which confusion reigns supreme. The mind naturally awaits a definition of the new system, but Peirce, James, and Papini all warn us not to expect a definition of Pragmatism. We can, therefore, only take advantage of those respects in which the Pragmatists themselves are the least involved; and, by doing this, we may say at once that Pragmatism includes three principal things: a mental attitude, a theory of reality, and a theory of truth. As to the first, Pragmatism is in open revolt against usual, intellectual methods. Regarding both reality and truth, "creative" is the word to keep in mind; for Pragmatists claim a really creative efficiency with regard to both; their kind of objective existences, and truth itself, being said to spring into their only real existence at Pragmatism's magic touch. According to this principle, that alone is true which, being tested by the demands of practical, daily exigences, works out in a way that is advantageous to us, and "guides us prosperously" in our daily wishes and needs. Reality owes its existence to the same means; and it must be remembered here that the Pragmatist does not talk thus as of a *test* of truth or reality, but of their very *fieri*, of their very coming into existence. We need not say that in this summary we shall weigh pragmatic utterances according to their objective value, and not according to the assurances of Pragmatists as to what they really mean.

And pausing a moment for the brief criticism which alone is possible here, we may quote and adopt, with regard to Pragmatism's rejection of intellectualism (often called "rationalism" in pragmatic manuals) the words of a recent newspaper critic concerning

Pragmatism as set forth by James. "There is something of the hilarity of sport in dragging out the inconsistencies, if not insincerities, of a philosopher who has tried to defend rationally a system which is professedly an attack on rationalism. For just that, and nothing more, is Pragmatism. It is easy to show that such a philosopher ought, so far as the correspondence of logic and reality goes, to be a complete sceptic". In his first work, Professor James makes very strenuous efforts to appear thoroughly convinced that he is dealing with the deepest and most important realities; appealing, even, to the sense of responsibility with which man's real and necessary creation of truth and of reality should invest his every act. But, after becoming first irritable and then despairing under the continual cross-fire of his adversaries, he gives, in his second work, an account of his troubled mental times, and frankly says:[1] "I had literally come to the end of my conceptual stock-in-trade, I was bankrupt intellectualistically, and had to change my base." And:[2] "I hoped ever for an intellectualist way round the difficulty, and it was only after reading Bergson that I saw that to continue the intellectualist method was itself the fault. I saw that philosophy had been on a false scent ever since the days of Socrates and Plato, that an *intellectual* answer to the intellectualist's difficulties will never come, and that the real way out of them, far from consisting in the discovery of such an answer, consists in simply closing one's ear to the question". As a natural result, he says,[3] "I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably." To finish the narrative at once, we may add that the next stage in the professor's mental phenomena consisted in his going through Bergson's "inner catastrophe," in placing himself, that is, "at a bound, or *d'emblée*," as that author says, "inside of the living, moving, active thickness of the real." All of which only moves the same critic to further complain, "But what will you do if, before the ink is fairly dry on your book, this Proteus of the lecture hall is before the world with a recantation of his errors and a frank retreat to just such logical scepticism as you denounced him for not confessing?" This instant plunge into the "inside of the real" is a recent and favorite prescription of Bergson. It is of an essentially mystic and mysterious character; but is partially described as an "inner catastrophe", a critical, and, as it were philosophically climacteric change, which seems to consist principally in the negative attitude of refusing everything that

[1] *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 291-2.
[2] Ibid., p. 291.
[3] Ibid., p. 212.

ordinary men believe, with a further consequence of liberty to believe whatever one's self may wish to hold. Professor James claims to have taken the leap, and he recommends it most highly to others. But, in very truth, the total result of Pragmatism's revolt against intellectualism plus the bound *d'emblée* of Bergson and James is to deprive their adherents of any even probable belief.

Regarding its second quasi-definite doctrine, that, namely, concerning "reality", Pragmatism is emphatically a philosophy of the "flux". "The stubborn fact remains", says Professor James[4] "that there *is* a sensible flux", and he excludes all else by practically making his own such utterances as the following,[5] "'Behind the bare phenomenal facts', as my tough-minded old friend Chauncey Wright, the great Harvard empiricist of my youth, used to say, 'there is *nothing*.'" For Professor James and the Pragmatists, this flux of sensation is the only real world, and for them,[6] "the world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands." The pragmatic idea is that we, adventitiously touched, as it were, by this "flux", seize upon it, and build reality out upon it, and thus augment the actual extension of reality; and this, not by any mere rearrangement of its parts, or by borrowing any part of preëxistent reality, but, by a truly creative act, causing the whole of something to exist where there was absolutely nothing before. One is here mildly reminded of Kant, but Professor James explicitly warns us that Pragmatism is by no means Kantism. When we remember, further, that the power within us which thus "creates" sensible, or sensational, and therefore material, reality, is, for James, our thought, and for Papini, our imagination, it is readily seen that the resulting "reality" can only be of the most illusory and fantastic kind.

Pragmatism's third doctrine, that of truth, claims a very open field; for we are told[7] that "at present we have no definite notion of what the word may mean." The old idea that truth consisted in a relatively static correspondence of the mind with the thing is expressly rejected, the word "static" itself being an object of especial abhorrence; and in the substitute thesis of Pragmatism, truth —meaning all conceivable truth—exists, like reality, only in a fusible, malleable condition; for we are told again[8] that "we have to live to-day by what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood"; a precept, we may note in passing, that Mr. James very faithfully follows. He himself had made, as far

[4] *Pragmatism*, p. 255.
[5] *Pragmatism*, p. 263.
[6] *Pragmatism*, p. 257.
[7] *Pragmatism*, p. 192.
[8] *Pragmatism*, p. 223.

back as 1897, some initial essays in this matter of truth, the results appearing finally in a rather heterogeneous volume, *The Will to Believe*; a somewhat unfortunate title, since in the hands of the critics it became *The Will to Deceive, The Will to Make-Believe,* etc., compendiously expressing their judgments upon it. In his later utterances on truth, he is reporting Schiller and explaining that author's "humanism", rather than attempting any further analysis of his own. Combining, however, the utterances of all its exponents, it is clear that Pragmatism seeks to show that in regard to truth, not less than in regard to reality, man is a true creator, that we see "truth in the making," that we ourselves build truth out upon truth, just as we are said to build reality out upon reality, and both from nothing. Absolute truth, we are told, nowhere exists. Even our most basic principles of thought are, for Pragmatism, only unusually fortunate, workable guesses which no actual experience has as yet, indeed, disproved; but which might, at any time, and by any accident, be seen to be wholly erroneous. A list of ill-starred "truths" of this kind *de facto* shattered in this wholly unpremeditated manner is given by Professor James in his characteristically confident and flippant manner; and it will be noted that his gaiety increases with the gravity of the subjects he attacks. "Ptolemaic astronomy", he says,[9] "euclidean space, aristotelian logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled over those limits, and we now call these things only relatively true, or true within those borders of experience. 'Absolutely' they are false; for we know that those limits were casual, and might have been transcended by past theorists just as they are by present thinkers".

As to this account of truth, Professor James's own later avowals of complete scepticism form an all-sufficient commentary; and, as we have said, the present work gives no additional light in this matter. We only note that throughout this part of the author's work, there is a woful confusion and confounding of many simple tests for truth with truth itself; and a total lack of the distinctions and divisions absolutely necessary for the proper understanding of questions involving many essentially different grades of being and of action. If, like God, we saw all things in one all-perfect glance, it would be different. Imperfect, as we are, we must divide and subdivide, in order to reach anything like accuracy.

Passing to a rapid general view, it will be seen that any careful analysis of the entire matter of Pragmatism will show that it refuses all Logic, denies all intelligible reality, ignores Psychology,

[9] *Pragmatism*, p. 223.

smiles at Mathematics as mostly "man-made", abhors Metaphysics both General and Special, and in Ethics finds that to be good which is profitable here and now, and without any reference to any outside authority or sanction. In Theology, Pragmatism is simply blasphemous. Though continually talking about religion, James never even so much as mentions Christ, while in his pages, wandering Indian "swamis," Neo-Hegelian "One-Knowers", and Fechnerian "Earth-Souls" all receive respectful consideration; after which it is less astounding to notice that a straggling "poem" of Walt Whitman, the loathsome "cow-pen" poet, furnishes the text for James's lecture on Religion. As far as anything definite can be extracted from his utterances, James is a confused, psychical-research kind of pantheist. Concerning the real God Himself, James says,[10] "The truth of 'God' has to run the gauntlet of all our other truths. It is on trial by them, and they are on trial by it. . . . Let us hope that they will find a *modus vivendi*". Speaking of accepting the evils of this world in the ordinary Christian spirit of resignation, on the ground that God's ways are unknown to us, and that He has some good reason for permitting such trials, James further says,[11] "A God who can relish such superfluities of horror is no God for human beings to appeal to. *His animal spirits are too high.*" And these flippantly blasphemous utterances could be indefinitely multiplied. We shall only say that perhaps the most characteristic note in all Pragmatism is its colossal assurance, and that it is rather too much for men whose antecedents can be known only through the various "Who's Who's," to ask us to rely upon their unsupported personal authority, and, at their simple request, to dismiss all that the world has thus far deemed valuable in the realms of thought, and to substitute for the granitic truth of the centuries the incoherent vagaries which betray complete poverty of mind regarding consecutive thought and the fundamental rules of right reason.

D. DEVER.

THE BERLIN DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION. Full Report of the Lectures given in February, 1907, and of the Evening Discussion. By Eric Wassmann. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder; London: Kegan Paul. 1909. Pp. xiv–266.

The cause and circumstances which gave rise to the "Berlin Discussion," authentically reported in the present book, will probably be already known to the reader, as they have been made known generally through the press. Father Wassmann, it will be remembered,

[10] *Pragmatism*, p. 109. [11] *Pragmatism*, p. 143.

in his work on *Modern Biology* advocated a form of evolutionism of organic species within the sub-human kingdoms. This book was animadverted on by Professor Haeckel in certain popular lectures which he had delivered in Berlin in April, 1905. Father Wassmann felt called upon to answer his critic publicly, and when subsequently he was invited by a committee of representative German scientists to deliver a course of lectures on his theory of evolution he accepted the invitation. The three lectures were given on the 13, 14, and 17 February, 1907. On 18 February there was a public discussion of the subject dealt with in the lectures, eleven prominent men of science or letters appearing on the platform as opponents of Father Wassmann. The volume at hand embodies a full report of the lectures and the discussion.

In the first lecture the author considers the doctrine of evolution as a *scientific* hypothesis and theory. He argues that the transformation of sub-human species is perfectly compatible with the Christian theory of origins, and he furnishes some evidence for such transmutations from his own private special study, the ant family and their guests. The second lecture deals with evolution *philosphically*, and proves that it is quite distinct and should be separated from atheistic or pantheistic monism as well as from the specifically Darwinian hypothesis. Darwin's method of natural selection is inadequate—though it is subsidiary—and must be supplemented by the idea of *internal* adaptivity of organisms. In the third technic it is shown that the soul of man, being a simple and spiritual substance, can certainly not be accounted for by any evolutionary process. Concerning the body, the author says that "the Church has not promulgated any definite decision as to the nature of the substance employed by God in the creation of man. Theologians, however, following constant tradition and the opinions of the ordinary teaching authority in the Church, have constantly maintained that the human body was formed of inanimate matter. Perhaps this is all that can be said on the theological side of the question. . . . . Zoology and its attendant sciences within their proper sphere are perfectly free to discuss the scientific side of man's origin. The assured results of theology need serve them only as an external standard, for one truth cannot contradict another. If science reveals some undoubted truth, theologians will accept it. I can vouch for the accuracy of this statement" (p. 55). It need hardly be said that the natural sciences have as yet discovered no evidence and no serious arguments for the bestial descent of man's body.

Whilst one who is familiar with the evolutionary discussion will discover no new arguments *pro* or *con* in Father Wassmann's lectures,

he will find, first, some interesting illustrations drawn from the author's specialty—entomology—which seem to indicate "the formation of *new species, genera, and families*" (p. 13); secondly, he will probably find nowhere else within the same compass so clear, methodical, and all-around satisfactory a presentation of what is said by experts for and against the evolution of organic types.

About two-thirds of the volume is devoted to the report of the so-called Berlin Discussion. It must have been a dramatic spectacle, the Jesuit priest standing before a Berlinese audience of two thousand persons (mostly non- and anti-Catholics) and confronting eleven adversaries obviously determined, if not to confute, certainly to confound the defendant! It had been at first arranged that Father Wassmann should be allowed to speak at least twice: once after the first and again after the last speaker. By some unexpected change in the program which could hardly be called undesigned, Father Wassmann was given but one opportunity of rejoinder, and that was after his opponents had occupied three hours in objecting—from 8.30 to 11.30 P. M. One who has had no experience of the tactics of infidels would believe it, to say the least, improbable that distinguished men of science could fall into such illogical argumentation, much less could be guilty of such substitution of personal attack for reasoning as was manifested in this Berlin Discussion. The unbiased reader will find it very easy to agree with Father Wassmann's own modest summing-up of the event—that his eleven opponents did not collectively succeed in encountering and refuting him on the ground of science and philosophy; that some of them strayed from the subject and turned a scientific discussion into an attack on the Church, doing this in the name of free science; that they thus furnished the best proof that the opinions which Father Wassmann presented both as a Christian and a scientist do not clash with the principles of free research (p. 257).

We may note in conclusion that the translation is unusually well done into clear idomatic English. It would have been better had the translator adhered to a uniform method of giving the titles of German books. Sometimes they appear in German but usually in English. In the latter case the reader may be led to suppose that the book cited exists in English, whereas it seldom does. Thus Father Wassmann's other books which have not been translated are given in English title equally with those that have been translated. How shall the reader distinguish?

UNE ANGLAISE CONVERTIE. Par le Pere H. d'Arras. I. "Ma Conversion," recit autobiographique, par Madame d'Arras. II. Notes, souvenirs, correspondance. Introduction par la Comtesse R. de Courson. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie. 1909. Pp. xvi–212.

The story of Madame d'Arras' life was written at the solicitation of Mgr. Guillibert, Bishop of Fréjus and Toulon. He had heard her give some oral account of it, which so pleased him that he asked her for a written sketch of it with the understanding that he might publish the same after the lady's death. A commonplace reviewer, charmed at sight and sincerely thrilled by the spontaneous vivacity, pathos, genuine persuasion of the *récit autobiographique,* also groans in spirit over the conventional and stereotyped religiosity, undiluted cant, or something much similar, in the supplementary portions. And possible faults to the front, be it furthermore objected that a great deal of the supplementary matter belonged strictly to an inner family circle, and not, with propriety, to any outer public. At least not in the form now given; for whilst the convert's personal relation is of a throbbing reality that should move every susceptible Christian heart, and must humanly touch even heretics and unbelievers, with any particle of sentiment in their constitution: one is considerably doubtful whether the supplements will affect anybody but the "rigid righteous". Whereas, of course, the publican and sinner stand in much deeper need of edification.

Madame d'Arras, whose maiden name was Louisa Augusta Lechmere, was born at Worcester, 9 February, 1829; of a distinguished aristocratic lineage, resident in England from the time of the Norman conquest. Her immediate ancestors, however, were no longer Catholic, but even stiffly "bigoted" Protestants, and utterly intolerant of everything "Popish". Her mother withal, and a governess, later on the scene, were strongly Calvinistic. Indeed the objective background of the personal narrative brings out into full relief the *Protestant* sides of the Anglican Communion, generally regarded, until the Tractarian reaction. The singular contrast will also suggest itself herein, that although the "Church of England" has always looked askance at the "unchurched" Lutherans of Continental Europe, the Lutheran "orthodox" practice retained several features distinctly nearer to the Catholic usage (the cross, candles, Communion wafer, etc.) than the ordinary practice of Anglicans prior to Dr. Pusey and the Ritualists. Miss Lechmere's very first glimpse of Catholic rites, when as a child of nine years she visited Boulogne-sur-Mer, left a permanent impression on her observant faculties; till then accustomed to the "chill" of a meagre

bareness of worship. There was a richness, fervor, heartiness in the Catholic devotions that even a child, with eyes and ears alert, soon seized with joy. But Miss Lechmere underwent several phases of Anglican education before finally reaching the Catholic centre. Her Anglican confirmation, strangely enough, since her parents were such radical Protestants in doctrine, occurred in the "advancing" Ritualistic parish of *St. Paul, Knightsbridge*, London; this being the family residence quarter in town. Perhaps this merely reflects the frequent Anglican "comprehension", or "Broad Church" platform. At any rate, when Miss Lechmere answered in the accepted catechism fashion, *two* sacraments generally necessary to salvation, the Rev. "Puseyite" Vicar corrected: "Yes . . . but there are five other sacraments." In like manner, her manual of instruction for Holy Communion detailed a broadly "comprehensive" diversity of Anglican teachings on the *one* supreme Eucharist; ranging from "Real Presence" (High) to spiritually memorial, or Calvinistic and *Low*. At Brighton, however, when happening to attend a true Catholic Mass, about a twelvemonth after her Anglican confirmation, our subsequent convert experienced an unaccountable emotion during the solemnity of *elevation*: "I adored even still in ignorance of the Mass, and in spite of myself." Meanwhile, as the Tractarian reaction spread, her father one day declared in anger, he would shut his doors on any child of his that should ever presume to turn Catholic. Miss Lechmere became all the more eager to know the whole "secret" of Catholic doctrine; and so accidentally lighted on a controversial tract containing a convert's profession of faith. She forthwith attentively proceeded to *collate* the same, text for text from her "Protestant" Bible; with the result that she "admitted all the dogmas of Rome, without so much as having previously read a Catholic book or consulted a priest." Still she continued attending Anglican rites: wherein, to be sure, the Rev. *Puseyite* rector's sermons gave her "more and more the desire to embrace the Catholic religion." Notwithstanding the clause: "At that epoch, to become Catholic was deemed a great dishonor for the person and the family." Somewhat of the *social* caste therein implied, as by the "Four Hundred's dictum: 'You know, the *nice* people all belong to our (Episcopal) Church.'"

"At this juncture, we were sojourning in the country. There was a Catholic church in the neighborhood, but I knew not exactly where. In course of a walk one day, I stood face to face with this church. Imagine my feelings! I trembled with agitation at the thought of meeting a priest, and was already wondering: If he convinces me of the truth, what shall I do?" Whom she met, in fact,

was a certain *Brother Cenairs* (a Redemptorist): and through him, the Superior, Father Laus. On disclosing her desire of becoming a Catholic: "I remember being quite astonished that he did not immediately propose to baptize me. Ignorant as I then was, I understood that the Catholic priests did everything to gain converts, and received them irrespectively of conditions." Father Laus, instead, gave her good spiritual counsel, a prayer-book, crucifix, and catechism. She subsequently met an earnest Father Ludwig, of the same Order, who guided her in the successive steps toward Catholic profession. But some vehement family "storms" had also to be painfully, not far from "desperately" weathered, when her parents got wind of the situation. There was even downright blows on occasion (*mais des coups de poing*: not simply, gusts of the aforesaid "wind"). Even *materfamilias*, "usually so gentle, so kind, so tender, was greatly enraged. She tore from the wall a rosary once brought me from Ireland, for a *curio*, then, and overwhelmed me with reproaches . . . " Also imprecated *paterfamilias* the fires of hell, were this Catholic resolve to take effect in a child of his. When exiled to her room for a month, to be nourished with volumes violently opposing the Catholic faith, Miss Lechmere, contrary to the expected purpose of a book denouncing *Virgin Worship*, culled from it some beautiful praises to the Blessed Virgin, and shaped them into a small "office", all her own. "Since then, *Salve Regina* has ever been one of my favorite prayers." Next she was sent on a visit to an Anglican uncle, resident at Brampton Brian, Herefordshire. Here she enjoyed the happiness of kindred affections, but it was a vain move to check her Catholic resolve: the more because the Reverend uncle took even his Protestant religion chiefly in the way of a parson sportsman: "impassioned for the horses, the dogs, the sports; above all the chase to the fox." Whose *deacon* once bringing the message, an infirm parishioner desired to commune on the morrow: "Impossible for me to attend to this tomorrow. I leave at five in the morning, and the meet is scheduled at seven."

Her health becoming shattered by the emotional strains that she underwent, Miss Lechmere's parents (she was yet a minor) at last gave their conditional consent to her Catholic purpose; but she was first to receive thorough *Protestant* instruction: whose dispensing oracle should be none other than "Monsieur Bennett, clergyman of the Puseyite Church of St. Paul, Knightsbridge"; the same who had prepared her for Anglican confirmation. A sympathetic adviser, in many respects; yet insistent on his lines of opposition to the *Roman* Catholic Church. Miss Lechmere's one clinching an-

swer: "If the Church can have erred in her doctrine, the promise of Jesus Christ is void: the gates of hell have prevailed, and our Lord was not thus the Son of God." Monsieur Bennett also *confessed* his "Romish" ward; but much to her surprise, the *forms* he did use were identical with those in a Catholic manual she had received from Redemptorist Father Ludwig: Monsieur Bennett having simply *pasted* the like in his Anglican volume! In conclusion of the confession, she was bidden to read the "protestation of St. Francis of Sales, borrowed from *Garden of the Soul*." Whilst this Puseyite clergyman allowed her to believe, if she chose, in Purgatory and prayers for the dead, he still personally pronounced *en chaire*: "There is no such thing as Purgatory, however consoling the belief therein"! As touching the absolution, this, it appears, had to be deferred (in those days) to the Anglican Bishop of London. Her penance, absolution or none, was to fast through Lent until six in the evening; daily rising at five. His Anglican Successorship to the See of London, just then, was nothing of a Ritualist, and "seemed to have no very lofty idea of his power to absolve. I am not sure that I had much faith in it myself, indeed; but I should have done almost anything, at the moment, for a little repose and peace of soul."

Eventually, when twenty-one years old, she was permitted to consult a Catholic priest with a view to practical decision. "Dr. Wiseman, at that time Apostolic Vicar, afterward Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster," was "the only priest in whom they had any confidence"; and it was arranged for Miss Lechmere to meet him. Even here, some hitches occurred: Mrs. Lechmere would neither allow a Catholic person to darken her doors, by way of escort; nor lend her carriage, nor otherwise enable her daughter to visit Dr. Wiseman consistently with British decorum. A note to him resolved the dilemma: he would send a Catholic gentleman, in a carriage . . . "The course of true love never did run smooth!" When Miss Lechmere started to meet this conveyance, at a point agreed, the *rendez-vous* failed; and by sheer "Providence" of luck, in the mixed London throng thereafter, she "hailed" a carriage that possibly might be the one at issue; and so it proved. The subsequent steps were all successful: some temporal difficulties notwithstanding: the convert's "whole fortune", at a certain pass, amounting to three shillings and sixpence. Her first Communion occurred on a Saturday, 14 June, 1850. Several years later, she "espoused Monsieur d'Arras, a Catholic full of faith, devoted to the cause of Pope and King." Her family became reconciled, in a measure; though she was disinherited, barring a stinted indirect "settlement".

Three of her four children were destined to Church vocations: Father Henry d'Arras, who first "wore the cassock in 1880"; a daughter Marguerite, in the Carmelite Order; another daughter, with "Little Sisters of the Poor."

Apart from the phrasing and exaggerated "religiosity", as to some it would appear in the added chapters, these, too, contain passages of salutary merit. One can roundly subscribe the following comment, referring to the delight of Madame d'Arras in the "major offices and liturgical prayers of the Church": "I have scant use for all those booklets of sentimental devotion, wherein you find nothing substantial; *spiritual pastry*, were I fain to style them. People go to Mass with these tracts; flit from one sentiment to another, instead of nourishing their souls with the magnificent prayers of Holy Mass, the prayers of the Church herself, so powerfully assisting our conjunction with the priest. And then the Psalms! I never hear *In exitu Israel* without profound emotion: methinks every word a right theme for meditation."

Madame d'Arras "died in the Lord", on 31 October, 1907. Monseigneur Guillibert applies to her Saint Paul's commendation: *Charissimam quae multum laboravit in Domino.* W. P.

THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By Tilmann Pesch, S.J. Translated from the German by M. C. McLaren. London: Sands & Co.; St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder. 1909. Pp. xiv–637.

A SPIRITUAL CANTICLE OF THE SOUL AND THE BRIDEGROOM CHRIST. By St. John of the Cross. Translated by David Lewis. Introduction by Benedict Zimmerman. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1909. Pp. xxiv–317.

PSYCHOLOGIE DES MYSTIQUES CHRETIENS. Poeme de la Conscience: Dante et les Mystiques. Par Jules Pacheu. Paris: Perrin & Cie. 1909. Pp. 400.

If mysticism is, as some authorities define it, "the love of God", then are all reasonable Christians, in so far as they love God, mystics, and all saints who love God in an eminent degree the living masters and the examples of mysticism. Among the saints, however, some more than others possess the power and the providential vocation to analyze their own mystical experience, the causes, and conditions, that lead up to and the laws that prevail within the state of highest love or closest union of the soul with God. Of the saints most gifted in this way were St. Ignatius of Loyola and St. John of the Cross. The former embodied his science of divine

love in the Book of the Exercises. The latter embodied his in three works entitled *The Ascent of Mount Carmel, The Dark Night of the Soul*, and *The Spiritual Canticle of the Soul*. The volume above, entitled *The Philosophy of Life*, is constructed on the basis laid down by St. Ignatius. Most of our readers will probably know of the late Tilmann Pesch through his voluminous scholastic writings — the *Cursus Lacensis* and the *Welträthsel*. All who are familiar with these writings are aware that their author was not simply a learned expositor of scholasticism. He was this, but he was more. The very exuberance of his style, both Latin and German, pointed him out as an overflowing, an outgoing character —a man in whom the love element, the mystical in the true sense of the term, dominated, controlled, directed the mind, the visual, the speculative faculty. It is well that he has left us in his *Philosophy of Life* the expression of this practical side of his personality. Calling it practical, we do not mean to ignore, much less to deny, its theoretical and expository character. Like the *sacra doctrina* of the Master, St. Thomas, whom he knew and loved so well, on whose writings he commented so wisely and so abundantly, his science is here *speculativa sed eminenter practica*. He has taken the book of his other and more immediate master, Ignatius, as his basis and starting-point, and upon it he has constructed a Philosophy of Life. The "Exercises", however, furnish only the ground plan and the broad ideas that pervade the superstructure. These ideas he has moulded and fashioned into manifold shapes, while within and around them he has built countless others drawn from many sources—Scripture, theology, philosophy, science, literature, personal experience. The book is a collection of "thoughts" following the soul's orbit—its journey from and back to God, pursuing "the Way", Christ, and terminating in union with God Himself through perfect love. There are more than a hundred and eighty chapters—enough to outline without attempting to exhaust a large variety of subjects and furnishing abundant food for meditation or reflective reading and oral instructions.

The translation is on the whole well done, clear, and readable. Here and there it might be made more faithful. For instance, at page 20 where what apparently is meant for some of Fichte's teachings the text says, "I postulate myself", etc. *Posit* is what Fichte says, which is not the same as *postulate*. At page iv Bishop Kneipp is mentioned. The lowly apostle of the *Wasserkur* would have deprecated so lofty a title, even though in his latter days he did wear the purple of a *Hausprelat*, a monsignor.

The *Spiritual Canticle* embodies the culmination of the philosophy of life as conceived and wrought out by that master of mystical science, St. John of the Cross. His preceding works, *The Ascent* and *The Dark Night,* systematize the truths and laws that concern the soul's passage from sin by repentance and mortification (*via purgativa*) unto the life of solid virtue (*via illuminativa*). The present volume treats principally of the highest stage of the spiritual life on earth—that which is attained by generous and heroic souls—the life of conscious union with God. The Spiritual Canticle consists of forty stanzas which may be said to contain an abridgment of the Song of Songs, and therefore to picture under the Scriptural symbolism of espousals the blessedness of the soul that has attained to union with God. The stanzas were composed by St. John during his imprisonment at Toledo (December, 1577, to August, 1578). At the request of the Carmelite religious whom he directed he wrote a continuous commentary on the poem—interpreting each line and expression. This commentary is presented in the above volume, the translation being substantially that of Mr. Lewis's second edition, with a luminous introduction by Father Zimmerman. The work embodies the supreme "philosophy of life", the highest wisdom. Few are chosen of the many called to this sublime life. The priest whose vocation it may be to guide the elected few can, it need hardly be said, do nothing more secure than follow the direction of so experienced a leader as St. John of the Cross.

M. Pacheu's *Psychologie des Mystiques* is a description of mystical experience in its broadest significance; as embracing, that is, the inner phenomena of the spiritual, the supernatural, life in all its stages — purgation, illumination, and union. The groundwork and the principal materials are taken from the *Divina Commedia* of Dante, and the Book of the Exercises of St. Ignatius. The facts gathered from these classics of the spiritual life are amplified and illustrated by matter drawn from the other great mystical writers, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Teresa, St. John of the Cross, and many others. The work, as we have just indicated, is for the most part descriptive. The author has another volume preparing in which he purposes giving a critical psychological analysis of the mystical experiences described in the volume at hand. The latter, however, is an independent work and may be recommended for its luminous treatment of the subject, and its reverent and thoroughly Catholic spirit.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. By the Rev. Michael Cronin, M. A., D. D., Professor, Cloncliffe College, Dublin. Vol. I. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son; New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1909.

LEHRBUCH DER NATIONALOEKONOMIE. Von Heinrich Pesch, S. J. B. I–II. Freiburg, St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder. 1909.

The German work here introduced is probably the most comprehensive and thorough treatise on political economy in that language, and one may search the kindred literature in the other languages without coming upon its equal. Political economy, when rightly viewed, is a science "subaltern" to Ethics, that is, it is the development of ethical principles applied to the establishment and maintenance of public well-being. It is therefore rooted in and logically grows out of moral philosophy. The German language is fairly well supplied with works on the latter root-science. Not so with English. Heretofore, we have had no single work in which the science of ethics is adequately treated.

Happily in the English book above introduced we find the first of what promises to supply the long-felt need of a comprehensive treatment of ethical foundations solid enough to support an economic superstructure such as is embodied in the German work before us. The first four chapters of the volume cover the ground familiar to the student of scholastic philosophy—human acts, their final end, the specific distinction of good and evil. This portion is, of course, almost exclusively expository of fundamental concepts—the metaphysics and psychology of morals. With the next chapter—on the moral criteria—the student approaches the more controverted questions, and as the ensuing chapters unfold he finds himself in the midst of conflict, where his adversaries of to-day and yesterday press upon him from every side—foes with modern weapons, sharp-shooters with breach-loaders, at ready command. Freedom and morality, duty, hedonism, utilitarianism, evolutionism, the moral faculty, intuitionism—the mere mention of these chapteral headings suggests to the knowing reader what a field bristling with fierce battle is here outspread. The ensuing chapters on "synderesis", the consequences of morality, habits and virtues, cover ground more peaceful, troubled rather by skirmishing than by war; while the final chapters on law and rights close the work once more amidst the din of battle.

Throughout it all the student feels the security begotten of the consciousness that he has before him a leader who, while skilled in modern tactics and equipped with modern arms yet wears an armor wrought of mail that has been reforged according to the latest pro-

cesses of science and linked in a way that leaves fullest play to hand and limb. Or, to change the figure, the reader feels that the foundations on which he stands are of granite set on a base of granite; granite chiseled and fitted together block for block with an eye to modern purposes and demands. No competent student will read the chapters dealing especially with evolutionism—biological (Spencer, Leslie, Stephens), psychological (Mill, Bain, Royce), transcendental (Hegel, Green), without being impressed first with the clarity and justice with which the opposing theories are presented; secondly, with the thoroughness of the criticism; thirdly, with the author's mastery of his own principles, and the keenness with which he distinguishes the error from the truth in his adversaries' opinions, utilizing the one while discarding the other.

The foundations are here laid deep, broad, and solid—proportionate to the weighty structure of special Ethics, with its important individual and social questions, and to the economic problems, such as are discussed in the German volumes introduced above.

The first volume of Father Pesch's work appeared some four years ago and was then described in the REVIEW. The second volume has but recently been published, it having been delayed by the author's illness. Father Pesch evolves his science, it need hardly be said, right out of its philosophical principles. He begins with the relations of man to his natural environment—man as "lord of the world" through labor; and in society; the ministry of nature. These relations involve the conceptions of wants, goods, value, exchange, etc.—economic ideas which are carefully analyzed at the opening of the first volume. Society and sociology take the next place in order—occasion here being given to compare the excessive evolutionistic theories of society with a saner philosophical construction. The roots and support of the social organism—the family, the state, and private property—are in turn examined in the light of old principles and new views. The foregoing topics occupy almost half of the first volume. The second half is devoted to a comprehensive study of economic activities and their organization—individualism, socialism, and "solidarity", being the central ideas—and to the science of economics in its ideal structure, laws, and method.

The general aim of the first volume is therefore to lead up critically and constructively to the specific end of economic theory—the general well-being of a nation. The whole of the second volume is engaged with the study of the essence and the causes of that welfare. *In was besteht der Volkswohlstand und wie ensteht er?* The answer to this large double question is carried through five gen-

erous chapters: 1. The older economic theories (the Mercantile, Physiocratic, Industrial or Individualistic, and Collectivist; over against these Father Pesch establishes his own—"the social-labor system", as he calls it—the system of coöperation or solidarity); 2. the public weal as effectively attained under the latter system; 3. the concrete determination of public welfare in the individual nation; 4. the land and national well-being—climate, soil, geographical territory; 5. the people and welfare—problems of population, Malthusianism, race and nationality, popular health, education, religion, morality, "the classes and the masses". It will be noticed from the foregoing outline that the present portion of the work is confined to general politico-economic activity and theories. The special organization thereof on the lines of production and exchange and the sub-departments thereof will be treated of in a future volume; upon which will follow other volumes devoted to special industries, finance, statistics, etc.—volumes to be prepared by specialists in these studies. The breadth and comprehensiveness of the entire program are thus apparent. The imposing foundations thus far laid down assure the strength of the future edifice.

GRADUALBUCH. Auszug Haus der Editio Vaticana, mit Choralnoten, Violinschluessel, geeigneter Transposition, Uebersetzung der Texte und Rubriken. Herausgegeben von Dr. Karl Weinmann. Regensburg, Rome, New York, Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet. (Typographers of the Holy Apostolic See and of the S. Congregation of Rites.) 1909. Pp. 396–128–134.

We have said a good deal of late about making the liturgy accessible to the intelligent appreciation of the faithful. What is true of the language is true also of the form of musical notation employed in the Vatican edition of the Gradual. That a typical form of worship and sacramental ministration, prepared for the universal Church in the centre of Catholicity, Rome, should have a language and a script or cypher, which is in a sense cosmopolitan, and which therefore serves as a common medium between the leaders of the Catholic army in every nation, thus safeguarding the standard of unity to which all must conform, is surely reasonable; nay, it reminds us of the divine wisdom and the evangelical promise which marks the Church of Christ as the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic institution established by Him on earth for the guidance and salvation of men of every nation and race. But when we press the eternal usefulness of this measure so far as to insist that the faithful should join the priest in prayer and listen to his ritual instruc-

tions exclusively in a tongue which they do not understand, and which the greater number of priests will not, and in many cases can not, interpret to them in their native speech, then we exhibit one of those saddening phenomena of institutional sectarianism which would substitute formalities for sincere and useful realities, and which confound lip-service of uniform sound with real unity of belief and worship. What we contend for in the use of ritual in the administration of the Sacraments, applies in some measure to the use of the Vatican Gradual, which is to further congregational chant as well as understanding of the liturgy, unity of sacred action and decorum in the public services of the Church. Our singers are not Roman or Italian seminarists, who make their living in the service of chantries and endowed vestries. They are young men who are engaged in some useful trade or profession, or they are schoolboys whose parents have to support them. They cannot give the time to learn Latin with any hope of understanding the liturgical text which they are to sing, even if their own vernacular were, like the Italian tongue, much closer related to the Latin than it is.

In view of this indifference in those who are to worship in the Latin rite, it must be considered a wholesome measure, likely to help toward carrying out the purpose of the Pontifical legislation, to have the vernacular accompany the Latin text in the authorized chant books, and to replace the archaic, square notation, by the five-line stave with notes which our young people can read like the music which they learn in the schools. This is what the Pustets have done for their German patrons. They have likewise recognized that it is altogether impracticable, not to say extravagant because of the needless expense, and an obstacle to the actual introduction of the Roman chant, to find it printed in a volume which the mere holding of requires much strength and courage on the part of the singer; it also takes money needlessly out of his pocket, for a big bulk of paper and print, a large proportion of which he does not, can not, use in his whole life-course as a chanter.

We therefore welcome Dr. Weinmann's *Gradualbuch* as remedying both the above-mentioned inconveniences, and we strongly recommend a like version for the use of English choirmasters and chanters. The *Gradualbuch* is an excerpt from the *Editio Vaticana*. Its practical features emphasized are: 1. It contains only such chants as suffice to answer the common liturgical needs and conditions of the Church. For extraordinary and local circumstances the complete edition can easily be substituted. 2. The chants are written in the familiar keys of modern music, and are therefore transposed to a middle pitch usually tending toward the lower manual, and with

an eye to actual practice. Most organists in case of need, will find it easy to alter the transposition into a higher or lower key. 3. The common objection that such transposition interferes with the melodic line and the freedom of phrasing claimed for the Gregorian or choral chant, is met, at least to a great extent, by the retention of the old form of square notation, and by the absence of rhythmic and dynamic marks, which thus leaves the chanter at liberty to follow the traditional changes of phrasing and sustaining. 4. An interlinear translation of the Latin text gives the chanter an opportunity of understanding and appreciating what he sings; and this simple device has unquestionably a decided influence on the manner of his chanting the Latin. "Psallere cum corde" is impossible for those who have no idea of the meaning of the words they sing. 5. The responses of the Gradual, such as the *Tractus*, which are intended for soloists are given merely as text, since they may be recited on a single note; or, if variations are called for on special occasions, they are easily mastered by a soloist chanter. 6. And, last of all, this Gradual, which answers all the ordinary needs throughout the liturgical year, is much cheaper than the bulky editions now in hand, although we are not unmindful of Dr. F. X. Mathias's *Epitome ex Editione Vaticana* which adopts the modern notation.

CAEREMONIAE MISSARUM SOLEMNIUM ET PONTIFICALIUM aliarumque functionum ecclesiasticarum. Opera Georgii Schober, C. SS. R. Editio altera revisa et aucta. Ratisbonae, Romae, Neo Eboraci et Cincinnati: Sumptibus, chartis et typis Friderici Pustet. 1909. Pp. 427.

THE HOLY SACRIFICE AND ITS CEREMONIES. An explanation of its mystical and liturgical meaning. By M. C. Nieuwbarn, O. P., S. T. L. Translated by L. M. Bouman. London: Burns & Oates; New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1909. Pp. 111.

The late Redemptorist Father Schober has left us as a monument of careful industry some Missal and Breviary studies, which, whilst in part representing revisions and recastings of works outlined by St. Alphonsus, serve the student of liturgy as permanent sources of authentic information concerning the rubrics and their proper interpretation. Father Joseph Aertnys, the veteran theologian, has revised the present volume, adjusting some of the references and thereby adding to the authority of the manual in the details of quotation. It covers, besides the functions of solemn Mass, those of the Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, Pontifical Mass, and Solemn Vespers, for the various ministers engaged therein.

The occasion of the republication of the second book above listed gives us an opportunity of commenting briefly upon a liturgical study of the Holy Sacrifice which, whilst not alone in its scope or form, comes nevertheless as a timely addition to the English literature of the subject. The Dominican author briefly outlines the Catholic teaching on the Holy Mass, describes the ceremonies, illustrates the rite in its solemn action, and explains the use, forms, colors of the sacred vestments, the essential qualities of chalice, paten, and other instruments of the sacrificial worship. Whilst the method pursued in the exposition, as well as the ground covered, is largely the same as that of Father Gavin's excellent little manual, *The Sacrifice of the Mass*—an explanation of its doctrines, rubrics, and prayers—or Archbishop Howley's *Explanation of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass*, there is the difference of style and detail, not to mention the critical something which recalls Father Charles Cowley Clarke's *Liturgical Notes on the Mass*, or the more extensive survey of this subject by the Sulpician Father Vigourel in his *Synthetical Manual of Liturgy*, translated for us by Father John Nainfa of the Baltimore community.

DIRITTO E PERSONALITA UMANA NELLA STORIA DEL PENSIERO. Prof. Giorgio Del Vecchio. Pp. 32. Zamorani e Albertazza: Bologna.

L'ETICA EVOLUZIONISTA. Nota Critica. Prof. Giorgio Del Vecchio. Pp. 12. Rivista Italiana di Sociologia. Roma.

The first of these two pamphlets was intended to outline the course of the "Philosophy of Right" given by Prof. Del Vecchio at the University of Ferrara, and might aptly be entitled "The Historical Evolution of Ethical Ideas." In it the author furnishes a remarkable instance of the fact that "in moralibus finis saepe inficit opus"; for in it the author reveals the by no means commendable purpose of his otherwise laudable and conclusive vindication of the existence and the liberty of the personal *Ego* that Spencer so explicitly denies. This purpose is to supplant the evanescent *Ego* of Spencer with one that shall not only be permanent, but shall also be supreme as the only fount of cognition and the only source of law. In the author's view, the modern development is such as to demonstrate that "what is *a priori* in the order of cognition is also *a priori* in that of ethical jurisprudence", meaning that the individual, as such, is first and last in both. His *Ego*, therefore, is so very independent and so very free that it becomes in its sole self and in the most absolute manner the only and the ultimate founda-

tion and standard of all morality. The idea of a creating, and therefore justly ruling, God, or of any other extrinsic authoritative entity, is, in the mind of the author, only an illusory projection of this autonomous *Ego*; and, in the same view, this misleading figment of the imagination has in the past been a very heavy incubus on human progress, and still remains as a most troublesome heritage of ignorance and comparative imbecility, obscuring the true light of juridic science, and perpetuating, on the one hand, the most destructive traditions of servility, and on the other, that of usurped authority; and in both cases most lamentably impeding the proper onward progress of the race.

The author hails with delight what he considers to be the already accomplished intellectual vindication of this *Ego* by Kant and Fichte, but deeply deplores the lagging behind of practical science with regard to its more speculative congener, and also bewails the annoying persistence with which we retain the slavish, degrading idea that man may, after all, have a master, and that there may perhaps be some extrinsically adjudicated punishments and rewards concerning which it would be well to take timely thought.

The principal thesis of the book is hopelessly at variance with consciousness, reason, and fact; and it is accordingly labored and obscure. Yet the work as a whole is not altogether devoid of ingenuity or of erudition, the part devoted to the mutual relations of Philosophy and Jurisprudence and their respective historical developments giving especial evidence of studied elaboration.

The author finds that in the ancient civilizations Philosophy and Jurisprudence were amalgamated and blended into one somewhat confused whole, rather than distinctly outlined in themselves, or accurately co-ordinated with respect to each other. Amongst the Greeks, philosophical ideas predominated; while the more practical Romans accented jurisprudence at the expense of any more explicit cultivation of purely speculative science; both Greek and Roman thought, however, finally flowing, to a great extent, together through the deep influence of Stoic Philosophy upon Roman juridic forms; its impressive rigidity fitting it well to be the practical norm of that sternly imposing people; and the "Jus Gentium" forming finally the magnificent synthesis of all that was best and highest in either Greek or Roman juridic conceptions, and remaining as the principal and classic fount of all subsequent civil ordination. Throughout, however, the individual was merged with the state, to an extent that almost elided his personal standing; this lack of clear distinction and of proper co-ordination being, in the mind of the author, the especially weak point in the whole of ancient juridical thought and practice.

With the appearance of Christianity, the author finds the first distinct assertion and acknowledgment of individual right and of personal dignity; but with it also he deplores the ascribing of what he considers a false cause for this supremely desirable effect. For he says that in this case the elevation of the individual was not due, as it should have been, to a recognition of man himself as the supreme and sufficient norm of all things whether rational or ethical, but to the immission of a divine element, coming from an overruling God, and demanding respect as such; thus leaving the really absolute autonomy and inherent supremacy of human nature as completely unrecognized as before.

Yet even this vicarious title to consideration was not long allowed to exert its beneficent practical influence in the direction of individual liberty; for—always according to the author—there soon entered an element more deplorable still, the element of self-assumed human authority, a factitious "Church", whose egotistic and ambitious prelates unwarrantably asserted their own necessity as guides for the practical development of this divine principle, and for the attainment of its connatural recompense in a future life, and thus riveted the ancient bonds of individual enslavement only more closely, more gallingly, and more hopelessly than before. Freedom could only come again when, not only these usurping human intermediaries, but also the very concept itself of any extrinsic norm or of any future sanction would have been ruthlessly cast aside. And after the long night of the dark and middle ages which inevitably followed upon such fundamentally erroneous principles, the author sees in the Renaissance and in the Reformation the first Samsonic struggles of the long-enchained *Ego* and the first flamings of a light that was to bring it at last to a finally effective vindication of long-deferred right. The Renaissance represents the struggles of the *Ego* toward the throne of supremacy in the cognitive order, struggles which became triumphs only with the explicit vindications of Kantism; the servitude of the ethical order being finally sundered and cast aside in the mighty upheaval of the Reformation; in which we are to see, therefore, the victorious *Ego's* final rupture and rejection of all his extrinsic moral fetters, and of all his heavenly, yet falsely, imposed moral bonds. The author naïvely admits that the revolution has not proved to be wholly complete either in the speculative or in the practical order; that systems of philosophy that should have excluded God still retain Him; and that the Reform forged a dogmatism not less absolute than that which it was supposed to destroy; but he as naïvely informs us that the present is not the time or the place to explain these facts which militate so strongly against his preconceived theory.

Supposing, however, the *Ego* to have been freed to the extent and in the manner described, it is said to have made still further progress, by becoming the dictator, and not the follower, in regard to the state; which relation the author rather strangely designates as "morality"; so that, in this view, positive human law is to be modeled upon human nature as this is known and interpreted by individual reason; and the *locus* of the juridic struggle is no longer to be between the Church and the Empire, but between the individual and civil society, between personal liberty and the corporate laws of the state.

As we have already indicated, the author is obliged to confess that this elaborately interwoven theory of the *Ego* in its nature, struggles, and destiny has always had its difficulties; being persistently shackled with forms derived from the old Greek and Latin days, from the odious Church, and from unduly encroaching civil enactments. But in addition to this we are told that a new and supremely perilous crisis awaited it at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Heretofore, it had only been neglected and ignored; but at the period in question its very existence was threatened by the dissolving and decomposing tendencies of empiric psychology, which denied to personality any substantial existence, and reduced it to the sum of coincident psychical states. Naturally enough, this philosophical upheaval, though valiantly resisted, had its reflex in the practical order; and led to the consistent denial of this fugitive *Ego* as the ultimate base of all law, and to the provisional substitution of historico-theoretical ideals of a shifting and extremely doubtful character.

The present state, therefore, of philosophico-juridical science, as described by the author is one of dislocation. Instead of a solid study of the true foundation in the *Ego*, one is now forced, we are told, to deal principally with the radically erroneous ideas and enactments of modern civil society, with the not remote danger of specifically juridic science being wholly disintegrated and dissipated in the stern, unpitying attrition of the positive sciences, or of meeting the even more ignoble fate of living on without identity in the historico-dogmatic *mélange* called sociology. The regeneration and resurrection of juridical science must await that of speculative philosophy in general. Both must free themselves at all cost from the ever more exacting and more peremptory demands of positivistic tendencies.

And here one meets with a faint outline of the author's second idea, his version of what is now so commonly and yet so inexactly called the "Concept of the World". He sees that his own *Ego*

has vast consequences, eliminating, as it does, all idea of a creation and of a Creator in the only comprehensible sense of these terms; and he also sees that in this line of negative distinction the positivistic attitude of some students of science is not less efficacious than his own. But while he looks calmly upon the supposedly final cancellation of God by the engines of positivism, he is dismayed at the prospect of his own *Ego* disappearing in the same general ruin, and would gladly stem the modern tide wherever it threatens to engulf his own cherished ideas, theories, and conceptions. We have already marked his emphatic protest against Spencer's empiric invasion of Ethics, and his motive in so doing is now plainly apparent, being nothing less than the substitution of his own *a priori Ego;* a purpose which the author himself admits to be as yet but very slightly effectuated. He terminates his analysis, nevertheless, with a rather faint act of faith in our human powers of resuscitation, and voices the hope that the human mind will yet recognize and assert its own primary position as the creator of knowledge and of right; and will, accordingly, regulate individual and social relations in a manner conformable to this fundamental conception; and he concludes this preliminary address with the assurance that he will bring to his teaching the sincere enthusiasm of his moral conscience, an assurance that would seem to indicate that the author had unconsciously fallen back into the old, time-honored ways of thinking and speaking, since it is by no means easy to see just what such an expression would mean in the professed terms of its author.

The tendencies revealed in this work are extremely important, since, in the professed domain of Ethics and of Law, they represent an obstinate refusal to recognize the only authority which can make either intelligible, the supreme authority of God Himself; and they likewise represent an equally determined denial of man's essentially dependent position, as well as that persistent desire and purpose to prove him supreme which has never been absent from human history, yet was never more widespread or more pronounced than now; linked, as they are, with the cognate creative powers claimed under Pragmatism and similar modern theories. Yet we feel that this simple exposition is all that is necessary or desirable here, since an adequate criticism covering, necessarily, the whole range of theoretical and practical science is manifestly impossible, while a few fundamental tenets of sane philosophy and a brief appeal to consciousness would form their all-sufficient refutation.

L'Etica Evoluzionista is nothing less than a critique of a critique of Spencer's psychologico-ethical system. It is a study of G. Sal-

vadori's work of the same title, which, in turn, is devoted to an interpretation and vindication of Spencer's ethical ideas. In considering this example of Salvadori's exegetical methods and results, Professor Del Vecchio renders two distinctly valuable services. He utters a valid protest against that unwarranted species of commentary which commends an author by changing him, and he accurately indicates some of the more grave defects which render the biologico-evolutionistic theory of ethical relations wholly unfit to serve as a basis for any scientific concept of morality. Incidentally, he also shows that Spencer himself and many of his followers were not wholly unconscious of these fatal faults of the system.

It is not difficult to discern the wide significance of Spencer's own admission that the doctrine of evolution did not serve him as a guide to the extent that he would have desired; and for those who wish accurately to understand the question—certainly fundamental in Ethics—of human personality with all its far-reaching consequences, the author introduces the following quotation from Spencer's *Principles of Psychology* (I, p. 501 ff.). "When, after a certain composite mass of emotion and thought has arisen in him, a man performs an action, he commonly asserts that he determined to perform the action; and by speaking *as if there were a mental self* [the italics are ours] present to his consciousness, yet not included in this composite mass of emotion and thought, he is led into the *error* of supposing that it was not this composite mass of emotion and thought which determined the action. . . . To say that the performance of the action is, therefore, the result of his free will, is to say that he determines the cohesions of the psychical states which arouse the action; and as these psychical states constitute himself at that moment, this is to say that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd. Their cohesions have been determined by experiences—the greater part of them, constituting what we call his natural character, by the experiences of antecedent organisms; and the rest by his own experiences. The changes which take place at each moment in his consciousness, and among others those that he is said to will, are produced by this infinitude of previous experiences registered in his nervous structure, coöperating with the immediate impressions on his senses: the effects of these combined factors being in every case qualified by the psychical state, general or local, of his organism." Del Vecchio very justly marvels, when, in open opposition to this explicit declaration, Salvadori, professing to interpret and explain his principal, says, "Without doubt there is in the Ego a new activity which evolves itself freely, and which cannot be considered as a merely passive product of past

generations and a simple result of physical and social environment." And the marvel increases when Salvadori again declares that "the doctrine of evolution does not tend to the negation, but in very truth to the affirmation of moral liberty and of responsibility."

All must agree here with Del Vecchio that these utterances of Spencer are hopelessly, because fundamentally, irreconcilable with those of Salvadori; that the antecedently determined *Ego* of the supposedly misunderstood Spencer is an essentially different concept from that of the freely acting agent of his interpreter; that this independent *Ego* and the personal liberty implied by its existence would, therefore, introduce a new and fundamentally differentiating element into Spencer's biologico-evolutionistic determinism; and that, as a final conclusion, the system of Spencer, which thus reduces the *Ego* to the mere sum of antecedently determined coincident psychical states, could never give the reason why that *Ego*, or any other, should ever be the subject of praise or blame, reward or punishment; or why, in fact, there should be any ethical system at all.

D. DEVER.

THE SACRAMENT OF DUTY, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Joseph McSorley, Paulist. New York: The Columbus Press. 1909. Pp. 284.

"To be cheerful, humble, honest, brave, constant, reverent; to wage ceaseless war against the myriad forms of selfishness which obstruct the path to the higher life; to care fervently for the Blessed Christ, and seek an ever-closer communion with the indwelling Divine Spirit; these are aims and endeavors which the soul indeed recognizes as its finest opportunities, but which the flesh grows weary of pursuing." Father McSorley writes, and writes well, from a desire to strengthen belief in these aims and ideals, to keep alive the realization of spiritual values, to foster the ambition to grow in reverence and hope and unselfishness, despite the discouragements that beset the struggle through life on earth. And for such end the essay, which clothes its purpose in manifold guise suited for gaining the attention of the moody and divers-minded reader, is better adapted than the moralist's treatise which appeals to men already convinced and fails most often to attract those whom it is chiefly intended to correct.

"Soul Blindness," the "Sacrament of Duty," "On Being Cheerful," "Open-Mindedness," "The Ideal Man," "The School of Paul," "God in the Soul," "Modern Life," and the epilogue upon "The Unconverted World," are themes which have close affinity, like cause and effect or substance and accidents. Whichever way we

read them they lead us to the same end, namely, the increased endeavor to be cheerful, humble, honest, brave, and reverent. The language which Father McSorley speaks is pure, discriminating, natural, and that is saying much for the value of a book that speaks of things spiritual to the man of the world.

Literary Chat.

The *Outlook* (11 December) has a keenly appreciative sketch of Father Tabb's life, under the title *Poet and Priest*. "Like Brother Azarias, whom he resembled in the quietness of his spirit and the shyness of his nature, Father Tabb was all his life out of the rush of affairs." Yet "apart from the world, his heart was deeply engaged with the fortunes of his kind. He had a rare genius for condensing his emotion or thought without sacrificing clarity or beauty. . . . A casual glance at the lyrics brings out his deep religious feeling, his passion for nature, and the refinement and purity of his sentiment." The writer illustrates by some lines quoted from Father Tabb's collection of poems, the deep sense of intimacy between the world of nature and the God who made it, expressed with a refinement of style and a spontaneity of feeling characteristic of the best art.

Father Tabb was an intimate friend of Sidney Lanier for many years, and their kindred tastes gave to the friendship a rare union of purpose in literary work. "Professor Bright, of Johns Hopkins University, who knew him well, describes him as frank and jovial, and the soul of wit in his intercourse with his friends. He saw the beautiful side of everything. . . He was an extremely exacting craftsman, unwilling that his little verses should go forth until they had received the last touch from his trained hand. Men of Father Tabb's temper, of his quietness of spirit, his genius for meditation, and his unworldliness of aim, are rare in any country. In this busy, hard-worked America of the twentieth century his little songs have come like rivulets of pure and refreshing water from a hidden fountain." This is true praise.

Among the edifying output of Franciscan literature in the English tongue must be mentioned an attractively printed little volume on the *Life, Virtues, and Miracles of Fr. Magin Catala, O.F.M.*, one of the Spanish missionaries who went to Mexico in 1786 and was later on active in the work of evangelization and colonization in California, and who has left a tradition among the natives which has earned him the title of the *Holy Man of Santa Clara*. Father Zephyrin Engelhardt is already known to our readers, not only as an indefatigable missionary, but also as a student who has opened up for the Catholic historian much that lay hidden in the scattered archives of the old missions in the far West. He is author of a volume *The Franciscans in California*, and another entitled *The Franciscans in Arizona*. Besides this he has written much on the subject of missionary work in general.

There is something to interest priests in Katherine Conway's stories, despite the fact that she aims in her books mainly at Catholic culture for women. "Father O'Connor" in *The Woman Who Never Did Wrong*, and the Rev. William Murray in *The Place That Was Kept*, give us character phases of clerical life which are real as well as edifying, and do much to keep up reverence and affection for the "Soggarth Aroon" where other things conspire to diminish that quality of Catholic faith. But the best things that have come from Miss Conway's pen are undoubtedly her practical lessons for

young women of our country and age, as contained in the *Family Sitting-Room Series.* (Flynn & Co., Boston.)

Dr. Thomas O'Hagan issues a little volume entitled *Essays, Literary, Critical, and Historical* (Author's edition, Toronto), in which he brings together some studies and interpretations of literature and history which have appeared in American periodicals at odd times. They are original and in places contain sharp criticisms of local methods in education. *The Degradation of Scholarship* is an arraignment of the Public and High Schools of Ontario which would strike the unbiased reader as somewhat overdrawn, if the author did not challenge its contradiction by offering proof of the inefficiency of the Provincial teachers and by citing from the reports statements of educational officials that seem to bear out his criticism.

A volume of superior merit as a text-book of Rhetoric is P. Nikolaus Schleiniger's *The Principles of Eloquence*, translated from an enlarged and revised edition of the Jesuit Father Karl Racke, by Joseph Skellon, with a preface by F. King, S.J. (Kegan Paul, London). In the section dealing with the arrangement of compositions, and in another treating of the mastery of the emotions, the author is especially clear and instructive. The selections are thoroughly Catholic, that is to say, they cover illustrations from lay orators of classical worth, among them Edmund Burke, Pitt, Lord Chatham, Lord Erskine, Lord Brougham, Grattan, Sheridan, O'Connell, Lord Beaconsfield, and Gladstone. A separate section is devoted to American orators, such as Patrick Henry, Sargent Prentiss, Webster, Clay, Seward, Lincoln. The list of spiritual orators includes Wiseman, Thomas Burke, Newman, Manning, Purcell, Spalding, Kenrick. Everything about the book, its form and contents alike, commend it to the use of students in seminaries and for private culture. (B. Herder.)

Steadily, if slowly, our didactic literature of Catholic philosophy is developing. Text-books, manuals, there are in many varieties. What has hitherto been lacking is a short outline of the history of philosophy. The demand has recently been supplied by Father Coppens, S.J., the well-known author of several other useful compendia. Within the limits of less than one hundred and fifty pages Father Coppens has succeeded in synopsizing the story of philosophy—Eastern, Greek, Roman, Patristic, Medieval, and Modern. This may sound incredible, but it is true none the less. Of course, not a great deal can be told within so narrow a compass of any particular system or thinker. Nevertheless, there is enough for an intelligent survey, enough for a text-book in the hands of a competent teacher, enough for an outline to be filled in by a professor, enough to introduce an intelligent reader to a larger work, like Turner's *History of Philosophy*, or Finlay-Stöckl's kindred work.

Here and there a critic might detect an exaggerated statement; as where it is asserted that Darwin in his theory supposed "that whatever can be imagined to have happened has actually occurred" (p. 118). This, of course, is hyperbole. A few other such blemishes might be pointed out. Again, Alfred Wallace is said not to have "included man in the series of evolution" (ib.). Wallace, we believe, excluded from the evolutionary process the *higher faculties* of man, not the human organism with its purely organic powers.

Although the Catholic press in France pours forth an incessant stream of books—religious and philosophical—very many, indeed most of which, are instructive and attractive, some of the older books of a generation past have not lost their hold on the reading public. There is, for instance, Père Gratry. His works, while perhaps not quite classical, seem to have taken permanent rootage. Quite recently his *Morale et la Loi de l'Histoire* has passed into its fourth edition (2 Vols., Paris: Téqui). Seeing that the work originally ap-

peared just as forty years ago, this may not be deemed a very remarkable perdurance. And yet its comparative longevity arrests attention and calls for an explanation. The latter may lie partly in the charm of style, though mainly it must be sought for in the principles and personal appeal which the work embodies and fulfills. Père Gratry was temperamentally drawn to those Catholic principles that answer immediately to the religious and the volitional elements of human nature. He saw as well as spontaneously felt those revealed truths that find their natural adjustment to man's will and feeling. While his appeal did not overlook the intellect it touched immediately the aspirations and ideal tendencies. It was human and personal. Hence its natural adaptation to the modern spirit, which in so far is not necessarily modernistic. The moral law and the law of history are in the work above mentioned shown to be co-extensive. The moral law of nature is seen to be the natural reflex of the law of the Gospel—do unto others as you would have them do unto you; and the latter is shown to be the law or principle on which the preservation and progress of human society depend. Without being explicitly so styled, the work is a Catholic philosophy of history—Catholic, that is, universal in compass; and Catholic in the sense that it builds upon the Catholic, that is, the natural, adjustment of human personality to God and the supernatural order, the *anima naturaliter Christiana*.

Under the title *Dieu, Lectures Théologiques,* Canon Berthé has arranged a catena of excerpts from the Fathers, Doctors, and eminent theologians of the Church, illustrating the Divine existence, nature, and attributes. The passages are arranged on the plan of the corresponding topics in St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*—the work, also, from which the greater part has been adapted. As a store-house of illustrative material representing the best thoughts of the masters the volume will be found useful and suggestive. The book has been neatly made up by Bloud et Cie. (Paris), the well-known publishers of series styled the "Library of Science and Religion," a series containing so many little treasure-troves of things valuable. Amongst the latest noteworthy accessions to the series are *Morale Scientifique et Morale Évangelique devant la Sociologie*, a brief essay by the eminent physician and professor (Montpelier) Dr. Grasset, on the relative efficacy of naturalistic and Christian ethics for healing the present social disorders; *La Survivance de l'Ame chez les Peuples non-civilisés*, a study in comparative religions, by M. Bros, establishing the belief in immortality prevailing amongst savage nations. The booklet is valuable for its compact mass of evidence. *Les Arguments de l'Athéisme*, by M. de la Paquerie, a succinct criticism of the antitheistic objections urged by Kant, Spencer, Hebert, Dantec, Büchner. Then there is *Petau*, a learned and luminous sketch of the works of the great Jesuit theologian Petavius, by the Abbé Jules Martin. Each of these neat and valuable little books—and many hundreds more of their kind—can be bought in Paris for half a franc! Surely wisdom in these days goes almost a begging for acceptance!

There are many good thoughts, practical and beautiful, in Mr. Lyman Abbott's recent little book *The Temple* (Macmillan Co.). "The body is the temple of a holy spirit which we have from God, whose offspring we are" (p. 170). What service the members of the body should render to the spirit, and the spirit to God, Mr. Abbott shows convincingly and attractively. An exacting critic might and should detect some Pelagianism in the author's theology, but a generous reviewer prefers to extoll the same views of what is and what may be made best in man—views which abound in the book. Let us give by way of example the following. The author is speaking of the tongue: "Words are like the carbon in the electric lamp. The carbon burns out, but the electric current endures and makes luminous a new carbon . . . . Words are at once most transient and most permanent. They are vehicles of life. The vehicle perishes, the life remains. We forget the word; we re-

tain the influence which it has communicated." Then, after developing this thought in relation to public speech, he goes on to show how "private instruction is more effective when it is practicable to give it," and he illustrates the fact by the experience of the "political campaigner," "the evangelist," the college "tutorial system," and "the confessional which gives untold strength to the Roman Catholic Church because in the confessional an individual gives counsel to an individual". Further on he continues: "Society —that kind of society in which men talk much and say nothing—is a great waste of time, the more pitiable because it is also a waste of opportunity. To converse ought to mean what the dictionaries tell us it does primarily mean—to live with another. Conversation ought to be a real interchange of life. What is the sense of this modern reserve which forbids us from talking about the matters which really interest us? Is it because we have so little life to impart? Do we keep the curtains of our soul down lest the world should see how empty the rooms are?" Then, after some illustrations of personal experience to the contrary, he adds: "When I get in literature a glimpse, to me a very enticing glimpse, of the French *salon* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I wonder whether the woman's clubs of the twentieth century are any improvement—are not rather the reverse. In the one was the play of an intellectual conversation, a real communication of life; in the other there are the silent audience and a learned or eloquent speaker—sometimes" (p. 48).

The Macmillans publish a new volume by Jacob A. Riis, author of *Children of the Tenements, The Battle with the Slums, How the Other Half Lives,* and other works which have done much to light up the dark recesses toward which scores of prophetic moralists and writers on Sociology have turned their melancholy microscopes to discover and discuss theories, but theories for which we needed actual data as well as the courage to face and trace the sad conditions to concrete causes. These data Mr. Riis furnished in his earlier books, and it has earned for him the approbation of the nation of his adoption, as well as the proud gratitude of the Danish sovereign and people to whose educational influence he largely owes the qualities of mind and heart that have been exercised in fostering among us republican ideals of a high standard. It has sometimes been said that Mr. Riis is a partisan; that he allows religious or anti-religious proselytism to mar his philanthropic work. His writings demonstrate the contrary. We say demonstrate, not merely assert. For there is in them that quality of strong personal presence which rarely deceives, least of all when the writer discusses not merely the objective results of study or professional experience, but the intimate motives of his action as they reveal themselves in his antecedents and in the circumstances of his ordinary life. We have the story of his life by himself, not told indeed in a spirit of self-adulation, but as a record of experience well calculated to help the young American toward the true realization of our national ideal of citizenship. The *Making of an American Citizen,* which is practically an autobiography of Mr. Riis, is to our mind one of the most healthful books that can be put into the hands of an American youth. And the new volume, *The Old Town,* might be called a supplement inasmuch as it furnishes the reader of the former volume with the background of the story of the Danish youth who, true to the instincts of a love for right, gave vent to his ambition to do, and to be helpful, amid the novel and trying circumstances which beset the immigrant. The volume is redolent of his love for home, his sympathy with the stranger, his eagerness to face new and difficult conditions, and a generous intolerance of shams and of the temporising spirit that delays reform.

The Old Town is the story of Ribe, a town on the North Frisian coast of Jutland, where the author was born. It gives us a picture of a quaint and honest civilization that is fast passing away, memories of boyhood's simple

joys, of places and persons in which local traditions and time-honored national virtues are represented. There are touches throughout the book of respectful allusions to ancient Catholic customs still surviving in the life of the town, grouped about the old Dom Kirche with its altar and its symbols of pre-Reformation days. It is a book that breathes reverence and unaffected loyalty for whatever is true and good and fair; and for that we commend its reading to those who, to their respect for the old things and tolerance for the right things, even when they are not labeled according to our own notions, join the appreciation of American freedom in its recognition of honest speech and square dealing.

Father Schuyler's *The Courage of Christ* is the first of a series of four small volumes that are to analyze and interpret the characteristic virtues of Our Lord's Sacred Humanity, with a view to engage our imitation of the Master who became Man that He might show us the Way that leads to eternal life. It is a timely as well as an attractive theme, for in the midst of the manifold secondary issues that are foisted on our attention as the essentials of happiness, everything that urges a return to the simple ideal of Christ's life and teaching is of much value. Courage in action, in mental suffering, in physical suffering, and the courage that can sustain the hope of eternal joys by perseverance in well-doing, is a fundamental quality—the gift sometimes of inheritance, to be guarded from turning into pride of life; sometimes as the fruit of prayer, to be daily renewed, lest the thorns choke its growth. The book is handsomely furnished. (Peter Reilly, Philadelphia.)

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Les Confessions de Saint Augustin. Traduction d'Arnauld d'Andilly. Introduction et Notes par Victor Giraud. Paris: Bloud et Cie. 1910. Pp. 323. Pr. 1 fr. 20.

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Epitres de Saint Paul. Leçons d'exégèse. Par C. Tousaint. I. Lettres aux Thessaloniciens, aux Galates, aux Corinthiens. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie. 1910. Pp. xxiv-506. Pr. 5 frs.

De Scriptura Sacra. J. V. Bainvel. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie. 1910. Pp. 214. Pr. 3 fr. 25.

De Sacrificio Missae, Tractatus asceticus continens praxim attente, devote, et reverenter celebrandi. Auctore Joanne Bona, Presb. Card. Ord. Cisterc. Cum Approbatione Rev. Ordinariatus Ratisbon. Ratisbonae, Romae, Neo Eboraci, et Cincinnati: Sumptibus et Typis Friderici Pustet. MDCCCCIX. Pp. xvi-208.

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LE PAIN DES PETITS. Explication dialoguée du Catéchisme par l'Abbé E. Duplessy. Tome I: Le Symbole des Apôtres. Tome II: Les Commandements. Paris: P. Téqui. 1909. Pp.: Tome I, xiv-255; Tome II, 255. Prix, 2 fr. le vol.

NON MOECHABERIS. Disquisitiones medicae in usum Confessariorum. Fr. A. Gemelli, O.F.M., Doctor Medicinae et Chirurgiae, Prof. ad. honorarius hystologiae, Lector Medicinae Pastoralis. Rome, New York, Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet. 1910. Pp. 248. Price, $1.50.

A COMPENDIUM OF CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION. By the Very Rev. Angelo Raineri. Edited by the Rev. John Hagan, D.D., Vice Rector, Irish College, Rome. In two Volumes. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1909. Pp. 573. Price, $4.25 *net.*

COURAGE OF CHRIST. By Henry C. Schuyler, S.T.L. Philadelphia: Peter Reilly; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. 1909. Pp. 127. Price, $0.50 *net*, postage 6c extra.

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